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Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia Said 'Under Threat'

LD0812121894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1050 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 8 Dec (ITAR-TASS)—"The international Contact Group,which is at the sharp end of handling settlement of the Bosnian crisis, is concerned at the situation which arising around the UNPROFOR," said Aleksandr Zotov, the Russian president's special envoy, speaking to the ITAR-TASS correspondent in an exclusive interview today. In his assessment "the very peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is under threat since the UNPROFOR are not able to carry out the functions which are not part of their duty in an inappropriate atmosphere." [sentence as received]

In the afternoon A. Zotov and other members of the "Contact Group" are flying out to Sarajevo from Zagreb. "We wish to familiarize ourselves again with the situation and to carry out an analysis of it from the point of view of the results of the Brussels conference of the [Contact] Group foreign ministers and the CSCE Budapest summit," he said.

Members of the group are planning to meet with the Muslim authorities alone in Sarajevo.

"We will stay with the policy of not involving in the talks partners who do not accept the Contact Group's plan. That is our strategy for now," the high-ranking Russian diplomat said.

Asked by ITAR-TASS whether the international mediators in Sarajevo intend to present changes to the peace plan, including the possibility that the Bosnian Serbs may be allowed to establish a confederation with Yugoslavia, A. Zotov said: "No changes have been made to the plan. As for the question of confederation, this idea originated in the Geneva 'package'. There is some scope here for interpretation, but the key question is the attainment of a balanced and equitable constitutional settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which does not discriminate against anybody. Essentially, this means that something which is allowed to one party cannot be forbidden to another."

"We as a group," A. Zotov stressed, "are not placing any undue emphasis on the question of a confederation since we do not wish to arouse suspicions that the territorial integrity of Bosnia is under threat or that the very existence of this state is being undermined. I am not speaking now about Russia's position as such, but I am adhering to formulations which were jointly adopted. These were confirmed at the Brussels ministerial conference. However, the Geneva 'package' does also state clearly that all special links, which segments of the Bosnian union may form with neighboring states, are not someone's monopoly but something which everybody is entitled to. Nobody is being told to form or not to form a confederation. What we are saying is that if things do go in that direction, then everybody—Muslims, Croats, and Serbs—have equal rights in this respect."

The international mediators are expected to spend the whole of today and part of tomorrow in Sarajevo, and then return to Zagreb Friday evening.

Moscow's Peacekeeping Role in CIS, CSCE Status Analyzed

MK0712115094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian, No. 61, 4-11 Dec 94 p 5

[Article by Pavel Podlesnyy, division chief, Russian Academy of Sciences Europe Institute: "Who Is To Be a Peacekeeper in the CIS?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Along with such sensitive subjects as the expansion of NATO and the situation in Bosnia, the Budapest summit, which has just ended, also discussed the CSCE's peacekeeping role. The pertinence of this question is related to the debate, which has been going on for one and a half years now, around Russia's implementation of peacekeeping operations in the CIS. The problem of interrelations in this area between Russia, on one hand, and the United Nations and the CSCE on the other, has still been rather acute. Nagorno-Karabakh has become a test of the possibilities for its resolution and a place for coordinating the efforts of international organizations and Russia.

The role of the CSCE in searching for ways to resolve conflict situations on the territory of the former Soviet Union has been rather modest to date. It has mainly involved the sending of CSCE mission to "hot spots" (Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova) or to areas where they could potentially emerge (Crimea-Ukraine) and also promoting the rights of Russian-speakers (Estonia, Latvia).

On 24 March 1992 the CSCE Council of Ministers adopted a decision to create a "Minsk Group" including representatives of Russia, the United States, France, the FRG, Italy, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Sweden, and Belorussia [Belarus] with the view to organizing peacekeeping efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including the convening of an international conference on Karabakh under CSCE auspices. Along with this, active intermediary efforts were undertaken by both individual states (Russia, Iran, France, Turkey) and on a bilateral basis (Russia-Kazakhstan). The "Minsk Group," however, failed to reach any visible breakthrough regulating the conflict. The decision to send 600 military observers to the conflict zone remained unrealized, nor was an international conference called. A certain role here was played by the CSCE's organizational shortfalls; the deep differences in the positions of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh about ways of settling the conflict; the course of combat operations on the battlefields; and the impact on the situation

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the part of third states. The cease- fire agreement reached 13 May 1994 became mostly the result of activity by Russia which, furthermore, offered to introduce its peacekeeping contingent to disengage the warring sides' forces.

On 16 September 1994, however, the CSCE Sherpas Committee made a decision which, in spite of the verbal tribute "to Russia's decisive contribution to advancing a comprehensive settlement of the conflict," placed the thrust on a "single coordinated plan" of action within the "Minsk Group." It also provided for an urgent packaging of CSCE multinational peacekeeping forces and sending them to the conflict zone. Such an approach met with criticism on the Russian side which believed that it was fraught with disrupting the emerging settlement process.

There is ample reason for such fears. The formation of a multinational contingent in itself will take considerable time if only because there are serious differences about its composition. In particular, Armenia rejects the idea of Turkish troops being included in it. Financing of the operation also poses problems. The United States, for example, while offering material and technical provisions and observers, is ready to bear only 9 percent of CSCE costs for peacekeeping operations in this region.

At least two conclusions can be made from this.

First, no international structure—even the most perfect—is free from the impact of geopolitical, strategic, and economic interests of the states constituting it. In this instance, for the West, and also some states neighboring Russia, primarily Turkey, the CSCE is a sufficiently convenient political instrument to counteract a strengthening of Russia's positions in the Transcaucasus, especially in Azerbaijan.

Second, there is an obvious need to create an effective CSCE peacekeeping potential, consolidate its role in averting international conflicts, and adjust the relations between the conference on one hand, and the United Nations, NATO, and a number of regional organizations in Europe on the other. With such a potential, the CSCE could play its role in the CIS. But this is a rather long and complex process.

Furthermore, the question arises: Should Russia concentrate on pitting the CSCE against NATO's upcoming expansion in a situation when it has neither effective levers to affect the CSCE nor allies in this cause? The complicated interrelations between Russia and the "Minsk Group" over Karabakh only confirm that it is hardly worthwhile seeing a strengthening of CSCE functions as a panacea in resolving those complex problems which Russia has encountered today in Europe, to a large extent through its own fault (internal instability, the absence of a coherent foreign policy concept, the inability effectively to resolve the situation in Chechnya, and so forth).

Budapest CSCE Forum Seen as Victory for Clinton

MK0712103094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by Mikhail Karpov under the "Diplomacy" rubric: "NATO Ascent, CSCE Decline? Clinton Wins American and Russian Presidents' Duel Over Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Whatever words the politicians participating in the Budapest CSCE forum use to camouflage the differences revealed, they can hardly succeed. The differences are so distinct that they can be seen with the naked eye and from a great distance. Coming into sharp relief is a standoff between the Russian Federation and the United States, between Yeltsin and Clinton. The only thing that they perhaps shared was the opinion that the CSCE's role in the prevention and elimination of conflicts should be enhanced. Even so, both had their own point of view on this. [passage omitted]

Sad as it is, the following picture is emerging. While Russia was busy dismantling the Soviet imperial policy, they were singing praises to it and hinting at a speedy and full integration into the world and European community. As soon as there was nothing left to dismantle, and one had to put together a new foreign policy of an independent Russia, the railroad crossbar was lowered right in its face. Just like it was suggested that Russia calmly observe how its former allies, thoughtfully let under the bar, were integrating.

The situation, from the West's point of view, is almost without risk of loss: they set the terms, we have to observe them. They are masters, we are supplicants. Should the supplicant fail to comply with the masters' terms, he has only himself to blame. As he will have the label of splitter tacked onto him at the same time.

And this eventuality appears to be in store for us. Rhetorical questions are already being heard: Is the attempt to create a durable peaceful system in Europe following the end of confrontation between East and West close to failure? And all because of Russian arrogance, they would say. True, some people still hope that Moscow's stance is no more than the desire to buy time, to hike the price of its consent for the expansion of NATO. Still fresh in the mind are Gromyko's vetoes and delays without refusing to hold talks.

No one would believe even for a second that Russia's main interests do not go beyond equal partnership. They discern behind its stance this plan: the right to vote in the West, no outside interference in the East.

The most dramatic CSCE summit is over. It leaves in its wake more questions than answers. One thing is perhaps clear: At the focus was European security, and in approaching it the overseas interpretation has gained the upper hand.

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Saddam Husayn Message to Yeltsin Says Iraq 'Trusts Russia'

LD0712145594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1400 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Babkin and Andrey Serov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Dec—In a personal message to Boris Yeltsin, [Iraqi President] Saddam Husayn welcomed the Russian initiative in resolving the issue of lessening the sanctions with regard to Iraq. This was reported today by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz, who brought the message to Moscow. He told journalists after his meeting with Andrey Kozyrev that the Iraqi leadership "trusts Russia" and thinks highly of Moscow's efforts to get constructive relations going between Baghdad and the UN Security Council.

"Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations relating to the UN Security Council resolutions," T. 'Aziz said. "The last step was made on 10 November during the visit of A. Kozyrev to Baghdad, when Iraq officially declared recognition of the sovereignty and frontiers of Kuwait." The deputy prime minister is convinced that the Security Council should now "actively and seriously act to lift the sanctions." According to him, Baghdad is placing "great hopes in Russia's objective and active role in this field." As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it is in Russia's power to play this role, Tariq 'Aziz stressed.

Tariq 'Aziz Visit 'Undertaken on Baghdad's Initiative'

LD0712131594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The current visit by Iraq's Premier Tariq Aziz to Moscow was undertaken on Baghdad's initiative Viktor Posuvalyuk, a Russian deputy foreign minister, has declared in an interview with Interfax. As Posuvalyuk reported, 'Aziz, who will meet with Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev Wednesday, has brought a personal message from Iraq's President Saddam Husayn to his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin.

According to Posuvalyuk, 'Aziz voiced the desire to stop over in Moscow on his way to New York, where "on December 10-12, the head of the UN Commission on Iraq's Disarmament Rolf Ekkeus will report about Baghdad's compliance with the disarmament clauses of the UN Security Council resolution 687.

As the diplomat said, "the Russian side decided to receive 'Aziz as a follow-up to the dialogue started between Moscow and Baghdad so that they could check compliance with all other provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions ."

Posuvalyuk believes that further steps in this direction should be taken "on a double track". "On the one side, Baghdad should meet the international community demands honestly, scrupulously, and in full volume. And on the other, Russia and some other Security Council members want the Security Council to full its pledges by properly reacting to Iraq's constructive, positive steps," Posuvalyuk concluded.

Soskovets Seen Behind 'Aziz Visit

MM0712210594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by Elmar Guseynov: "Saddam Husayn's Envoy Knows When To Fly to Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leaders of Russia's foreign policy were still on their way back from Budapest, where Russian diplomacy had been dealt a telling blow by the NATO leaders. Meanwhile, an aircraft carrying Iraqi Vice Premier Tariq 'Aziz—living symbol of one of our Foreign Ministry's most embarrassing and outrageous schemes of recent times—was approaching Moscow.

It is Tariq 'Aziz's third trip to Moscow in the last four months. Like the previous ones, it is cunningly described by Smolenskaya Square [Foreign Ministry HQ] spokesmen as "unscheduled." Saddam Husayn's envoy brought a letter from his boss to the Russian president. During a possible audience with the Russian top leadership 'Aziz intends to personally hand the letter to the addressee. There is a suggestion that Saddam's message is a reply to a letter from the Russian president which was received in Baghdad two or three days ago.

Russia has taken the trouble to be the world's chief protector of Saddam Husayn's regime. It appears that our diplpomats are prepared to risk open confrontation with the Western leaders to that end.

Clearly, the Foreign Ministry has begun to regard as unconvincing the oft-repeated references of late to the $7 billion, which Iraq owes Russia and which Baghdad would be unlikely to be able or to want to give back even after the lifting of sanctions. On the eve of the present visit Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk placed greater emphasis on another argument, not a new one either. The gist of it is that following the lifting of sanctions Western firms, above all, U.S., British, and French, will make a beeline for Iraq. The Russian diplomats' strategy is to get an early foot in the door of the Iraq's markets by helping that country to get the sanctions lifted.

But if the Americans are going to pour into Iraq once sanctions are lifted, why should Russia help them, the Americans, by initiating the lifting of sanctions from Iraq at the United Nations?

It was no accident that the Iraqi vice premier's arrival coincided with an obvious cooling of relations between Russia and the West.

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The thing is that even the hint of a possible revival of confrontation between West and East is the only chance for a cornered Baghdad regime to play the old game of the cold war period again. Which is to rely on the help of one of the antagonists and thus escape from the blind alley which Saddam and his military adventures have led the country into.

That is why 'Aziz was in such a hurry to get to Moscow immediately after what was for the Kremlin's politicians an unfortunate episode in Budapest, in order to be able to exploit, while the going was good, the conflict situation that had arisen there and the Russians' obvious annoyance at the Western leaders' latest steps.

The attempt to revive what was for Russia such a ruinous friendship with the Baghdad regime is clearly not a personal initiative on the part of Andrey Kozyrev. An analysis of recent events suggests that Minister Kozyrev is simply becoming increasingly wary of the mood of certain circles in the Russian leadership who are confident that a return to some of the foreign policy guidelines of the Soviet period is possible.

Typical of this is the episode during the visit to Japan in November by Oleg Soskovets, Russian Government first vice premier. At a meeting with Japanese parliamentary deputies who were members of the "Friends of Russia" association, Soskovets obtained assurances from these legislators that they would contribute to the lifting of the sanctions from Iraq. So that Russia could get Baghdad to pay its debts and revive trade and economic cooperation with it.

Oleg Soskovets is the member of the government responsible for the defense complex, in particular, the "Rosvooruzheniye" firm, the leaders of which have publicly declared their intention to revive and even increase weapons supplies to Iraq by a factor of 10, if Andrey Kozyrev gets the sanctions lifted from Baghdad. And it was Oleg Soskovets who petitioned in Japan for the allocation of $300 million in credits for the "LUKoil" oil company. The very company which, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is vigorously working on plans with the Iraqis, who are full of promises, for the assimilation of massive capital investments in Iraq.

The nastiest thing that could happen now is if Smolenskaya Square, smarting from the recent skirmishes with the Americans and under pressure from the pro-Iraqi lobby, were to promise Saddam something that Russian cannot and, indeed, should not take on.

Kozyrev Urges UN To Show Flexibility on Sanctions on Iraq

LD0712152794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1429 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Babkin and Andrey Serov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Dec—Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev today urged the UN Security Council to show flexibility in solving the question of easing sanctions in relation to Iraq. He was discussing this problem today with Deputy Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz. The Baghdad representative visited Moscow prior to the examination in the United Nations of a report on complying with the decisions of the world community regarding the elimination of the consequences of the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict.

The head of the Russian foreign policy department stated that there are forces within the Security Council who place their stakes on pressure in solving political problems. "If the UN Security Council wants to be flexible, and not to act as a tool for satisfying internal political demands in one country or another, it has to be able to react to the fulfillment of its decisions," A. Kozyrev stressed. "We are saying that the Security Council should not be a sledgehammer but a more flexible tool."

A. Kozyrev said that at the meeting with Tariq 'Aziz the question of the Kuwaiti citizens who disappeared without trace during the crisis in the Persian Gulf zone was examined. He noted that Dmitriy Volkogonov, who has, according to the Russian minister, great experience in solving such problems, would be visiting Baghdad in the near future.

As is known, failure to solve the issue of the missing Kuwaiti citizens has been one of the obstacles to a settlement of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations. The removal of this problem would deprive the opponents of the easing of anti-Iraqi sanctions of one more argument.

INA Reports 'Aziz-Kozyrev News Conference

JN0712205994 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1955 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Dec (INA)— Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz met in Moscow today with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The two explored avenues for increased cooperation between Iraq and Russia. They also discussed coordination at the UN Security Council and the reciprocity that the Council should show toward Iraq's fulfillment of its obligations toward UN Security Council resolutions.

The talks, according to the Iraqi News Agency's correspondent in Moscow, were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cordiality.

At the conlcusion of the talks, Mr. Tariq 'Aziz told a joint news conference he was visiting Russia to advance bilateral coordination with the aim of closing the sanctions chapter.

Iraq, said 'Aziz, is working with Russia toward removal of the economic sanctions, in view of the country's important status as a permanent Council member. Russia, he added, has credibility and a role to play in the

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region. The deputy prime minister said Iraq highly values Russia's attempts to promote normal, positive, and constructive ties between Iraq and the Council. He cited Andrey Kozyrev's efforts and the two trips he has made to Baghdad.

'Aziz noted that President Saddam Husayn two days ago received a message from President Boris Yeltsin and that he carried a reply message welcoming Russia's sincere efforts and its interest in contributing to a resolution of outstanding issues.

On his side, Mr. Kozyrev told the news conference he thought the Iraqi leadership was serious and that Iraq will go on cooperating with the Security Council and the Special Commission in the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Kozyrev underlined the need for the Security Council to be a diplomatic and political channel rather than a hammer brandished over the heads of others.

Kozyrev said that Russia works to return Iraq to the international community so that it may assume the natural place that it deserves and that the UN Security Council should positively respond to the steps Iraq has taken, particularly the decision to recognize Kuwait and its borders and Iraq's cooperation with Rolf Ekeus.

Kozyrev said he regrets that there are countries in the UN Security Council which support the UN Security Council's recourse to pressure against other countries and transform it into a tool of coercion at a time the Council should remain an instrument for political and diplomatic action.

Andrey Kozyrev said that Russia is working at the present time with Iraq to solve the issue of the missing Kuwaitis. He said he believes the Iraqi command is serious in settling this humanitarian issue, and that he has sensed this during his recent meeting with President Saddam Husayn.

Many Russian and foreign correspondents accredited in Moscow attended the joint news conference.

Tariq 'Aziz arrived in Moscow yesterday evening on a working visit.

Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk has stated that Russia has an interest in promoting its relations with Iraq and the other Arab Gulf countries not only for purely trade motives as some disseminate although we naturally do not want to lag behind with respect to other countries in winning beneficial trade deals with Iraq in the future, but also to establish security and peace in the region.

Posuvalyuk said: What will happen immediately following the settlement of the crisis with Iraq is that the United States itself, the European countries, and major Third World countries will rush toward the Iraqi market. He said that the reports some papers disseminate that Moscow's only concern is to have Iraq pay back its debts are completely untrue.

Volkogonov To Visit Baghdad To Investigate Missing Kuwaitis

LD0712172694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1632 GMT 7 Dec 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Member of the Russian Presidential Council, Chairman of the Commission for Finding Missing Citizens under the Russian president, General Dmitriy Volkogonov will leave for Baghdad, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said after his meeting with Iraqi Vice Premier Tariq 'Aziz in Moscow today.

Kozyrev said he and 'Aziz had agreed on the issue during their meeting today. Kozyrev said that he had earlier discussed the mission with Volkogonov who agreed to carry it out.

Kozyrev said Volkogonov would help Iraq to find documents clarifying the fate of Kuwaiti residents missing since the Iraqi- Kuwaiti war.

"This is a humanitarian problem and Iraqi President Saddam Husayn is interested in resolving it as soon as possible," Kozyrev said.

He said the issue of missing Kuwaiti residents had been discussed during the visit of Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin to Kuwait. "Participation of such a professional as General Volkogonov will be a real contribution of Russia to resolving the problem," Kozyrev added.

He stressed that Russia was in favor of the UN Security Council "adequately reacting" to "positive moves" taken by Iraq the main of which consisted in recognizing sovereignty and the international borders of Kuwait. He said Moscow wanted the UN Security Council to show that it appreciated the peace decisions of the Iraqi leaders at its next meeting.

Kozyrev said he believed that the UN Security Council must be more flexible. He regretted that some members of the UN Security Council supported "use of sanctions and tough pressure without applying political methods."

He said that "to become efficient the UN Security Council must insist on its decisions and flexibly react to positive moves for carrying its decisions out instead of trying to satisfy interior political requests of this or that country."

Kozyrev said he considered it as very important that Baghdad had recognized the Kuwaiti borders and cooperated with the UN commission for disarming Iraq.

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He said cooperation was rather efficient though more could be done in this sphere.

'Aziz said that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn had received a message from Russian President Boris Yeltsin two days ago. He said he had brought with him a response of Saddam Husayn to the message of the Russian president. 'Aziz said the Iraqi president welcomed the Russian initiative and highly appraised "personal efforts by Andrey Kozyrev" during his two recent visits to Baghdad.

'Aziz said that his talks with "his dear friend" Andrey Kozyrev were "useful and constructive."

'Aziz said Baghdad was ready to cooperate with the UN for resolving all issues raised by the UN Security Council.

He said Iraq welcomed participation of Russia in settling the problems. "We trust Russia and its efforts for ensuring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf zone," he stressed.

'Aziz said the main task for Iraq was to have the economic blockade lifted. "The UN Security Council must take active and serious actions for lifting the economic sanctions against Iraq. We hope that Russia will play an objective role on the issue. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is capable of playing such role," he stressed.

CSCE Conference Outcome Viewed

MM0812110794 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by Yevgeniy Popov under the rubric "From the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Album": "How Did the Meeting of CSCE Countries' Leaders in Budapest End? European Chimera"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] So a new abbreviation has been coined in Budapest: The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. We can practise the pronunciation right now even though the new acronym does not into circulation until 1 January 1995 when, as Ostankino announced, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will have to change its name to nothing less than...the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe!

This is the contribution by our country's diplomatic service to the Budapest summit. The Russian president brought with him a whole package of plans marked by the optimistic vision of transforming the CSCE into a "small European United Nations" with an influential Russian role in it. In short, "May Day, a true birthday of the heart" [quote from Gogol—used to denote something wonderful—fbis], plus—the "Code of Conduct of the States in the Military-Political Sphere," the "Program for Europe's Path into the 21st Century," the "Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II"... [passage omitted]

Surely never before have the claims of Russian diplomacy to an autonomous role in international affairs supposedly not dependent on the United States seemed so unconvincing and simply pathetic as they did in Budapest. This is not surprising: What kind of international prestige can a country have when it cannot guarantee even its own future, as the recent events in Chechnya have very eloquently confirmed?

As for the concept of the "cold peace" invented by the president's team of speechwriters, this does not clarify the essence of the matter, instead it clouds it. Ultimately, even a "cold peace" would indeed be far better than a good argument, as the Russian proverb has it, and would certainly be better than the flames of discord in the vast number of hot spots on the map of Europe right now. The problem is that the almost 50 years of postwar stability in Europe (a highly fragile stability at times, during the years of the Cold War, but stability nevertheless) have been replaced by a period of geopolitical cataclysms of enormous destructive force.

These cataclysms are by no means spontaneous in character. We know who the forces are who destroyed the USSR and thus brought down one of the Atlases who bore the whole system of postwar security on his shoulders. These forces effectively undermined the foundation on which the activity of the CSCE was based. [passage omitted]

The Budapest meeting's results were quite meager. It approved the declaration with the grand-sounding name "Toward political partnership in the new era," a declaration which is not binding on anyone or anything. After the emotional skirmish between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan a decision was adopted at the conference on the creation of peacemaking forces which will be sent to Nagornyy Karabakh—not Russian forces but international ones.

The Bosnian conflict was the central theme of the discussions in Budapest (along with the question of expanding NATO). The Russian delegation blocked the adoption of an anti-Serb resolution. The Western countries in turn ignored Russia's objections to NATO's eastward expansion. (passage omitted]

You can give whatever name you like to a summit of states' leaders meeting regularly, once every two years, for a discussion of topical European problems but in the prevailing situation you can hardly expect, unfortunately, to transform the CSCE (or OSCE) into a "full-fledged European organization with a reliable legal basis," as envisaged by Russia's set of hare-brained plans.

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Russian Role Viewed

MM0812122794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Dec 94 First Edition p 1, 2

[Article by Vladimir Kuznechevskiy: "Program for Europe in the 21st Century. The Confrontation of Military Blocs Began With Warsaw. The History of the Post-Soviet World Began With Budapest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The history of the post-Soviet world began with Budapest. That will mostly likely be the conclusion reached by future analysts, whose task it will be—in a far calmer atmosphere than ourselves, the contemporaries of the disintegration of the bipolar model of the world—to assess the main stages of the evolution of the new world order following the Soviet Union's departure from the international political arena. They will analyze the 20 concluding documents adopted at the Budapest summit, including the main final document—the Political Declaration "Toward Full Partnership in the New Era," which proclaims: "We intend to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, so that it plays a key role, meeting the challenges of the 21st century."

These analysts will hardly attach great significance to the panicky passages in the Russian press about the "dramatic clash" between the Russian and U.S. Presidents, the allegedly "severe defeat for Russian diplomacy," and suchlike assertions.

Bill Clinton, who led the Democratic Party to catastrophe in the mid-term elections, is today forced to look firm vis-a-vis Russia in the eyes of the Republican majority in Congress. After all, he has to think of the near future, both his own and his party's. In the final analysis, it is obvious that it is not in the interests of the Washington establishment—nor indeed of all the great states of West Europe—to move over to confrontation in relations with Russia for the sake of the immediate acceptance of Poland into NATO, for example. B. Yeltsin did not "discover America" when he said in Budapest that his country is predestined to be the "Eastern pillar of European security and stability." So it was, and so it shall be.

This role of Russia's can never be fulfilled by all the East European states put together. In the 20th century it was convincingly proven during World Wars I and II from just where the threat to European (and world) security and stability could come. Not from Russia, of course, but from quite another state.

The emotions of the moment will pass, but the impetuses formulated and declared by the two presidents at the Budapest summit will begin to receive development in the practical construction of the new world order. One year from now no one will even remember what Lech Walesa said in Budapest in objecting to the Russian president. But the world and Europe will take account above all of the cornerstones of the future world order which were laid in Budapest by the United States and Russia. And for all the equal remoteness of these pillars international relations will be constructed by common efforts in the area existing between them.

Of course, this process is by no means straightforward, and will be fairly protracted. Not everything will be achieved at the first stage. Even in Budapest far from everything was achieved, despite the abundance of documents adopted specifying individual provisions of the Political Declaration and defining the role, place, and tasks of the CSCE in the construction of the future political face of Europe (incidentally, in line with Russia's proposal, even this organ itself will no longer be called a "Conference" but the "Organization for Security and Cooperation").

All the same, this was not the most important result of the summit. It was the fact that a practical beginning was made to the blueprint "Program for Europe on the Road to the 21st Century" proposed by B. Yeltsin. The whole tone in which the Budapest summit is being covered in the Western press—especially the American press—also speaks in favor of such a conclusion. And this tone is far calmer, and I would say, more sober, than that of the Russian press.

'Two Views' of CSCE Future Emerge

MM0712125294 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by RIA NOVOSTI political observer Vladimir Simonov: "Budapest Summit: Opponents and Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest—It would only be half true to say, after the summit meeting in Budapest, that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) emerged from it considerably strengthened, with a new, more important role in the continent's affairs. In general this assessment of the results of the forum is, of course, true. However, behind it lie two different views of the organization's main task, and therefore of its future.

Indeed, if you leaf through the eight pages of the political declaration adopted in Budapest you can find there plenty of fine words about the Conference. "We believe in the central role of the CSCE in building a secure and stable Europe.... The CSCE is the security structure embracing states from Vancouver to Vladivostok...."

But the speeches of many Western leaders, and above all President Clinton, left the impression that they would like to adapt the CSCE to the task of fulfilling one very timely, significant, but at the same time extremely narrow mission—that of being a firefighter for regional conflicts. Maintaining all-European security in general should be the concern of NATO, in their opinion. It is NATO that should send out the signals on where and when the CSCE should direct its peacekeepers.

This concept was presented in its most naked form in Warren Christopher's remarks. "I think," the U.S. secretary of state said, "that reinforcing the CSCE with

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some kind of peacekeeping formula which would enable the Conference to use various countries' armed forces could make it more effective...."

This thesis in itself prompts no objections. Suffice it to say that in the hall in the Novotel hotel where the Budapest meeting was taking place there was dead silence as the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina compared the cruel, unproductive actions of the United Nations and NATO in his country to a surgical operation without anesthetic. Indeed, ethnic wars have become the curse of Europe in the nineties, and it is high time to endow the CSCE with peacekeeping potential.

As Boris Yeltsin noted in his speech, Russia is perhaps more aware of the need for this than anyone on the European continent. It is squeezed in a ring of mini-wars adjacent to its borders, and naturally it would be glad to share the responsibility for peacekeeping operations—both politically and financially—with other CSCE members.

At the same time the attempts by the United States and its supporters to have the Conference don the armor solely of some kind of mercenary knight who pacifies Europe's patrimonies, obeying every gesture of its North Atlantic master, appear to reek of bloc attitudes. They reveal the desire to make one group of the CSCE's equal states more equal than others. They would like to keep the others, Russia in particular, at a distance from European affairs, or even simply in isolation. It is also clear that this scenario for making the CSCE the vassal of NATO headquarters in Brussels belittles this unique organization, while its substantial potential for turning Europe into a real peace zone remains unexploited.

It is not difficult to grasp that behind this clash of opinions on whether the CSCE should concern itself primarily with peacekeeping or, as Yeltsin sees it, should certainly do that but at the same time create a new model of all-European security for the 21st century—behind this lies the conflict, now severely exacerbated, over NATO's expansion eastward.

The North Atlantic bloc at Russia's borders. Unfortunately, this thesis kept recurring in Budapest, albeit in different kinds of camouflage, in the speeches of Western leaders. Thus, FRG Chancellor Kohl called the gradual expansion of NATO "a part of the all-European concept of security." President Clinton also gave a stern warning that nobody outside NATO will have a veto on its new members.

Maybe it was this persistence, bordering on stubbornness, that made Boris Yeltsin criticize the NATO expansion plan more sharply than ever before. In the president's opinion it could sow the seeds of distrust and create new demarcation zones.

In an interview with RIA NOVOSTI's correspondent, Andrey Kozyrev gave a more restrained and figurative interpretation of Moscow's position. We are not erecting barriers to the expansion of the North Atlantic alliance, but it should not be rushed through, the chief of the Russian foreign policy department warned. It is no use "skipping" all the rungs of the ladder at once, you should look before you leap. While categorically objecting to this destabilizing haste, Kozyrev at the same time suggested that "in principle Russia too could join NATO some day."

But it would be a mistake to think that Budapest was only a venue for clashes of opinion and position. The CSCE summit meeting largely justified the title of the political declaration adopted here—"Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era." It was as senior partners that Russia, the United States, and Britain chaired the ceremony in Budapest at which Ukraine, Belorussia [Belarus], and Kazakhstan adhered to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time five heads of state signed the Protocol on the Exchange of Instruments of Ratification on the START II Treaty.

If you think about it, this was a truly historic moment. The treaty which strips the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former USSR by nearly one-third has finally come into force. Now the next goal can be set—START III....

At one time, 10 years ago or so, this would have been a worldwide sensation. Today, both the participants and the invited journalists regarded the ceremony as something that goes without saying. We are indeed living in a new, more perfect world, a new Europe, and the 20 years since the CSCE's birth in Helsinki have not been in vain.

UN, CSCE Vetos Show Policy on Balkans Changed 'Drastically'

MM0812090094 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by Maksim Yusin: "Russian Diplomats Have a New Hobby—the Veto"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The late Andrey Gromyko would probably have been pleased with his heirs in the Russian Foreign Ministry. The traditions of "Mr. No," who used the Soviet veto at the slightest opportunity, live on in Smolenskaya Square.

Last week, for the first time since the end of the eighties, our country's representative at the United Nations blocked a Security Council draft resolution, reckoning that the text was too harsh toward the actions of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. Less than three days later, on Tuesday, in Budapest, the Russian diplomats, having acquired a taste for it, again used the veto—this time on a draft statement by the CSCE summit participants on the situation in Bosnia. Moscow's complaints were the traditional ones: the document was anti-Serb.

Russia was isolated once again, opposed to the vast majority of forum participants. It is indicative that in the discussion of the text of the statement Moscow was

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supported neither by its CIS neighbors, nor by Greece, which traditionally upholds Serbia's interests.

The Russian veto again highlighted the feeble and amorphous nature of the CSCE, whose effectiveness is paralyzed by the principle of consensus. World public opinion saw the Budapest meeting participants in a very bad light. The documents of the conference, which was convened to resolve security questions in Europe, did not reflect in any way the bloodiest conflict on the continent in the past 50 years, raging just a few hours' drive from the Hungarian capital.

One recalls Andrey Kozyrev's response only recently to the intransigent opposition's charges that he was reluctant to use the veto. He said something along the following lines: A diplomat's skill is not in using the veto whenever a dispute arises, but in being able to reach a compromise and reflect his country's viewpoint in international documents. One of two things: Either the minister has revised his view of the art of diplomacy, or Moscow's approach to the Balkan crisis has changed so drastically that it is now impossible to reach a compromise with partners in the United Nations and CSCE.

Yeltsin, Clinton Differences on NATO Expansion Viewed

MM0712131594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 First Edition p 1

[Commentary by Mikhail Shchipanov under "Topic of the Day" rubric: "Budapest—City of Peace. A Cold Peace? Russian and U.S. Presidents Views on CSCE's Role Have Diverged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin's speech delivered from the podium of the third CSCE summit was a revelation.

The Russian president rejected from the outset the different options for building a system of collective European security on the basis of blocs and coalitions, and made a resolute appeal to place at its heart the jointly produced "Program for Europe Into the 21st Century." It is this very program which should breathe life into the renewed CSCE and transform this consultative forum into an all-European organization with a reliable legal base.

However, even on the eve of the opening of the Budapest meeting it had become evident that our full-fledged, harmonious system of "building up" the CSCE will to a significant degree be weighed down by the NATO factor.

Any program to actually transform the CSCE into the leading regional organization will sit awkwardly with NATO's eastward expansion and the alliance's swallowing up of our former allies. Meantime, a communique from the NATO Council session finally dispelled any illusions about the possibility of somehow making the NATO status quo permanent. It became clear that the "Partnership for Peace" will not cure anybody of Atlantic fever.

As a matter of fact it turned out that the partnership is actually exclusively for Russia's benefit, which by dint of its influence and military potential could not in any way be accepted into the the North Atlantic alliance without changing the internal characteristic peculiar to this bloc. But for the East European countries, the "partnership" has simply become a stage on the way to their full membership of NATO. This means that for the majority of Europe hopes for stability and security guarantees would in the very near future be automatically linked to NATO and not to the CSCE. And as a result, any efforts by the conference to strengthen its influence on European affairs would inevitably be restricted by NATO's sphere of influence.

This situation is fundamentally unacceptable to Russia, which is why Boris Yeltsin took the liberty of assessing it fairly harshly: The plans to expand NATO may create new poles of delimitation instead of bringing European unity closer. The president did not start to decipher in any detail the actual concept of "poles of delimitation." However, the very fact that he spoke with such insistence about the CIS's increasing role in European affairs can very well be interpreted as illustrating another point in the president's report on the impossibility for a major power to live according to the laws of isolation. For "major power" we should, of course, read Russia, which does not intend to deprive itself of allies whatever the situation.

However, it was not hard to guess that Russia's attempts to somehow prevent NATO's expanding to the detriment of other, more representative European institutions would meet with determined resistance. For this reason not only was President Clinton quick to assure his audience that not one country outside of NATO will be given the right to veto the North Atlantic alliance's expansion, but his Polish colleague Walesa noted with great satisfaction that a new age had dawned when, as he said, no one can dictate to Poland what it should do.

In short, Russia appealed for Europe not to be plunged into a "cold war" and for past mistakes not to be repeated, and the United States promised to establish individual timetables for the neophytes' admission to NATO.

Thus, the CSCE's Budapest summit really posed more questions than it gave clear answers. And although Boris Yeltsin, clearly hinting at Washington, said that it was impermissible for the world's fate to be decided from one capital, Bill Clinton gave a clear demonstration in the Hungarian capital of his own influence and potential. Evidently, the era of political romanticism in the world really is passing. A period of sober appraisal of the processes taking place is upon us.

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Talk Assesses DPRK-U.S. Talks on Diplomatic Relations

SK0812070894 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Korean 1200 GMT 7 Dec 94

[Talk from the "Today's World" program by station commentator Aleksey Kondratyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] DPRK representatives and U.S. representatives have been holding talks in Washington. Our station commentator Aleksey Kondratyev writes:

A major topic of the current round of talks is for the two countries to open diplomatic missions in Pyongyang and Washington. The U.S.-DPRK treaty signed on 21 October in Geneva stipulates that diplomatic missions be exchanged. The United States and the DPRK have held unofficial contacts for the past few years on normalizing relations. For example, the diplomats of the United States and the DPRK held contacts in Beijing.

Normalization of bilateral relations is being discussed today. When strong relations are built between the United States and the DPRK, the situation on Northeast Asia will be stabilized significantly. This can be a diplomatic measure that will conclude the 1950-53 Korean War.

However, the current round of talks are of great importance in that normalization of relations may change the situation on the peninsula in earnest. This is because if Washington and Pyongyang establish diplomatic relations as a result of the current round of talks, this will provide prospects for reexamining the military and political structure on the peninsula.

First of all, North-South dialogue will be held more positively. Normalization of North-South relations will be a basic topic of discussion to resolve the pending issues, including denuclearization. Consequently, the future status of the U.S. Forces in the ROK will be dealt with appropriately, and relations between Japan and the DPRK will be normalized.

Tokyo has today declared that it intends to hold talks with Pyongyang. As I have pointed out repeatedly, this is a long-range problem: Only when relations between the United States and the DPRK are normalized completely, will such long-range problems be solved.

The United States and the DPRK are merely taking the first step toward establishing diplomatic relations. We should not forget that a complete agreement has yet to be reached on the [word indistinct] issue. Furthermore, each side assesses the bilateral talks differently: Pyongyang believes improving DPRK-U.S. relations is inevitable, while the United States assumes a cautious attitude.

Nevertheless, the United States entertains much expectations that the current round of talks will succeed.

U.S. Threat to Oil, Gas Sector Described

MM0812150594 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Richard Ovinnikov: "Up for Grabs Abroad. Where Our Energy Resources Are Disappearing To"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our wide open spaces always have been immensely rich in natural resources. This is particularly true of energy resources—the main motor of the modern economy. It was precisely on the basis of such a favorable natural resource situation that the Soviet Union occupied first place among the world's extractors of the most important energy sources—oil and gas, far outstripping the other producers. This mighty leap into a leadership position was achieved unaided. Extraction was on the whole carried out using nationally produced equipment, and the pipelines were also our own.

However, to the great pluses of these mammoth operations some fairly major minuses must be added. The abundance of cheap energy resources did not stimulate their economical consumption within the country. In turn, the proceeds from their export, amounting to the colossal sum of $200 billion, was used uninspiredly. We literally ate our way through this revenue. The only consolation is that we did at least channel them into our own needs. And here we are getting to the nub of the new problem.

After the collapse of the USSR the Russian Federation found itself in an unusual situation. The point was not that it had been left without any reserves of power. On the contrary, in this respect the Federation was lucky: Some 85-90 percent of the former union's energy resources proved to be on what is now Russian territory. What is unusual about the situation is something else—our resources have become a source of opportunities for other, chiefly Western, countries and companies.

It is no accident that the attraction of Russian energy sources for the West is turning into a mania. After the discovery in 1967 of a gigantic oil field in Alaska, whose exploitation was complicated by ecological problems, there have simply been no new comparable, globally significant reserves discovered. But the immense Russian reserves are far from exhausted. Russia does not have any competitors at all as regards reserves of natural gas. Our "Gazprom," which is the monopoly producer, possesses more than a third of the world's reserves of this energy raw material. It extracts twice as much gas as the West's seven largest power companies put together. Finally, it has 40 percent of the world's gas trade to its name.

But it is the very scale of the Russian energy reserves that really whets people's appetites. In October the U.S. magazine NEWSWEEK expressed this in the following way: "Foreign investors can no longer resist the temptation of the enormous unclaimed stores of cheap raw

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materials such as oil.... Russian resources are considered to be fantastically cheap." So the question is whether we will be allowed to steer our energy resources into Russia's revival or whether they will be snapped up by foreigners. Everything considered, the battle to maintain national control over our natural resources will not be easy.

The starting point was very favorable for the Russian Federation. At the end of 1991 foreign involvement in our oil sector was expressed in the following figures: As regards resources it accounted for only a thousandth (less than 0.1 percent) of the whole, and in oil extraction—a hundredth (less than 1 percent). In other words, the Russian Federation as an independent state started off with full control over its oil resources. The same situation obtained in our gas industry.

But in the last three years alarming signs have begun to increase. The very role of the Russian fuel and energy complex as master in its own home now has a question mark over it.

In order to obtain a more detailed analysis of the situation it is necessary to take into consideration the sector's production specifics. The technological process for exploiting oil and gas deposits basically has three stages: The first is the extraction of the raw material from the ground; the second—its transportation; and the third—the marketing of the finished product. The processing aspect will be left out of this article.

Now—where and how our national interests are affected in each of the aforementioned stages.

If we take the final stage—the sale of energy sources to consumers, Russia does, of course, have an interest in their being sold on external markets. The reason is obvious—the large returns. There are, however, two brakes on export. The first involves stopping the export of energy resources which starves our own industry and internal consumers of energy. The safety margin in this respect, at least as concerns oil, has gotten dangerously narrow, as over the past two years extraction of it has halved.

The second regulator is the question of where it is best to export. In the Soviet period a significant portion of energy sources flowed from Russia to the other union republics. When they became independent republics, this channel was maintained for a period of two years. However, in 1994 the export of oil and gas to CIS countries has been radically cut and has exacerbated their difficulties. The "surpluses" which were formed in this way were transferred to Western markets. This is, of course, a result of changed political preferences.

With regard to the extraction and transportation of energy resources, the main factor here is the wholesale reduction of internal investment. This began back in the days of Gorbachev when capital was withdrawn for short-term purposes. Owing to the subsequent collapse of the economies of the USSR and the Russian Federation, the situation has become even more acute. An inevitable result of the underfunding of the oil and gas complex has been the wholesale wear and depreciation of its extraction, transportation, and processing facilities. Ultimately this has resulted in a catastrophic increase in stoppages and accidents. Against this background, for the first time in the history of our country we elected to rely on foreign countries as a means to put the situation right. The West has now been called on to become a source of investment.

It would not, of course, be a bad thing if the Western countries and companies really did help us in this critical situation. It would do no harm to pay a decent price for this. There are, however, serious doubts that people in the said circles are actually thinking in terms of assistance. It is more likely that what is happening here is an attempt to exploit our problems for their own ends.

It is American fortune seekers—the oil and gas emissaries of private companies solidly supported by the U.S. state apparatus—who are most actively traveling Russia. This sends some of us into raptures of expectation. People are writing about the formation of a "Russian-American oil club," which, it is said, "is going full steam ahead." Anyone who believes that there are no subsidiary positions in the clubs, or that they are not for us, is naive. The indisputable facts convince us of the converse.

Fact one—the persistent growth of the scale and rate of foreign involvement. Let us take as an example the oil basin in the north of the European part of the country. Three years ago the American company Conoco set about opening up a deposit here with modest reserves of 16 million tonnes. This year, three powerful American companies (Texaco, Exxon, Amoco) have already formed a consortium in the region to develop oil reserves which are 20 times larger. It is said that only the tip of a rapidly growing iceberg is visible. The bulk of the Americans' activity is safely hidden from prying eyes by an absence of glasnost.

Fact two—the openly mercenary thrust of the American energy projects. For example, in July of last year the U.S. Export-Import Bank signed a framework agreement with the Russian authorities on a $2 billion credit for the oil and gas industry. This was, however, done on three strict conditions. First of all, the money is only being provided for the modernization of old, nonoperational wells. Such an investment avoids expenditure on prospecting, permits the use of existing serviceable infrastructure, and provides an opportunity to start pumping oil quickly. It is cheap but good.

Another condition of this credit is that essential new equipment and technologies should be exclusively American. This means that orders are taken away completely from our machine-building industry. There is one more condition: The borrowers reimburse the credit by exporting the extracted output to foreign countries, not

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the last of which will be the United States. That is, the Russian side loses the freedom to choose its markets. So who is helping whom?

The signing of specific agreements with 10 Russian oil and gas enterprises is proceeding at present on these cabalistic general terms. Another symptomatic example of that nature: The U.S. Export-Import Bank recently opened a line of credit to "Gazprom" worth $750 million. The stipulations were the same as usual: The new equipment must be American and the output must be exported to world markets. So here too the Russian side is in the gentle embrace of the boa.

Fact three—the unceremonious diktat with regard to the status and rights of the Russian business partners. It is known that the Western oil and gas concerns are foisting on the Russians their own system of expert appraisal of the resources. As a result, it seems that they have even forced agreement out of our largest oil producer—the "Lukoil" concern—for a 75-percent reduction in the volume of reserves under its control. So in this way our producers are at the stroke of a pen being reduced to the rank of junior partner in the deals. With regard to small Russian oil companies instances are known of foreigners buying up their resources for 0.6 percent of their real value.

Fact four—control over Russian energy resources is beginning to shift into foreign hands. Foreign capital has been permitted to own 9 percent of shares in "Gazprom." This is tolerable—but it is only the beginning. A campaign is already being conducted in the West—publicly, what is more—to get the Russian Government to privatize the package of "Gazprom" shares belonging to it (according to various information this accounts for between 40-45 percent of them). Then, it is said, "American institutional investors" in particular could buy them up. The permitted level of foreign involvement in "Lukoil" is 15 percent. However, foreign investors are using backdoor methods to increase their stakes. As the British journal THE ECONOMIST reports, couriers armed with dollars are being dispatched directly to Western Siberia where they buy up shares on the cheap from workers of the privatized oil and gas enterprises. The fall of the ruble only makes things cheaper for them.

Finally, on the position occupied by the highest Russian structures in the face of all this pressure.. Judging by the most recent official projects and statements, it is planned that from early 1995 a whole series of measures will be taken which are intended to accommodate the wishes of foreign capital, especially as regards our energy resources. To be specific: 1. The reduction of state orders for internal purchases of petroleum and petroleum products as well as a continuation of cuts in such deliveries to CIS countries; 2. Expansion of the export of this output to world—that is, in practice—Western markets, either through increased export quotas or their complete abolition, as well as through reduced export tariffs and broader access to export pipelines; 3. Halving the duty for major foreign investors on imported goods of their own manufacture—that is, including equipment; 4. The abolition of profit tax for foreign companies.

It is a paradoxical fact that the advantages being stipulated are not for our own but for foreign enterprises.

If these intentions are put into effect, then in just a few weeks' time the last barriers protecting the Russian fuel and energy complex, as well as other national sectors, from invasion from across the seas will begin to be destroyed. There will thereby be a quantitative leap toward Russia's transformation into a raw materials colony without any rights. This is the scale of the challenge which has been made to our country.

Envoy: UK Not To Follow U.S. Lead on Contacts With Serbs

LD0712181594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1632 GMT 7 Dec 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] London does not plan to follow Washington's example and establish contacts with Bosnian Serbs, the British Ambassador to Moscow Sir Brian Fall has told Interfax.

He made it understood that the USA acted at its own initiative without any prior understanding with its partners in the contact group that also includes Russia, Britain, France and Germany.

"The Bosnian Serb leadership should understand very clearly that the contact group is united requiring a long-term settlement. But it is also right that we should not give them an appearance of respectability which they don't have at the moment because they are the only people resisting the proposal which everybody else has accepted," the ambassador said.

In Fall's opinion the crucial thing now is that the contact group should stay together. "We should keep in very close touch with the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and he should continue to make sure that that boundary closure between Bosnia and Yugoslavia is effective so that the Bosnian Serbs realize that there is no easy way out by way of accepting the plan of the contact group," he said.

On the stand of Bosnian Muslims who spoke against of the decision of the contact group to recognize of the equal rights of all the sides to the conflict Fall said that neither the Muslims, nor the Bosnian Serbs have said their final word yet.

In the ambassador's opinion all sides realize that the withdrawal of British, French, Russian peace-keepers would make life much worse for the people of Bosnia. "The UN force is keeping the peace, maintaining the safe areas and what is most important allowing humanitarian

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aid convoys to go through. Now if the conditions deteriorate so, that it cannot do any of those things there will be no point in keeping it there," he said.

According to the ambassador, Bosnian Muslims having reflected also realize that the lifting of the arms embargo, the removal of the peace-keepers and air strikes are not going to solve the problem, they can only make it worse.

The British ambassador also spoke in detail on the prospects of relations between Russia and NATO. He expressed confidence that Moscow's decision to postpone the launching of the Russia-NATO program will by no means affect bilateral Russian-British relations.

The ambassador favored the development of partnership between NATO and its individual members, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. In his opinion these relations should expand primarily in the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace program.

Fall hoped that the process of explaining the NATO approach to the membership of Central and East European countries on which Russia insists will not take too long.

According to the ambassador, Britain believes that its interests in the modern world are best defended in a very close partnership with Russia. "We hope that Russia agrees that Russia's interests are best defended in close partnership with Britain, France, the USA and other Western countries. This is the way to cope with the problems of the future," he said.

The ambassador hoped that the Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin would make an official visit to London at the beginning of next year and that the visit would become an important event in bilateral relations. The date has not been set yet.

Answering a question about the documents that could be signed during the visit the diplomat said:"We are trying to move beyond the old fashioned habit of measuring the success of a visit by how many documents are left on the table after it. There will be primarily an opportunity for some serious conversations particularly about economic and commercial matters."

Fall did not rule out the possibility of some documents being signed during the visit, in particular on the mutual protection of investments and the prevention of dual taxation.

Envoy Draws UN Attention to Human Rights in Baltics

LD0712211194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2015 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations December 7 TASS—Now that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states has been completed, the international community is to focus attention on the rights of ethnic Russians living in these states, according to Sergey Lavrov, Russia's ambassador to the United Nations.

Lavrov addressed the U.N. General Assembly on Wednesday [7 December] with a report called "complete pullout of foreign armed forces from the Baltic states."

"By August 31, 1994, Russia had finished a complete withdrawal of its troops from the territory of the Baltic states. By doing so, it fulfilled resolution 48/18 of the U.N. General Assembly and its international obligations, as well as clearly demonstrated its commitment to the principles of equal rights, respect for sovereignty and independence in its relations with newly-independent states", the Russian ambassador pointed out.

According to Lavrov, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops "makes it possible to shift the accent in our relations to humanitarian, and trade and economic issues. Thus the question of Russian troops in the Baltic states is fully settled, and we can exclude this item from the General Assembly agenda," the ambassador stressed.

He also noted that Russia, showing a good will and meeting the Baltic states halfway, "started pulling out troops from these countries almost as soon as it assumed jurisdiction over the former Soviet armed forces' units deployed on their territory, without waiting for bilateral agreements to be signed."

Lavrov cited the following figures proving to the unprecedented scope of this operation. From March 1992 to the end of August 1994, over 100,000 troops were redeployed to Russia from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In addition, about 30,000 families of servicemen moved to Russia. Over the same period, some 41,500 pieces of military equipment, about 700,000 tons of material supplies were taken to Russia, 230 Russian ships left the Baltic sea ports.

It is not difficult to comprehend how much it cost Russia to carry out this action, Lavrov emphasised. "It should be added that Russia still has to build thousands of flats for the families of servicemen withdrawan from the Baltic states," he said.

"The military aspect of our relations with the Baltic countries is closed. We believe this enables us to concentrate on another problem of this region—the problem provoking concern and closely watched by the United Nations and other international organizations—the situation about respect of human rights in the Baltic states. We hope progress will be made in this important issue as well," Lavrov stressed.

ICRC: Has Access to Both Sides in Chechen Conflict

LD0712212994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2112 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva December 8 TASS—"We have access to both sides in the Chechen conflict", Dieter Pfaff, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Bureau for Russia and Central Asia told TASS here On Wednesday. Since November 18, ICRC representatives have met dozens of people who were taken prisoners during recent armed clashes in Chechnya, either by government supporters or by the opposition troops, he said.

"When visiting prisoners, the ICRC people aim to make sure that POW's are not subject to inhumane treatment", Mr. Pfaff said. Their upkeep is also examined.

In Chechnya, the ICRC seeks to ensure that humanitarian law provisions, set forth in Geneva Conventions of protecting victims of war, are fully observed. Meetings with prisoners are held without witnesses, in accordance with the ICRC procedures. "Otherwise, we would never agree to do it", Mr. Pfaff said.

On December 1, Mr. Pfaff told TASS that the ICRC was prepared to act as an independent mediator in the release of the POWs in Chechnya, if the parties involved in the conflict agreed. On November 28, the ICRC called on the warring sides to have mercy on civilians and military, refuse from taking hostages, and ensure medical treatment of all the wounded and sick.

Security Cooperation Agreement Signed With PA

TA0812122094 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 8 Dec 94 p 7

[Report by Roni Shaqed]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Palestinian Authority [PA] has signed a security cooperation agreement with Russia.

The agreement was signed on Tuesday [6 December] at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. The agreement includes the training of Palestinian security men by the Russian security agencies. The agreement was signed by the Russian deputy interior minister and Da'ud Barakat, the PLO ambassador in Russia. The PA has also participated in the discussions of the Civil Aviation Committee in Montreal. The committee dealt with international aid for building a 700-dunam airfield in Rafah, as well as the establishment of Palestinian air crews.

Russian, FYROM Interior Ministries Sign Cooperation Deal

LD0712192694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1802 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—Russia and Macedonia have signed an agreement on cooperation between the law enforcement bodies of the two countries.

The agreement was signed by Russian Interior Ministry Viktor Yerin and his Macedonian counterpart Ljubomir Frckovski in Moscow on Wednesday [7 December].

The ministers discussed ways to combat organised crime, illegal trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances, illicit arms trade and money laundering.

The delegation of the Macedonian Interior Ministry, which arrived in Moscow on an official visit on December 5, visited the Russian Interior Ministry Academy, the ministry's research institute and the interior department in the town of Mytishchi, outside Moscow.

The members of the delegation also met with representatives of the Federal Counterintelligence and Foreign Intelligence Services.

Crimean, Debt Problems Eclipse Kiev Security Guarantees

MK0712131094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 4

[Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy under the "Situation in Ukraine" rubric: "Guarantees Are Guarantees, but Debts Are Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday Ukraine marked a major foreign policy success—Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton, and John Major signed at a CSCE summit in Budapest a memorandum on granting the Republic security guarantees. At the same time, EC finance ministers announced that Kiev would be given 85 million European Currency Units ($104 million) to shut down the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station. The successes in relations with the West (and also with Russia, but in connection with the Western partners) were marred by the Crimean problem: Simferopol flatly refused to bring its legislation in line with that of Ukraine, as Kiev had demanded. As for Moscow's guarantees that economic pressure will not be applied, they are unlikely seriously to change the current debtor-creditor relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

To all appearances, the guarantees of territorial integrity and the forswearing of the use of force and economic pressure are only the necessary kudos for Kiev's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Moscow's signature under the memorandum can hardly be interpreted to mean that it is giving up its share of the Black Sea Fleet or Ukrainian debts for energy supplies. Even Russia's involvement (direct or indirect) in a settlement of the Crimean problem is unlikely to be reduced to naught (even if in Budapest Moscow recognized Ukraine's territorial integrity once again)—at least until the fate of the Black Sea Fleet is definitely decided. Talks on the fleet (which, as a matter of fact, resumed in Kiev yesterday) are also unlikely to end in the near future. At least because the two sides' stances on the key issue—locations where the Russian and Ukrainian parts of the Black Sea Fleet will be based—are diametrically opposed. To say nothing of the fact that a number of Russian requirements (for instance, that a Russian

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officer be appointed military commandant of Sevastopol) are to Kiev absolutely unacceptable. For the time being, Ukraine has proceeded with building up its existing fleet, which now consists of five ships: the Leninskaya Kuznitsa shipbuilding plant will shortly lay the keel of the "Zaporozka Sich" small antisubmarine warfare ship, similar to the already operational "Lutsk." Apparently, Kiev does not expect to get its share of the Black Sea Fleet any time soon, hence, Moscow will not get its share either.

Without resolving the problem of the fleet and defining the status of Sevastopol, the "Crimean Wall" will continue to loom large between Kiev and Moscow. All the more so because after nearly two months of being loyal to Kiev, Simferopol stated through its Supreme Soviet speaker, Sergey Tsekov, that "no one can deprive Crimea of its right to exercise the fullest state authority on its territory." Tsekov even accused Kiev of ignoring the law on delimiting powers between Ukraine and Crimea, concluding: "The Crimean parliament will continue to proceed from the assumption that Russia is entitled and obliged to defend the interests of the split Russian people." Kiev has not reacted to such fiery speeches yet. It would have probably responded, but there was no one at hand to do so: Leonid Kuchma and Oleksandr Moroz were on the move for the past few days (the former visited Hungary; the latter, Poland). In their absence no one happened to be ready to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity. The Crimean problem and the political dividends Leonid Kuchma obtained in Budapest, however, will clearly strengthen his hand in the struggle with the Supreme Soviet over the Law on Authority currently under consideration (the president signed it the other day; the law calls for considerable leeway for the executive authority to carry out reform in Ukraine).

Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the State Duma CIS Committee, is inclined to share the view that the CSCE summit's results are more of a domestic political importance for Ukraine. In his judgment, it is hardly serious to consider the guarantees of not applying economic pressure as a foreign policy success. At least because it is difficult to draw a line between economic cooperation and economic pressure. Given that, the Budapest memorandum is rather declaratory in nature. However, Zatulin said, "The nature of this document is similar to that of 'Partnership,' and it does not have anything in store for Russia but humiliation."

Upper House Ratifies Strategic Forces Treaty With Belarus

LD0712180994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1720 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Russian parliament's upper house on Wednesday [7 December] ratified a treaty with Belarus on the status of Russian strategic forces stationed in the neighboring former Soviet republic.

The treaty delineates the forces' functions and contains pledges by the two countries to ensure nuclear security and jointly monitor the state of the environment in areas where the forces are deployed.

The house also ratified five accords with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan on military cooperation, logistic support principles and regulations for the use of Russian military facilities in the three post-Soviet Central Asian states and the status of Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

The house refused, however, to approve a Russo-Polish treaty on trade and economic cooperation, linking the matter to a recent incident on the two countries' border, where several Russians were beaten up. But the house plans to go back to the document.

'Concern' Over CFE Flank Restrictions Voiced

MM0712165994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by Vadim Markushin: "Russia Must Secure Its Own Flanks. Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Again Voices Concern Over Lack of Correspondence Between a Number of Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Current National Security Realities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, on Monday [5 December] the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff arranged a briefing on a subject that has already been debated at length: the flank restrictions imposed by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]. This problem arose with the breakup of the USSR, which entailed significant geostrategic changes. For Russia it is becoming increasingly acute as the discrepancies increase in connection both with the new military-political orientation of the former Warsaw Pact countries and the deteriorating situation on the southern border, above all in the Caucasus.

The point is, Colonel General Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of General Staff, told journalists, that the CFE Treaty was devised and signed in conditions of confrontation between two blocs—Warsaw Pact and NATO. When it was signed, the part of the USSR's territory on which the Leningrad, Odessa, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts were sited was classed as flank areas. With the breakup of the USSR, independent states took shape on its territory, including in the aforementioned areas. But, in accordance with the letter of the Treaty, we are still forced to station the bulk of conventional armaments not where the situation realistically requires them to be sited (the south of the country in particular) but along the old East-West line and in Kaliningrad Oblast.

It is paradoxical, but of Russia's maximum number of 6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored fighting vehicles, and 6,425 artillery systems of 100-mm caliber and over, we are

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entitled to station on the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast (less than 0.5 percent of the European part of the Russian Federation) 4,200 tanks, 8,760 armored fighting vehicles, and 3,235 artillery systems. At the same time, we are able to have no more than 700 tanks, 580 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,280 artillery systems in the regular units of the Leningrad Military District and North Caucasus Military District, the territory of which accounts for more than one-half of the European part of the country.

There is here an obvious bias which contradicts the principle of consideration for the security interests of all states party to the Treaty. It seems that formalities are prevailing over common sense. Technically speaking, this is official discrimination as far as Russia is concerned. And it must be eliminated.

How? By suspending Article 5 of the Treaty, which is what the Russian representatives are seeking from their colleagues and partners in the joint consultation group in Vienna. Such a decision would not conflict with generally accepted world practice and would not entail a change in the text of the CFE Treaty.

The Russians are also designating other options for resolving the problem of flank restrictions. For example, transferring the North Caucasus Military District from the flank area to the rear, and making flank restrictions no longer applicable to the armaments of naval infantry and coast guard forces. But the Western partners are refusing to meet us halfway and are opposing the strengthening of Russia's defense capability in its vulnerable areas.

But what if our Western partners stubbornly continue to insist on binding Russia with the obsolete terms of the Treaty? In answer to this question Col. Gen. Zhurbenko said: "There is a whole year before the levels indicated in the Treaty come into effect. We hope this is time enough for the Western partners to appreciate our concern. And for us to make a decision."

U.S. Plan to Increase Military Budget Raises Concern

LD0812151594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1416 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Clinton's intention to request Congress to allocate an additional 25 billion dollars for military spending over the next six years has given rise to concern in Moscow.

At Thursday's briefing Foreign Ministry spokesman Nikita Matkovskiy described these plans as "a potentially serious correction of the U.S. political-military policy." "We will closely follow the development of events in this area," he noted.

As the diplomat explained, "Moscow proceeds from the assumption that in the past few years Russia and the U.S. had formed a reliable system of reciprocal commitments, which provides for concrete parameters of restraint in the military area and for coordinated measures designed to ensure global strategic stability."

According to Matkovskiy, Russia "views the need to maintain and strengthen such stability as a top priority goal."

"We hope that the American leadership takes a similar stand," Matkovskiy stressed.

Decree Approves Accord With Georgia on Journalists' Status

MM0712160794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 First Edition p 4

[Russian Federation Government Decree No. 1268, signed by Premier Chernomyrdin and dated 17 November 1994: "On the Conclusion of an Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and the Republic of Georgia Government on the Status of Russian Federation Mass Media Correspondents in the Republic of Georgia and of Republic of Georgia Mass Media Correspondents in the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Government decrees that:

The draft Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and the Republic of Georgia Government on the Status of Russian Federation Mass Media Correspondents in the Republic of Georgia and of Republic of Georgia Mass Media Correspondents in the Russian Federation (appended) submitted by the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry and preliminarily agreed with the Georgian side shall be approved.

The Russian Federation Foreign Ministry shall hold talks with the Georgian side on the final coordination of the appended draft, permitting changes and additions which are not of a fundamental nature to be made to it.

On reaching agreement with the Georgian side, the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry shall sign the agreement on behalf of the Russian Federation Government.

Note: The draft agreement is not being published.

[signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

[Dated] Moscow, 17 November 1994

No. 1268

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Political Issues

Kozyrev on 'Thoughtless' NATO Expansion

LD0812114094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1115 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Serov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Dec—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has described plans for a hasty expansion of NATO as "thoughtless" and "selfish." A few days after the Budapest summit of the CSCE, which revealed disagreements between Russia and the United States on the speedy inclusion of eastern European countries in the North Atlantic Alliance, the head of the Russian diplomatic corps uses sharp words to condemn the position of "developed Western democracies" in this sphere.

Speaking today at a meeting with representatives of Russian law enforcement organizations, A. Kozyrev warned that the hasty inclusion of eastern European countries in NATO will inevitably be used by the antidemocratic opposition in Russia to their own propaganda and political ends.

The head of Russia's foreign policy department recalls that NATO was initially set up as a tool to combat Soviet totalitarianism. After the collapse of the USSR, and following the democratic changes in Russia, the aims and tasks of this organization are unclear, the minister believes. "If NATO is not against us, why is it without us," A. Kozyrev said, having noted that the West has given no reply to this question.

Yeltsin's Election Chances Seen as a 'Battle'

MM0712180194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 94 pp 1-2

[First part of article by Pavel Voshchanov: "'Here I Am in the Kremlin!' What Next?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What is the most notable thing about the past political fall? The "trench" warfare for the Russian throne seems to have ended and the season of active election battles has begun. Of course, we are still a long way from serious fighting. What is happening now is not even a probing action. It is perhaps an adjustment of the weapons issued, a survey of the combat ranks. Nonetheless it all gives you the feeling that it has begun. Henceforth every step, every word uttered by the champions "of the Fatherland" of all shapes and sizes should be viewed from just one angle—preparation for the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Until recently some of those at home on the political Olympus still wondered whether it was not too early. Today no one is wondering. Now they are living by completely different fears—as long as they are not late! What has the present fall changed in the bustling Russian politicians? I think there are two reasons for what has happened. The first is the outcome of the elections which swept various regions of Russia. The mass of voters were quite indifferent toward them. But those for whom they vote have their own yardsticks. The "leftwingers" in opposition to the Kremlin sensed the sweet scent of imminent victory. The icy wind of crushing defeat has blown in the direction of the "rightwingers" treated with affection by the authorities. This has galvanized almost all of them: The former are rushing to consolidate their success, the latter put the situation to rights.

1. The President

What is the second reason? It lies in the words and deeds of the Kremlin's present incumbent. Ambitious leaders of many parties and factions, many of whom are already mentally trying on the president's clothes for size, have suddenly, at the end of the fall, clearly sensed in them the logic, albeit primitive, of the election struggle. And that could not fail to give rise to universal political fuss, because any elections are a chase after the leader. And as a rule the man who becomes leader is the one with real power in his hands.... For some reason I remember something I heard from the director of a beach in a small Black Sea town: "The real bathing season begins not when the first bold swimmer slips into the sea but when I want to get my feet wet!" There is something similar in our politics.

Perhaps since last summer Yeltsin and his retinue have been most annoyed by the ill-starred question of the president's ambitious desires. Does he intend to run again in the elections or not? But on each occasion there has been an evasive: "We are not thinking of anything like that! We are not in the mood—we have all of Russia on our shoulders...." Did anyone believe these lofty revelations? It is doubtful. The question of the further intentions of the present Russian head of state has acquired a ritual nature and so the answer, whatever it may be, has no real significance as far as information is concerned. Today it is hard to find a serious political expert who is not convinced that of course the president does intend to take part and will do so without fail. Although it will be harder for Yeltsin to be first across the finishing line than it will be for anyone. His movements are fettered by a power that is divided.

What is required for victory at the presidential elections? Above all an attractive image. It is an open secret that Yeltsin today—as a state leader and as a man—no longer generates universal empathy and sympathy. At the start of the election marathon he is in a very unfavorable "Gorbachev position": Support abroad with growing hostility within his own country. In this situation it is a big mistake to declare for all to hear his intentions of running for a second term. And in the absence of Burbulis in the president's team it is hardly likely that other skilled operators will be found in time to smooth it over, lending some kind of dignity to the reckless, self-confident rough diamond. And so before Boris

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Yeltsin's election intentions are announced officially there will unfailing be a series of propaganda actions whose aim will be to restore the attractiveness of the president's political image.

The Kremlin analysts cannot fail to see the kind of slogans with which the antipresidential opposition is now gaining points. National-patriotism is the most widespread political commodity. It is no accident that in the past fall this banner was actively used by almost all participants in the struggle to redivide power—from the extreme right to the extreme left. It is obviously for this reason that, in seeking to compensate at least to some extent for the point he has lost, the president has decided not to remain aloof from fashionable trends. After several light attacks in Moscow against the U.S. Leadership generated by its anti-Serbian position, he registered in Pskov as a true patriot and defender of Russian national interest. His inspection of the new border lines and the "not an inch of our native land!" heard there do not and cannot have any effect other than a propaganda one. A kind of rough sketch for the portrait of the future presidential candidate—a Patriot and a Supreme Ruler. Perhaps not that sophisticated in political maneuvers as some but, on the other hand, capable of banging his fist and stamping his foot if Russian interests are affected.

The national-patriotic card can't lose. But only in the hands of the opposition. For the power it could be fatal. That is the situation which is taking shape in the Kremlin in connection with the Chechen crisis. However much you speculate, there are only two ways out of it: either turning Chechnya loose and allowing its people to sort out their own problems, or to restore the supremacy of Russian laws and Russian power by force on this territory. The first path will hardly suit Yeltsin because the Caucasus sin will be added to the Belovezhskaya Forest one. And the second path? Having chosen it, the president will win on one condition—if he manages to avoid excessive bloodshed. Otherwise what will perhaps be the most acute crisis of confidence in his political career will await him. A crisis from which, considering the time factor and the strength of the opposition, he will hardly manage to extricate himself.

Boosting his own popularity rating is a task without whose solution it is pointless for President Yeltsin even to think about any elections. Unless he manages to resolve it there will be one way left for him and his supporters—modeling a crisis situation which make any democratic manipulations with the power impossible. The Chechen events provide that opportunity. The growth of the conflagration in Chechnya itself, the emergence of new hotbeds of armed resistance to the central power in other national regions of the North Caucasus, and, finally the acts of terrorism and subversion by the Caucasus gunmen in "continental" Russia—all this could be seen by the Kremlin as entirely sufficient grounds for temporarily removing the question of any elections from the agenda.

All this could be considered fabrication or insinuation were it not for one alarming circumstance—recently (and the past fall provided much confirmation) there has been a buildup of the special subunits under the personal control of the president and the leaders of his guard services. According to an assessment we received from a number of sources close to the Kremlin administration, their total numerical strength is now in excess of 40,000 people. That is far more than any former leader of the USSR, including Stalin himself. Somehow secretly, without discussion outside the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin became Supreme Commander in Chief not only of the Armed Forces but also of everything else designed to keep weapons in his hands—the internal and border troops, intelligence agents, and counterintelligence agents. As of now he lacks only one thing—the title of Generalissimo.

There is nothing more terrible than weapons in unskilled hands. Events not only in Chechnya but also in the Russian capital show that neither the president himself nor his trusted people in the power structures are able or trained to handle the formidable weapon in their hands. Much of what has been done recently is absurd, stupid, and indeed simply dangerous. Can one find another capital where combat operations were carried out before citizens' eyes by "military subunits of unestablished allegiance?" And for the head of state to express surprise the next day, promising to investigate it all? That kind of thing is possible only in our country and only with our power. We do not know whose aircraft are bombing the city. We do not know whose tanks are moving along the roads. We do not know whose soldiers will push an assault rifle into our side.... And in general we do not know who is leading the state in our country.

Having turned force into the most important element of his political image, the president has admitted indirectly that he will not manage for a second time to become the idol of a more or less sizeable proportion of Russian society. And since that is so there is nothing left but to show the country from time to time the timid relations with some social or professional groups—creative workers, journalists, mothers of many children, invalids, war pensioners. For some reason it was last fall, marked by the election urge, that they became welcome guests at ritual Kremlin gatherings. It would be logical to suppose that Yeltsin, guided by ratings considerations, will soon raise his hand against the holy of holies—the privileges of the new nomenklatura. Here his anger at the subject will be just as dispassionate as in the case of the reduction of the president's apparatus, which, at whose ill will we do not know, grew to incredible proportions.

But the main thing is nonetheless strength. And there are undoubtedly reasons for that. Here is one of them. Under present conditions the Russian president's lack of party allegiance is becoming a kind of political atavism. But this problem now longer has a solution—slightly mellowed Russian democracy is already rejecting the form of its previous political vagabondage—"a party for

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the leader." But Yeltsin has also changed. Thoroughly toughened, he will not be able to subordinate himself to any party interests or party discipline. I think that this is where the secret lies of how the special services will become Yeltsin's party.

The president has not yet been officially announced as a participant in the election marathon. But it is a fact that he is already at the starting line. And by no means simply to take part. That is borne out by the proposed amendment to the former rules of the election game. Hastily written, to the thunder of shooting outside the "White House," they are of course far from perfect. But for some reason the new draft law "on the election of Russian Federation State Duma deputies" issued from the Kremlin in November corrects only one instance—the quota for those elected on the party lists. So far this applies only to the legislators. But it is logical to suppose that the next step will be the extension of the new order to the party nomination of candidates for the post of Russian president because it could cause Yeltsin a lot of trouble. And so pressure, albeit only light, on one of the main competitors—political parties and movements—is entirely logical.

Gorbachev Expresses Interest in 1996 Presidency

LD0712175694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1600 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Anchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Abu Dhabi December 7 TASS—Ex-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said he may run for Russian presidency in the upcoming elections in 1996.

Speaking at a news conference in Abu Dhabi on Wednesday, Gorbachev said that he "is thinking this question over very seriously."

Gorbachev did not reveal his election programme, saying that it is too early to speak about it. At the same time, he added that it will aim at "moving towards a new democratic Russia."

He believes that those who will call for revenge or return to the past will not win. "We need to overcome the crisis and move towards a new Russia. There are many 'active' (figures) and many loudmouths, but I do not think that our future belongs to them," he said.

Yeltsin Approves Baltics Resettlement Funding

LD0712155194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1506 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed an instruction to earmark five billion roubles from the presidential reserve fund to build housing for resettlers from the Baltic states, the presidential press service reported on Wednesday.

The housing for migrants from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will be constructed in the settlement of Dubrovo in the Pskov region, bordering on Estonia. The first 2.5 billion roubles will be allocated to the Pskov region in December, 1994, and the remaining funds - in the first six months of the year 1995.

Another two billion roubles will be assigned to a school construction project to be completed by September 1, 1995, in the Pechora district of the same region.

Edict Dismisses Kalmykov, Provides No Motive

MK0812090094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 2

[Report by Irina Shkarnikova under the "Resignation" rubric: "'Inconspicuous' Minister Surrenders Powers. Vacancy Opens in Russian Federation Justice Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Yesterday's presidential edict dismissing Yuriy Kalmykov is worded laconically—it contains no motives for this decision. Yuriy Kalmykov is known to have handed in a request to resign, but it was not accepted. According to one version, his wish to leave the post was caused by his seeking a different job—that of Constitutional Court justice. The Federation Council, however, has turned down Yuriy Kalmykov's candidature.

As member of the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], Mr. Kalmykov was one of the few government members who simultaneously engaged in party activities. Mr. Kalmykov's resignation was rumored even before PRES leader Sergey Shakhray was discharged as nationalities affairs minister. At that time, guesses were voiced that members of this party were being ousted from the government. According to some lights, however, when Yuriy Kalmykov's candidature for the position of Constitutional Court justice was considered in the Federation Council, he dissociated himself from his party. Despite having been in the party, Kalmykov was not known to have been enmeshed in politics while justice minister.

Kalmykov's activity in the position of justice minister passed off more than calmly. As some specialists see it, the position of the ministry under Mr. Kalmykov was so imperceptible that nearly all of its functions—the proposing and elaboration of draft laws—were in fact performed by the Main Legal Administration of the Russian Federation president's staff.

Travkin Resigns as Democratic Party Head

LD0712154794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1428 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—Nikolay Travkin stepped down as head of the Democratic Party of Russia and leader of its faction in the State Duma on Wednesday.

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In his address to the Duma members released today, Travkin expressed the confidence that "the upcoming congress of the Democratic Party of Russia will determine the right course for the party in the interests of the people of Russia."

He thanked his colleagues for staying with him for almost five hard years and laying the foundation of the multi-party system and democracy in Russia.

Legislators Refuse To Attend Today's Duma Session

LD0712142894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1336 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—The parliamentary factions of Yegor Gaydar (Russia's Choice) and of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (Yabloko) as well as the parliamentary group of Boris Fedorov (Union of December 12) refused to participate in the afternoon session of the State Duma (Russian parliament lower chamber) on Wednesday.

This was made known at a news conference held by representatives from these factions this afternoon.

Boris Zolotukhin, deputy chairman of the Russia's Choice Faction, said that deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) "staged another hysterical show" at the morning session, the reason for which were the tragic events in Chechnya.

He noted that "Zhirinovskiy's followers and their partners in organising parliamentary scandals used the noble peaceful mission by a group of legislators for attacks and accusations against their parliamentary colleagues".

They accused Sergey Yushenkov, a representative of the Russia's Choice faction, of passifying the situation in Chechnya and protecting the lives of Russian prisoners of war", Zolotukhin noted.

He stressed that "the LDPR and its allies demonstrated again that the situation in Chechnya agitates them to an extent to which it gives them a chance to earn political capital".

Zolotukhin stressed that "Speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin was not up to the point either, since he did not use his powers to stop hysterical outbreaks".

The Russia's Choice and Yabloko factions as well as the parliamentary Union of December 12 withdrew their rapporteurs on today's agenda, preserving the right to apply to courts to protect honour and dignity of legislators.

They also protested against a decision by the State Duma to disband the parliamentary group Union of December 12. The decision was put on vote at the morning session today.

Irina Khakamada, a co-leader of the Union of December 12 group, told the news conference that "Zhirinovskiy is unable to wage an open battle against us".

She noted that "the registration of the parliamentary group Union of December 12 was repealed as a result of Zhirinovskiy's hysterical harangue and conciliatory response from Ivan Rybkin, despite a crude violation of the regulations".

She noted that the number of her parliamentary group is much greater then that of some party factions in the State Duma, and therefore there were no grounds to repeal its registration.

Representatives from these two factions as well as the parliamentary group protested that the plenary meeting of the chamber "turned into an endless flow of speeches by deputies from the LDPR, which were senseless in essence and abusive in form".

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Pro-Democracy Group Loses Faction Status in State Duma

LD0712134094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The State Duma (the lower house of Russian parliament) on Wednesday voted to strip the Liberal Democratic Union of 12 December group of its status as a parliamentary group.

Head of the house arrangements committee Vladimir Bauer proposed that proper amendments be made to the house rules to resolve the dispute. But LDP [LDPR] leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy insisted on his motion followed by a ballot in which 228 deputies voted in favor of withdrawing the group's registration as a faction.

Under house rules, any union of deputies seeking the status of a parliamentary group must have 35 members at least. The LDU membership ran at 37 when it was first registered as a group this spring, but eight of its members have quitted it since.

The removal of its status as a separate group amounts to LDU's loss of representation in the Duma Council, the right to office space, staff and some communications facilities.

LDU member Boris Zamay accused the Duma of violating house rules by voting on an issue unrelated to the agenda.

He said the LDU would stage a walk out and challenge the decision in court unless a fresh ballot was taken.

However, Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin's proposal to do so was backed up only by 58 deputies.

The Speaker had ordered that the initial voting results be checked after LDU members complained that the voting cards of absent members were used.

Federal Migration Service Reports Emigration Figures

LD0712223794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1222 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Dec—At present, the immigration to Russia from the states of the "new abroad" is 3.5 times higher than the emigration from territory of the Russian Federation into these countries, and the latter is constantly decreasing. At the same time, owing to external emigration, since 1990 the population of Russia has been decreasing. According to the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, 124,000 people left Russia to live permanently abroad last year alone. In the first six months of 1994 about 55,000 people (the figures include legal emigration only) received permission to leave.

One could mention that the places of emigration of most of our former citizens are quite traditional: 95 per cent prefer Germany, Israel, and the United States.

The inhabitants of some Siberian regions (Omsk oblast and Altay kray), Moscow, and St Petersburg prevail among the emigrants. As for their nationality, more than 40 percent of those leaving are Germans, over 20 percent are Russians, and 15 per cent are Jews. One could also mention that among those coming to Russia from abroad, and there were more than 56,000 of those last year, more than half were Russians.

Yeltsin Sends Draft Resolution on Chechnya Amnesty to Duma

LD0712131394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has forwarded a draft "Resolution On Amnesty to the People who Participated in Illegal Actions Related to Armed Conflicts in the North Caucasus" to the State Duma for consideration.

Under the draft, the presidential press service reports, no legal proceedings are to be instituted "against people who participated in events tied to the armed conflicts in the North Caucuses and who are not involved in grave crimes against the life or health of citizens and who have voluntarily laid down their arms." Those who are already serving a sentence in this connection are to be freed.

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In addition, "all criminal trials under consideration by investigation bodies are to be stopped."

At the same time Yeltsin proposes not to grant amnesty to people accused of committing terroristic acts, of banditry, of organizing mass disorders, premeditated murder, of inflicting serious bodily injuries, rapes, encroaching on the life of policemen, hooliganism with utilization of arms and those who were recognized as especially dangerous recidivists.

In accordance with the draft, the State Duma is to determine the territory on which this resolution is to go into effect as well as the period in which it is to be in force.

The State Duma may consider the presidential draft resolution at its December 8 sitting devoted to the situation in Chechnya.

More on Grachev on Chechnya Group's Mission

MM0712130994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Pelts: "Conflict Zone: Troops Ready To Act Decisively, but Talks Preferable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev, who is in Mozdok, reported that the objective of his mission stems from the Russian president's appeal to the parties to the armed conflict in Chechnya and also by the decisions of the Security Council, which discussed the questions of restoring legality, law and order, and peace in the Chechen Republic. The Security Council session, the defense minister explained, decided to approve Boris Yeltsin's appeal to the parties to the conflict, to agree with the plans of measures for the restoration of constitutional legality in Chechnya, and to form a leadership group to disarm and eliminate the illegal armed formations which, despite the proposal to lay down arms, are continuing the conflict. By a special decree of the Russian president Army General Pavel Grachev has been appointed leader of this group, which includes Nikolay Yegorov, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation president in the Chechen Republic; Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin; Border Troops Commander in Chief Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev; Federal Counterintelligence Service leader Sergey Stepashin; plus Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov; MVD Internal Troops Commander Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov; and representatives of the Emergencies Ministry. The Russian Federation defense minister stressed that the main task of the group which has been created is to organize talks on a settlement by peaceful means of the armed conflict in Chechnya. As was noted, this is the most important task. At the same time, everything will be done to secure the cessation of armed clashes on the territory of the Chechen Republic and release the Russian citizens captured and forcibly detained in Groznyy. In addition the leadership group is to ensure special entry and exit procedures for the zone of the armed conflict.

Army General Pavel Grachev reemphasized yet again that, despite the complex situation, the stress is being placed on precisely a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In this connection the Russian Federation Government has adopted a number of directives on rendering humanitarian aid to Chechnya. Special groups have been created to conduct talks with the parties to the conflict.

Pavel Grachev defined his personal task as follows: "To fulfill all Russian presidential edicts and government decrees. To attempt to meet with representatives of the warring sides and discuss the situation which has developed in the republic." The defense minister noted that he is ready to listen to both sides and examine their options for getting out of the crisis. But if the outcome is negative, the defense minister noted, he would be compelled to warn both sides of the use of other means of resolving the armed conflict.

In other words, Army General Pavel Grachev does not rule out a strong-arm option for ending the confrontation in Chechnya. He reported that groupings of forces which will only be mobilized if the peaceful option for resolving the conflict does not win the support of the warring sides are currently being created in a number of rayons bordering on Chechnya. These groupings, in his words, include Armed Forces and MVD internal troops units and special subunits.

On arrival in Mozdok the defense minister heard reports from all the leaders of the federal services which have been mobilized by presidential decree for a settlement of the armed conflict in Chechnya. The purpose of these hearings is to organize cooperation in the event of undesirable or, as the defense minister stressed, enforced developments. Here he noted that he believes in a peaceful outcome. But this requires the leaders of the warring sides to abandon excessive ambitions for the sake of their people's interests and attempt to find a way out at the negotiating table. The defense minister reported that he had meetings planned Tuesday with representatives of the warring sides, and he is agreeable to the holding of such meetings anywhere by agreement with representatives of the Dudayev government and the opposition Interim Council.

Overall, Army General Pavel Grachev assessed the situation as extremely complex. There is information that forces and resources to conduct combat operations are continuing to be amassed in Groznyy and women and children are being evacuated. Additional forces—illegal armed formations—are arriving in the city. State installations are being mined, barricades are being erected in the streets, and roadblocks and weapon positions are being set up. The most worrying thing is that there has been confirmation of reports of the arrest and detention of representatives of the Russian-speaking population,

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who, the defense minister believes, will be "used accordingly" if the situation deteriorates.

Nevertheless the defense minister, expressing his personal view, said that he is not seeking a strong-arm solution to the conflict. He listed measures which would prevent the armed struggle spreading to the rest of Russian territory. Already border posts have been reinforced, constant aerial reconnaissance is being conducted, and air defense systems are in a state of permanent readiness. The defense minister said that all aircraft without identification markings will be destroyed if they attempt to unlawfully enter the republic's territory.

Answering a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent's question about the fate of the Russian citizens seized in Chechnya, the defense minister said that a detailed investigation will be carried out for each one of them. He noted that it will be necessary to specifically sort out who recruited them and for what purpose. But, as was noted, nobody will allow reprisals against them. At the same time the defense minister once again expressed confidence that Dzhokhar Dudayev will keep his word about safeguarding the security of the Russians who are in Groznyy.

Duma Communist Faction Blames Yeltsin for Chechnya

LD0712131894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1221 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—The State Duma's Communist Party faction led by Gennadiy Zyuganov demands that the Russian president assume all responsibility for Chechnya's crisis. The faction's statement read by Zyuganov at a news conference in the Duma today says the president's position as the guarantor of the Russian Constitution and of human and civil rights commits him to do so.

The statement calls on all parties to the conflict to stop escalation of tension in Chechnya and settle down at the negotiating table to seek solutions to Chechnya's piling problems.

"It is our view that all responsible statesmen and officials must bear due responsibility, and we demand that a special commission of members of the Federal Assembly be set up for enquiry into the events within and around Chechnya," the statement says.

Zyuganov said he did not think wars in Russia would discontinue unless a renewed union state was reestablished, adding that the second Congress of USSR Peoples convenes in Moscow on December 13 to discuss a concept of the renewed union.

Duma Deputies Return From Chechnya Visit

LD0712184594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The leader of the State Duma faction YABLOKO, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, has told a news conference that the main result of a trip by nine deputies of the State Duma to the Chechen republic was the prevention of a power resolution of the conflict. He added that the parliamentary committee for defense had learned earlier this week that Chechnya was planning a military operation under the code name Volna (Wave).

Yavlinskiy recalled a statement by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev televised Tuesday [6 December] when he said that "power methods will be used in Chechnya, but he (Grachev - IF note) will do his best to make sure that civilians do not suffer." However, when Grachev learned of the deputies' arrival in Groznyy, he changed his tactics and insisted on a meeting with Dudayev, Yavlinskiy added.

Another member of the deputies' group which returned from Chechnya, chairman of the parliamentary committee for defense, Sergey Yushenkov of Russia's Choice, said that, according to his information, most members of the Russian Security Council were against imposing a state of emergency in Chechnya last week. However, he did not know who exactly took this stand.

Asked by Interfax for comments on the appointment of Nationalities and Regional Policy Minister Nikolay Yegorov as deputy prime minister, Yushenkov said that he considered Yegorov to be "one of the initiators of and those to blame for the latest events in Chechnya, and his promotion was evidence that the activities recently carried out in Chechnya are planned to be expanded."

Yushenkov pointed out that "there is still hope that President Boris Yeltsin does not see and hear in full what is happening in Chechnya."

Asked how he could explain that Yeltsin had failed so far to react to a request for a meeting sent to him by four deputies from Groznyy, Yushenkov said that "those people in the presidential team who possess a more-or-less democratic mentality are absolutely powerless." He pointed to the "highly appropriate actions of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Director Sergey Stepashin while freeing the hostages." Yushenkov stressed that he did not share Stepashin's desire to "establish the constitutional order" in Chechnya. However, he said that Stepashin was the only leader of Russian power structures who at least did not deny the hostages were Russian. Yushenkov did not rule out that he would not be able to address a closed session of the State Duma on the Chechen issue Thursday because his faction Russia's Choice could leave the hall as it did Wednesday.

Duma Official Says 82 Russians in Chechen Offensive

LD0712184094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1718 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Total of 82 Russian servicemen took part in the unlucky offensive of the opposition on Groznyy, the Chechen capital, on November 26. The fate of 55 of them is not yet known, Deputy Chairman of

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the State Duma Defense Committee Yevgeniy Loginov said at a press conference of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]) parliamentary faction today.

The LDPR delegation returned to Moscow from Groznyy on Tuesday bringing with it two Russian mercenaries, servicemen of the Kantemirov Division, who had participated in the offensive on the Chechen capital. The two Russian servicemen were present at the press conference.

LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy demanded that journalists do not blame soldiers who were only carrying out orders of their command and do not ask them "provocative questions" about who and how had hired them. He said the media could stir up "the fire of a civil war in Russia" by accusing "the Federal Counterintelligence Service or the Defense Ministry of having done something wrong."

Zhirinovskiy said the present crisis was a result of "struggle for the Russian presidency" led by "several teams" which were "the Kremlin, the White House (the government - IF), the Moscow government and the Federation Council." He said any of the "teams" "could carry out a state coup or introduce the state of emergency in the country but none of them will dare to hold democratic elections."

FCS Issues Statement on Russian Servicemen in Chechnya

LD0712191194 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Dec 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The public relations center of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS) today issued a statement that says the following in connection with arguments about the Russian prisoners in Chechnya: A Russian soldier performing a special task on the territory of his state—and, as is known, Chechnya is a subject of the Russian Federation—cannot be a mercenary. This soldier is regarded as a volunteer and is implementing his military patriotic duty. The state will fulfill its obligations to the patriots. Everything possible is being done for their safe return home.

In another statement, which was also issued today and also about the prisoners, the FCS firmly promised that those who have returned from imprisonment will not be persecuted by the counterintelligence bodies.

Yushenkov Criticizes Security Council Statement

LD0712192394 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1605 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The exacerbated situation in Chechnya was discussed today by the Russian Security Council. A statement adopted as a result notes that in Chechnya: There is only a power struggle that is being waged by unlawful armed groups. As regards a conflict between Chechnya and Russia, that is simply nonexistent.

Here is how this document was commented upon by State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov:

[Begin Yushenkov recording] It seems to me that this formulation by the Security Council shows a complete incomprehension of the situation in Chechnya. The formulation itself of the Security Council shows that there is no Security Council in Russia—there is an Insecurity Council [sovet opasnosti] in Russia and this Council needs to be dissolved forthwith. [end recording]

However, the activities of Yushenkov himself to free Russian prisoners-of-war is arousing irritation within the ranks of the irreconcilable opposition. Thus, Deputy Nevzorov accused Yushenkov of a striving to gain political capital:

[Begin Nevzorov recording] Yushenkov, the chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, a man, who simply because of the nature of his work, has access to various kinds of information, has availed himself of the opportunity of publicly damaging the Federal Counterintelligence Service. And this was done by not just anyone, this was done not by a journalist, this was done by a statesman who essentially divulged state secrets that were entrusted to him. This is permissible for you, this is permissible probably for anyone else who through the nature of his work does not bear responsibility for the safekeeping of secrets. Please rescue the captives, free them, and bring them with you, but do this quietly, do not try to get any profit for yourself out of it. [end recording]

Security's 'Final' Theory of City Hall Beating Given

MK0812091094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 1

[Report by Tatyana Malkina under the "Guard" rubric: "Security Service Sees Itself as Victim of Provocation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrey Olegov, spokesman for the Presidential Security Service, expounded to SEGODNYA a fairly detailed theory of what happened 2 December, which appears to lay claim to being the final one. According to the theory, the Security Service conducted "an entirely normal operation" to check out an unexpected report about the presence of armed men in banker Gusinskiy's motorcade on a semi-governmental route. Mr. Olegov said that such checks are routine and tend rather to please the public, concerned over growing crime. Mr. Olegov is certain that in the case of Gusinskiy, that same public had to deal with an entirely inadequate reaction. Moreover, with "direct disinformation."

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Andrey Olegov said that "our guys—a total of 10 men or so—tried to stop the motorcade" in order to check licenses to carry weapons. However, in his words, Mr. Gusinskiy's motorcade effectively resorted to "ramming," and presidential service cars had to back away. The ramming attempt was recorded on an operational film, he said. Because Russian security considerations required that the measure be completed, however, the security service officers, who were snubbed by Mr. Gusinskiy, had to "cordon off the parking lot outside City Hall" and still to try to check the armed men's documents.

But at the same time, Mr. Olegov said, "Savostyanov, I do not know for what reason or at whose request, sent his men." Then, according to the Security Service theory, "Savostyanov's men" without a halt shot out a tire of a friendly special service's car and also "whacked" one of the officers "on his head with a pistol grip." Mr. Olegov denied, however, that the officer who was hit on his head was none other than General Mikhail Barsukov, chief of the Main Security Directorate, in person.

It was this incident that triggered not only the prompt removal of Mr. Savostyanov, but also the extreme nervousness of the presidential service—which was subsequently recalled by numerous observers—a nervousness bordering on shocking roughness in the way they treated the detained Most security men. Meanwhile, Mr. Olegov questioned the evidence of eyewitnesses, who confirmed the beating of at least one of Mr. Gusinskiy's drivers, saying that the suspects abundantly provoked those who were detaining them into being rough: according to the latter's theory, when politely requested to show their documents, the former, having locked themselves inside their car, "showed Security Service officers through the car window everything but documents." Mr. Olegov expressed his astonishment at the fact that the detained driver, who "smilingly and easily got into his car," subsequently somehow "found himself on a hospital bed with some bruises." (Presumably, before being brought to the 43d militia station, he was given to the bloodthirsty banker for a cosmetic beating.)

The main new detail that gives an entirely new twist to the incident, however, is that representatives of the Security Service officially introduced themselves and explained the purpose of their actions at the very beginning of the operation, Andrey Olegov said. In his words, the Security Service plans to dispel the bewilderment by showing journalists the famous operational video film and possibly by inviting for explanations Aleksandr Korzhakov [chief of presidential security] himself and maybe even "the man in the cashmere coat," who woke up famous the next day and who, Mr. Olegov claimed, "is a very kind and fully intelligent person, however [illegible] this might surprise you." Andrey Olegov confirmed that the operation was conducted by a unit under Rear Admiral Zakharov and that despite a report carried by Radio Liberty, "not only has Gennadiy Ivanovich not been fired, but just two minutes ago he left my room, alive and kicking."

Thus, the Security Service thinks that in its struggle for a just cause it has itself become a victim of roughness, arbitrariness, and falsifications.

One is only left to hope that the Security Service sticks with this theory. The next one might accuse Mr. Gusinskiy of:

a) transporting one tonne of weapons-grade plutonium in his motorcade along the Uspenskoye highway;

b) snorting cocaine in public after a shot of vodka; and

c) consuming cutlets made of Christian infants afterward.

Most-Bank Raid a Sign of Political Struggle

MM0712131194 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Boris Slavin: "Before Portraits Are Replaced Inside The Kremlin. Political Games as Year Draws to an End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A classical scholar of the revolutionary struggle unloved by "democrats" said that when the "upper echelons" cannot govern in the old way, by the former methods, when society is being rocked by lurid scandals in the ruling echelons of power, we are dealing with a "crisis in the upper echelons." The contemporary political situation in Russia largely confirms this.

In actual fact, in the recent past alone we can see a sharp escalation of power politics regarding Chechnya and in the center of Russia. We are increasingly witnessing major scandals in the ruling elite. For example, how priceless was the anonymous ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA article directly accusing Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov of an attempted presidential coup.

What exactly is going on in the upper echelons, when virtually every day we learn of mysterious retirements in the Defense Ministry and Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] or of the disarming of the bodyguard of Moscow's biggest banker by unknown gunmen wearing masks?

It is known that the mass media are actively involved in all these scandals. No sooner had the government newspaper ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published the aforementioned article than it was immediately accused of lying on the Moscow television channel, first by the vice mayor then by the mayor himself. No sooner had Defense Minister Grachev explained in the Duma that he does not read newspapers like MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS than he was immediately labeled a "brown-red" by it. But maybe the apogee of this struggle should be considered to be the comments of "Itogi" anchorman Ye. Kiselev who, referring to the events around "Most-Bank" and Yu. Luzhkov, described them as a return to the thirties and drew a direct parallel between Kirov's murder and the corresponding violent

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actions by some "third force" against "Most-Bank." What exactly is he talking about? Whom has Kiselev failed to name, obviously fearing that he will not be presenting the next broadcast? Let us try to answer these questions for him, relying on certain hypotheses of modern analysts and political scientists.

When I interviewed S. Shakhray in the summer he unambiguously observed that the edge of political confrontation currently lies not between democrats and Communists but between the economic and political interests of various complexes: the fuel and energy complex, the military-industrial complex, the agrarian complex, and so on. In his opinion it would be bad for Russia if the difference between these interests turned into a fierce political struggle. I think that we are now dealing with this very kind of struggle, which was previously waged secretly but which is now increasingly coming out into the open.

Between whom is the struggle going on? Analysts are increasingly referring to two main groups: the Chernomyrdin-Grachev pro-government team on the one hand and the Luzhkov-Gusinskiy team on the other hand. The first team is backed by fuel and energy complex capital, pro-government newspapers, and the corresponding television channels, the second is backed by major Moscow banks, newspapers like MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and SEGODNYA, the Moscow television channel, Independent Television, and other mass media. The leaderships of all power structures include supporters of both the first and the second group. Yesterday NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA ranked Yavlinskiy and Lebed among the second group's eminent politicians. I think that this is not completely accurate: Lately Yavlinskiy has started to paddle his own canoe. As for General Lebed, he is evidently quite autonomous too.

Both groupings believe that, one way or another, the president's political days are numbered and that strategically this figure must not be backed. The struggle is therefore an uncompromising one. Both camps inflicted the heaviest blows on each other in the fall, precipitating on the one hand "Black Tuesday," which put the prime minister on shaky ground, and on the other hand the "gasoline crisis" in Moscow, which was supposed to topple the capital's mayor. Blows were then traded over the death of journalist Kholodov on the one hand, and over the results of the work of the commission on "Black Tuesday" on the other hand. Finally, an open attack on the "Most-Bank" leader's bodyguard took place. Whereupon we learned of a letter from Moscow bankers to the president. The specter of the "third force" looms.

Such a force does actually exist. From time to time it makes its presence felt. It comprises power structures which are personally loyal to the president (his personal bodyguard, the Kremlin bodyguard, and others). It was they who carried out the attack on Gusinskiy's escort. It is said that the president gave his authorization after reading the relevant report from A. Korzhakov. This report highlighted not only the role of "Most-Bank" in the power struggle but obviously also the role of figures like General Gromov and Moscow FCS leader Savastyanov.

It seemed that this whole version was contradicted by the formalities of seeing the president off to Budapest, whereby the Russian ruler shook Luzhkov's hand for a long time. In actual fact, everything is more complex in my view. In this context what comes to mind is the opinion of Mao Zedong, who liked to say that in big-time politics it is necessary to sit on a high mountain and watch two tigers killing each other in the valley below. I think that the Russian hypostasis of Mao Zedong is not only watching our own tigers but is also sometimes directly intervening in this struggle, helping first one side then the other, with the sole aim of strengthening his own power.

One thing is clear: This political infighting will not make the people any better off.

Security Chief Seen Building 'Police State'

MM0712142794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by Tamara Zamyatina: "Special Services' Impunity Could Lead to Creation of Police State in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For the four days since the special services operation in downtown Moscow outside the Moscow City Hall building, where people who were not charged with anything lay face-down in the snow under the barrels of the special forces' assault rifles—throughout this period the authorities have kept silent. We are verbally schooled to think that the authorities will condescend to explain their actions when they want to. [passage omitted]

People among Boris Yeltsin's aides and the head of state's Staff do not hide their disquiet that Major General Aleksandr Korzhakov, chief of the president's Security Service, has gotten actively involved in politics. Based on the "Public Opinion" Foundation's November ratings Aleksandr Korzhakov was named the country's fourth-most-influential politician. In a recent interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Korzhakov let the question of the extent of his political influence go without comment. Why comment when during the first few days of December he—recently a major, the "stooge" of Boris Yeltsin, first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee—showed the public "who's who in Russia"?

Having shown Boris Yeltsin his devotion and personal courage, Aleksandr Korzhakov was favored with the head of state's recognition and gratitude in the book "View from the Kremlin." Since the storming of the White House last October and the publication of Boris Yeltsin's book the major general, aware of his role, evidently thought that all his subsequent actions were justified by his lofty mission of clearing the field for

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Boris Yeltsin's future election campaign. And Aleksandr Korzhakov identified two potential rivals on this "battlefield."

Yuriy Luzhkov was evidently ranked number one. Is it necessary to explain that it was at him that presidential Security Service leaders were pointing the finger in the statement that "corrupt Moscow Government personnel were flushed out during the 2 October operation." That is why one can quite easily imagine that the president's Security Service might have commissioned the sensational ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA article entitled "Snow Falling," which was directed against Luzhkov.

It is harder for Korzhakov to "deal" with the second rival—Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. But it is not for nothing that he spends plenty of worktime in Government House, with first Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets. Although, what common tasks, you might wonder, could the first deputy premier and the chief of the president's Security Service be discussing?

In an endeavor to strengthen his positions, according to high-ranking Kremlin sources, following the sacking of Yevgeniy Savostyanov Aleksandr Korzhakov is expecting to transfer the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] Moscow Directorate to the jurisdiction of the president's Security Service. And from there it is two moves to a police state. The first move has already been made.

In protest at Yevgeniy Savostyanov's dismissal FCS Director Sergey Stepashin also intended to resign. He wanted to share his thoughts with the president 2-3 December over the telephone. But the people who isolated the FCS and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] from the operation on the Arbat did not connect Stepashin with the head of state. Other people persuaded him to remain at his post in order to prevent FCS organs being transferred to other jurisdiction.

According to Kremlin sources, the president, who was in Budapest at the time this article was being written, was not even informed of the repercussions that the 2 December operation had in Moscow. Korzhakov and other members of the president's immediate entourage did not submit to Boris Yeltsin the prepared draft directive on the investigation into last Friday's blockade of Moscow City Hall. They assured Boris Yeltsin that the supertask behind the actions in central Moscow was to guard the life of the guarantor of the Constitution, to wit the Russian president. Henceforth it will not be Sergey Gryzunov but Sergey Nosovets, chief of the Presidential Staff's Information Support Administration, who is backed by Aleksandr Korzhakov, who will be putting out this version.

I have derived all this information from the highest-placed sources in the Presidential Staff. As to why the sources wanted to remain anonymous while divulging all these "state secrets" to me, that is another matter. That is on their conscience. They may have decided to wait and see who would prevail and then decide whether to remain in the president's service under his new entourage or whether to quit. Some members of their confederate Vyacheslav Kostikov's team have already "caved in." My high-ranking informers assured me that they may not abandon hope of influencing the president and opening his eyes without appealing to public opinion (the team is said to be alone). Needless to say, they do have something to lose.

But things are no easier for us ordinary citizens as a result. In order to avert a police regime, therefore, we must strive to obtain public answers from the authorities to the host of questions that have built up over these last few days. [passage omitted]

On his return from Budapest Aleksandr Korzhakov will probably organize some "material evidence" of a threat to the president's life and thus justify the need for the operation. Nevertheless the guarantor of the constitution must provide society with proof that the fundamental law extends to all structures of state authority. Otherwise faith in presidential structures' democratic point of reference will rightly give way to the opposite.

November Price Increases Reported

MM0812105594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 First Edition p 3

[Report by the Russian Federation Government Center for the Economic Situation's Price Analysis and Forecasting Administration: "Slow Down, Inflation!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the substantial rise in consumer prices in October (15.1 percent) there has been a gradual and still small slowdown in weekly inflation rates (from 4.2 percent in the first week of the month to 2.5 percent in the last week). By the end of November food was 17.5 percent more expensive. Nonfood goods and paid services were up by 12.1 and 8.5 percent respectively—slightly less than last month.

Consumer prices increased most in the Far East Region, where foodstuffs were up 17 percent, nonfood goods were up 12 percent, and paid services to the population were up 19 percent (the highest figure for all the economic regions). The lowest figures were in the Northern Region, where food prices were up 14 percent, nonfood goods were up 10 percent, and paid services were up 3 percent.

Increases were above the Russian average in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Prices of nonfood goods in the capital were up 18 percent over the month, foodstuffs were up 15 percent, and services were up 6 percent. In St. Petersburg food was 21 percent more expensive, nonfood goods were up 12 percent, and services were up 8 percent.

Moscow Getting More Expensive All the Time

In November, as in October, there was a sharp rise in the price of animal fat—which has doubled over the past two

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months, including a 64-percent rise over the past month. In late November the average price of animal fat in Russia was 7,848 rubles [R] per kilo. Among other foodstuffs the biggest rises by late November were for dairy products (up 26 percent), eggs (up 23 percent), fruit and vegetables (up 21 percent), vegetable oil (up 19 percent), and groats and pasta products (up 18 percent). Bakery products increased slightly less (by 10.5 percent), while meat products, sugar, and salt were up 11-12 percent.

Foodstuffs are up 150 percent in the January-November period. The biggest price rise in the period since the start of the year has been for salt (450 percent) and for bakery products, groats, pasta products, vegetable oil, and dairy products (260-230 percent).

In November the rate of change in the price of food in small cities (with a population of less than 250,000) and medium-sized cities (250,000-500,000 people) was relatively similar at 16.7 and 17.2 percent. In big Russian cities (over 500,000) prices rose by more than 18.2 percent. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, where there were considerable price rises caused by the instability on the foreign exchanges in October, foodstuffs were up on average by 16.1 percent in November. In other major cities food prices increased by 20.8 percent.

The average cost of a basket of 19 of the most important foodstuffs in late November on average across Russia was R87,000 over the month—which is R12,523 more than a month ago (as a comparison, the increase in October was R10,771). Last month the basket cost R84,000 in the official trading system, and R109,000 in the unofficial trading system.

The spread between the maximum and minimum cost of the basket in different Russian cities was 290 percent—as it was a month ago.

During November the basket of the 19 most important foodstuffs in Moscow and St. Petersburg increased by 17 percent to R101,000 and R94,000 respectively. Over the month Moscow moved up from 24th to 22d on the list of cities surveyed, while St. Petersburg fell from 31st to 32d place.

Summer Footwear Will Wait for Now

Compared with October the growth in nonfood prices slowed somewhat. The biggest increases were in the price of fuel (up 27 percent), including coal (up 35 percent). Over the month the price of matches rose steadily—at approximately 4 percent a week (up 19 percent for the month as a whole). There was a marked change in the price of medicine and synthetic detergents—up 18 and 16 percent respectively. The smallest changes were in the price of tobacco products and summer footwear—up 8 percent.

On the whole in the period since the start of the year nonfood goods have increased by 160 percent—including medicine, fuel, wallpaper, and matches (up by 460-520 percent).

The biggest price change for industrial goods in economic regions was recorded in the Central Region (up by 15 percent), mainly under the influence of the overall increase in the price of nonfood goods in Moscow (up 18 percent). One reason for this increase was the sharp rise in the price of gasoline in Moscow in early November, when the price of a single liter of gasoline increased by 130 percent over the week to R1,040. Throughout November Moscow continued to be the most "expensive" city among the Russian cities surveyed in terms of gasoline price levels.

Cabinet Work On Budget, Chernomyrdin Critical

LD0812115794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1124 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennandiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 8 TASS—The question on the work of Russian executive authorities to ensure revenues of the federal budget was dropped from the agenda of the Russian cabinet meeting on Thursday [8 December] as insufficiently prepared. This was done at the proposal of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The prime minister said that accounts of the state tax service, the tax police department, state customs committee, federal service for monetary and expert control, as well as of the state property committee, drafted for a debate at the cabinet meeting only point to a serious state with supplementing the state treasury, instead of indicating the ways to remedy the situation. Funds that went to the revenues part of the budget this year make up only 65 percent of the planned volume, which is lower than world indexes, Chernomyrdin said.

The increase of the level of revenues is one of considerable opportunities for the government to conduct a tough financial policy, he said. Documents referred to the cabinet meeting attest to inadequate work, above all, of the tax service headed by Vladimir Gusev. Judging by his report, he deserves to be dismissed, the prime minister said. Documents that are thoroughly prepared should be referred to cabinet meetings so that the debate would not be emotional like a trade union meeting, Chernomyrdin said. In this case the documents were badly prepared.

The Russian prime minister instructed First Deputy Premier Anatoliy Chubays and heads of the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Finance to work out this matter within a fortnight and to submit the completed report of the appropriate ministries and agencies about the work of executive authorities to ensure revenues of the federal budget.

Despite the request of Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov to put off the debate of the matter to next year as, according to him, the situation cannot be remedied this year, Chernomyrdin insisted on a fortnight term so that

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the problem of revenues of the federal budget be decided as much as possible before the new year.

Then the government began discussing the draft budget of state extrabudgetary funds for next year. In addition the cabinet meeting on Thursday will discuss draft federal laws "on purpose-oriented budget funds" and "on state extrabudgetary funds", "on amendments and supplements to the Russian law on collective treaties and agreements", "on the state system of the health service", "on state social insurance", "on amendments and supplements to the Russian federation's code on administrative abuses, to the criminal code of the Russian Federation and the code of criminal procedure of the Russian Federation", as well as "on amendments to the federal law on the procedure of debating and endorsing the 1995 federal budget".

Duma Passes Law To Fix Foreign Loans Levels

LD0712161294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1548 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 ITAR-TASS—The Russian State Duma agreed with a presidential amendment and passed a law on Wednesday which says that it is the national legislature which is to fix the limits of annual foreign loans.

The law is yet to be approved by the Federation Council, the upper chamber.

Earlier the Duma had passed a similar law which was rejected by the president who submitted his amendments. Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov told lawmakers that the amendments mostly concern improvements in the system of foreign loans. In particular, it was proposed that the Russian Parliament has to annually fix the top limits of foreign loans by adopting a corresponding law, while credits and loans to CIS states would be included into the annual budget.

The law also envisages the creation of a single federal system of registering and accounting for foreign credits.

Chernomyrdin Favors Commercial Banks, Stocks

LD0712184194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1708 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Vladimir Zadera]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—"We have all the potential to make next year a year of financial stabilisation of the Russian economy," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said.

Speaking at an international conference on banking in Russia that opened in Moscow on Wednesday, Chernomyrdin said that the government is working on a mid-term programme to curb inflation, achieve macro- economic stabilisation, overcome depression and create the conditions for a steady economic growth during the next two years by attracting domestic and foreign investments.

On the prospects for Russia's banking system, the prime minister said there are several priority tasks, including measures to ensure an even development of small and medium-sized banks, and encourage the development of big banking structures capable of carrying out large investment projects and selling its services on the world market.

The government wants, he continued, commercial banks not only to conduct traditional transactions, but also to operate on the stock market, buy liabilities, purchase shares and stocks, and carry out other operations.

Duma Proposes Privatization Working Group

LD0712204494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2014 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The State Duma failed to pass a resolution on the results of the first stage of privatization of state property for certificates (vouchers). None of the proposed variants canvassed the required majority of 226 votes.

In particular, the parliamentary committee for property affairs, privatization and commercial activities proposed the results of the voucher privatization be recognized as "unsatisfactory." It was proposed that the government create a working group jointly with the State Duma to finalize a national program for privatization of state and municipal enterprises after July 1 1994.

In answer to deputies' questions, State Property Committee Chairman Vladimir Polevanov said that the assets of Russia's privatized businesses were estimated at one trillion rubles on July 1 1994. According to his information, 95% of privatized enterprises belonged to Russian and about 5% to foreign investors.

Polevanov spoke in defense of the committee's former chairman, Anatoliy Chubays, pointing out that his activities "created the basis for the development of a market economy in Russia, while his role will be determined by history."

Polevanov emphasized that privatized enterprises could not start working better than those run by the state at once, because they still used the same equipment and technology. The results of an enterprise's work should be evaluated in at least a year after privatization, he said.

Asked about foreign assistance in privatization, Polevanov said that foreign experts were supervising about 40 Russian enterprises, compiled their business plans and negotiated granting investments with foreign banks. Over the first nine months of 1994, foreign investments worth about $800 million were made in the Russian economy, which is clearly insufficient, he added.

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Polevanov supported creating a joint working group of government and parliamentary officials to finalize the national program for post-voucher privatization.

Weapons Research is Defense Budget Priority

LD0812082694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0618 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Dec—The Russian Defense Ministry has worked out the basic areas of military technical policy within the conditions of a severe budget deficit. ITAR-TASS learned from the Defense Ministry's Information and Press Directorate today that the plan envisages a cut in the number of enterprises engaged in fulfilling the defense order. Primary attention will be devoted to designing new technologies capable of providing a foundation for the production of promising weapon models. The state order will increase the financing of scientific research.

Conceptual defense-related issues will be examined in the near future at a sitting of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission on Defence Security headed by First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, the Defense Ministry reports.

Yeltsin Signs of Export-Contolled Technologies

LD0712174994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1553 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday issued an order approving the list of chemicals, equipment and technologies which are generally used for civilian purposes but, if need be, can be utilized in building chemical weapons. The export of these items is to be controlled and licensed.

According to the presidential press service, the government was instructed to approve a procedure for overseeing the export of these chemicals, equipment and technologies from Russia.

Gonchar on BSF, Unification Plan

MK0712120094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 1

[Report by Anna Ostapchuk under the "Russia-Ukraine" rubric: "Black Sea Fleet Officers Want To Serve in a Joint Fleet. Nikolay Gonchar's Sevastopol Trip Does Not Seem To Have Been a Waste of Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In November, Nikolay Gonchar, chairman of the Federation Council budget committee, attended celebrations devoted to an anniversary of a Black Sea Fleet marines brigade in Sevastopol. To all appearances, Nikolay Gonchar's mission did not limit itself to ceremonial matters, since after his return to Moscow 25 Black Sea Fleet officers (mid-level officer personnel), including those who have taken the Russian oath of allegiance and those who have pledged loyalty to Ukraine, sent an open letter to the two states' leaders. The letter urges them to listen to the opinion of ordinary people and to redirect efforts from splitting the fleet to unifying it. This is a notable fact in itself, for mid-level officers have to serve in an atmosphere of numerous conventions, a fact which confirms the fleet's serious attitude to these initiatives.

More than six months have passed since the April Russian- Ukrainian accord on splitting the ships (Ukraine got approximately 17 percent) and a separate mode of basing, but so far everything is still on paper. Until now the snag was that each side preferred to keep Sevastopol as its main base, while offering its counterpart a secondary naval port, Donuzlav. Most specialists say that this contradiction was evident from the outset because neither Russia nor Ukraine were going to leave Sevastopol. All the more so because just before the agreement was signed, the Ukrainian Navy Command moved its headquarters from Donuzlav to Sevastopol.

The joint appeal by Russian and Ukrainian sailors shows, however, that there is another way of solving the problem. They have effectively supported Mr. Gonchar's initiative, which says that a defense union of the CIS republics can be born out of suffering, that the peoples themselves should wish it to materialize, only then will it probably be possible finally to proceed from the "attributive stage" of forming independent states to a qualitative stage. For the time being, it can only be remarked that the mechanism of economic integration within the CIS via financial- industrial groups, which was also proposed by Nikolay Gonchar, proved to be fully effective.

In order to break "the CIS impasse" concerning the splitting of the Black Sea Fleet, Mr. Gonchar suggests that new talks begin on an entirely new conceptual basis. If negotiators venture to talk about unifying the fleet, at the initial stage Russian and Ukrainian experts would have to reconsider on a case-by-case basis traditional objectives of the Black Sea Fleet, taking into account strategic interests of Russia and Ukraine. If it turns out that they coincide (and no one has ever proved the opposite), the first stage would result in a corresponding protocol opening up a possibility for preserving the unity of the fleet. Then it would be easier to proceed to further stages—to consider matters regarding shared financing, manpower acquisition, and the most contentious problem of jurisdiction.

Federal Assembly

Federation Council Will Consider Chechnya Situation

LD0712130694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Federation Council has postponed consideration of the situation in the Chechen

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Republic for Wednesday [7 December] afternoon due to the fact that the chamber's chairman Vladimir Shumeyko and leaders of the "power ministries," who are supposed to deliver their reports are participating in the sitting of Russia's Security Council.

Petr Shirshov, chairman of the Federation Council Security and Defense Committee, reported to Interfax that consideration of the Chechen issue is to be started at 16:00 and will be held behind closed doors.

Dudayev Invited To Debate

LD0712124794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At a plenary session Wednesday [7 December] the Russian State Duma decided to invite the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and representatives of the Chechen parliament to a closed house debate on the Chechen situation scheduled for Thursday. The move was backed by 236 deputies with six opposed and three abstaining.

The proposal was made the deputy chairman of the Duma defence committee Yevgeniy Loginov (Liberal Democrat) who returned from Chechnya Tuesday bringing two Russian militarymen captured by Dudayev's supporters on November 26.

Dudayev Invite Sent by Fax

LD0812104894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1035 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents ivan Novikov and Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 8 TASS—Representatives of all the so-called "power ministries" are taking part in today's session of the State Duma, held behind closed doors, which is discussing the situation in Chechnya, Chairman of the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament Ivan Rybkin told ITAR-TASS during a break. He pointed out that the ministries were not represented by their top officials, because all of them are now in the area of the conflict.

Rybkin said that, in accordance with the Wednesday resolution, an invitation to take part in today's session was sent to Dzhokhar Dudayev. According to Rybkin, the invitation was sent by fax "to the number that was given to us."

Commenting on today's discussion in the State Duma, he said that "most speakers at the session of the chamber were holding a well-considered, reasonable stand." He did not explain, however, what stand he regards as well-considered and reasonable. "Today members of Parliament focused their attention on the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation 'on the non-recognition of the validity of elections to the Supreme Soviet and of presidential elections, held in Chechnya,' dated November 2, 1991," Rybkin said.

He believes as a result of today's session the president should be given a possibility to establish constitutional order in Chechnya, but preferably not with the help of extreme measures.

In his opinion, the State Duma should adopt by all means a resolution on the amnesty for all participants in the conflict.

Closed Door Session Begins

LD0812082194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0745 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 8 Dec—The State Duma today began a closed door examination of the situation in the Chechen Republic. The debates are proceeding with the press being isolated from the sessions hall. Correspondents are not permitted beyond the foyer of the State Duma building; guards have closed off all approaches to the corridors of the chamber.

According to correspondents covering the Duma's activity, these are the toughest restrictions in the whole time the lower house of the Russian Parliament has been working, although closed sessions have been held before.

Power Ministers To Address Session

MK0712130094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 1

[Report by Nika Stark: "The Deputies Can Finally See the Ministers, But Not Dudayev"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today Pavel Grachev, Sergey Stepashin, and Viktor Yerin are to interrupt their mission (peacekeeping this time) in the North Caucasus and return from Mozdok to Moscow. The Federation Council has invited the power ministers to a session devoted to the situation in Chechnya. The day before yesterday, when chiefs of the power departments were departing for North Ossetia, an emergency regime was still in force there, but today the region has suddenly become "regular." The senators did not approve a presidential edict on extending the state of emergency.

The Federation Council fell short by just seven votes of inviting Dzhokhar Dudayev, too, to the session: 83 house deputies were ready to meet with him as "an equal among equals." Although this move by Boris Nemtsov failed, Ramazan Abdulatipov yesterday sent telegrams to the leaders of the warring sides in Chechnya—Dzhokhar Dudayev, Umar Avturkhanov, Soslanbek Khadzhiyev, and Ruslan Khasbulatov—asking them to "address and brief" the house session.

According to information in KOMMERSANT-DAILY's possession, two of those invited—Khadzhiyev and Khasbulatov—responded via their representatives that they are ready in principle to participate in the discussion.

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Dudayev, after his meeting with Grachev and Yerin, will in all likelihood consider it beneath himself to meet with anybody except the president, and will confine himself to sending a personal representative.

The session on Chechnya will be closed: according to Vladimir Shumeyko, owing to a large number of "confidential documents." Yesterday's discussion of the president's edict on extending the state of emergency in the Ingush-Ossetian conflict zone was also held in camera. The decision to turn down the edict is due to the fact that, in the deputies' opinion, all previous analogous edicts have failed to bring about a change in the region. The house members decided to set up a commission which will try, together with the president, to work out new proposals on resolving the conflict. It is not clear whether the rejection of the edict means an immediate withdrawal of Internal Affairs Ministry troops from the conflict zone. Apparently not. [passage omitted]

Federation Council Continues Discussion

LD0712205094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1916 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Federation Council continued closed hearings on the Chechen issue Wednesday [7 December].

At its evening session, the upper house of the Russian parliament heard its chairman, Vladimir Shumeyko. In their interviews with Interfax, a number of deputies emphasized that Shumeyko's report did not contain new information on the situation in Chechnya and could not be used as a basis for a decision on the deployment of armed forces in the Republic.

Deputy Speaker Ramazan Abdulatipov supported inviting representatives of all sides involved to the next Federation Council session. He said that the opposition expressed readiness to take part, while the Chechen presidential administration said Dzhokhar Dudayev was preparing to meet Boris Yeltsin.

The consideration of the issue will be continued Thursday behind closed doors. Shumeyko's press secretary, Yuriy Algunov, said that an invitation for the power structures' leaders was still valid. All the leaders had sent in notes saying they found it impossible to come Wednesday. The Federation Council is likely to produce a resolution on the situation in Chechnya Thursday.

Duma Bill on Employment Budget Repealed

LD0712145794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Federation Council has repealed a federal bill "On the Budget of the State Employment Fund for 1994."

Presenting the bill on the Russian president's behalf, Fedor Prokopov, in charge of the Federal Employment Service, reported that in the final wording of the legislation, state fund revenues are cut from 4 trillion down to 3.1 trillion rubles in as the earlier planned figures presupposed a larger income growth among the population

.

The Employment Fund receives 2 percent of the money set aside from factory and office workers' wages.

Federation Council deputies are against a clause, according to which 20 percent of the Employment Service's revenues come from the regions, intended for the Center (Moscow). For this reason, the lower house's Social Policy Committee was proposed to slash this figure to 10 percent.

Upper house members were also displeased with the fact that the 1994 budget for the fund is being examined at the end of the year when the basic budget expenditures have already been made.

Duma's Criminal Detention Law Voted Down

MM0712161594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "At the Federation Council: Law Rejected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having examined the federal law "On the Detention of Persons Suspected and Accused of Crimes," which has been adopted by the Federal Assembly State Duma, the Federation Council has decreed that this law shall be rejected in view of the unacceptability of some of its statutes and articles, as well as sections and subsections of articles.

The establishment of a conciliation commission to overcome these differences has been proposed to the State Duma, with the inclusion in it of Anatoliy Mikhailovich Fedoseyev (cochairman) and Yelena Borisovna Mizulina, deputy chairmen of the Federation Council Committee for Constitutional Legislation and Judicial and Legal Issues, along with ratification of the changes and additions to the federal law "On the Detention of Persons Suspected and Accused of Crimes" that have been proposed by the Federation Council Committee for Constitutional Legislation and Judicial and Legal Issues.

Duma Group Urges Rybkin To Annul Vote on Disbandment

LD0712173494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1439 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The State Duma group Liberal Democratic Union of December 12 has prepared a letter to the chamber's speaker Ivan Rybkin in which it proposes to recognize the results of Wednesday's [7 December] vote on disbanding the group invalid.

On the initiative of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] faction, the majority of deputies on Wednesday morning voted for

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disbanding the December 12 group due to the fact that it lacks the 35 members necessary for being registered under present regulations.

In an interview with Interfax, Irina Khakamada, member of the Union of December 12 group, reported that voting data showed that at least 11 members of the State Duma, including Sergey Baburin, Stanislav Govorukhin, Anatoliy Kashpirovskiy, Aleksandr Nazarchuk, Andrey Kvasov, and others were on the record as being among those who voted for Zhirinovskiy's proposal. Meanwhile, members of the Union of December 12 group discovered that each of these deputies were either on business trips abroad or were undergoing medical treatment.

The deputies group proposed to Rybkin that he hold "another vote on this issue at a time convenient for Mr. Zhirinovskiy."

Duma To Control State Foreign Credits, Loans

MK0812114094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker in the "Laws" column: "The State Duma Places Foreign Loans Under Tight Control. The Cabinet Is To Present a Foreign Credits Program"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the wise rule "Business before pleasure," the deputies, in spite of the factional-political passions, yesterday adopted a law "On State Foreign Loans of the Russian Federation and State Credits Extended by the Russian Federation to Foreign States, Their Legal Entities, and International Organizations." This legislative act is the result of a compromise between the State Duma and the president, who returned the draft law to the deputies with amendments. Their essence bears on a point which is of fundamental importance to the government. While the White House wrote into the 1995 draft budget $12.7 billion worth of international credits, the Federal Assembly prescribed that credits taken in each current year must not exceed the amount of payments to be made within this year on earlier credits. Clearly, if the Cabinet of Ministers manages to get from international financial organizations the sum planned to cover the budget deficit in 1995, it will be in no position to repay the $12.7 billion. For comparison: This year the maximum sum of payments will not exceed $4.7 billion. Therefore the deputies agreed with the president's amendment to Article 4 which says: "The maximum amount of state foreign loans by the Russian Federation as a rule does not exceed the annual volume of payments on servicing and repaying the principal on the state foreign debt."

While compromising on this particular case, however, the State Duma "hooked" the executive branch from another side. Now, under the law, the government is obligated to submit, together with a draft budget for next year, a program for foreign credits and loans. And, what is especially important, international loans exceeding $100 billion are to be presented as a separate item. Thus the deputies will vote both for the aggregate size of credits in the budget and for separate "large-scale" treaties. Furthermore, the legislative procedure is such that if the government during a particular year agrees with a foreign state, financial organization, or private creditor about an unplanned credit of more than $100 billion, it will have to seek the State Duma's consent to ratify this treaty. And because the procedure calls for legislative formalization while its time frame is not specified, the loan can meantime "go away." In a word, the State Duma places this aspect of foreign economic activity by the Executive Branch under its tight control.

Lukin Comments on Outcome of Budapest CSCE Summit

LD0812110894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1100 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 8 TASS—"I do not see any failure of Russia in Budapest. But instead, I see difficulties that have arisen in the path of real European security," Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, told ITAR-TASS on Thursday [8 December].

Lukin believes that "the outcome of the Budapest summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is of little pleasure to us, since it demonstrated mounting unwillingness to recognise Russia's independent policy and real interests".

One of the reasons for that, in the opinion of the parliamentarian, is that "from the very outset Russia displayed readiness to say 'yes' to everything done in the West". This time the West is attempting "to pressurise Moscow" and this pressure has become particularly telling since the republican triumph at the mid- term Congressional elections.

Lukin associates this with President Bill Clinton's striving to "exchange the foreign policy, which is more gratifying to the conservative Congress for compromises in domestic policy".

The Duma committee chief pointed out that "American pressure manifests obvious elements of intimidation to the effect that the U.S. will not ask anyone as to who should or should not be admitted to NATO and that no one can deny the U.S. this right."

"Really, we may not give instructions and have no veto right, " Lukin said. "But russia is a serious factor in European security. When we say that European security should not be built in a currently attempted way, Russia's voice should be heeded. European security must be built with due regard for the attitudes of all the sides concerned. Otherwise, something different will be built, which we already experienced," he pointed out.

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Lukin believes that in order to establish an effective security system in Europe it is essential to "conduct a patient dialogue: our partners should listen to us and we, too, should listen to Czechs and Hungarians who have grounds for historically motivated anxieties".

"We have all resources for work both in Europe and the U.S.. But the main thing is to adjust the mechanism of state life in Russia and a mechanism for a consistent, purposeful and intensive foreign policy," Lukin said.

Regional Affairs

Groznyy Hands Over Russian POW's

LD0812173894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] There was a ceremony in Groznyy Thursday of the giving over of Russian POW's to a delegation led by a personal envoy of the Russian Defense Minister Colonel-General Ivan Chizh.

Earlier 11 troops captured during the abortive offensive of the Chechen opposition against Groznyy on November 26 were returned to Russia. The remaining seven demanded security guarantees personally from Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

All POW's Remaining in Groznyy To Be Freed 7 Dec

LD0712125994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] All Russian servicemen still remaining in Groznyy as prisoners of war will be liberated on December 7, well-informed sources in Russia's Defense Ministry and in the North Caucusus told Interfax.

According to these sources, at 14:30 Moscow time Colonel General Alexey Mityukhin, commander of the North-Caucasian Military District, will head to Groznyy from Mozdok to receive the prisoners of war.

Fourteen Russian servicemen, seized by Dudayev's supporters in the course of the abortive assault by the opposition on November 26, remain in Groznyy, the military intelligence service reports.

Among them are Major Valeriy Ivanov, Captain Andrey Kryukov, Senior Lieutenants Aleksey Rastopko, Kirill Kavarskiy, and Yevgeniy Zhukov, Groznyy reported.

On Wednesday the Chechen leader reconfirmed the agreement on freeing the captives, reached in the course of the meeting between Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Dzhokhar Dudayev on Tuesday in Ingushetia.

Russian POW Release Remains Pending

LD0712160794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1439 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Commander of the North Caucasian Military District Colonel-General Aleksey Mityukhin was unable to bring home Russian POWs from Groznyy on Wednesday.

Mityukhin was to fly out to the Chechen capital on September 7. According to Interfax sources, however, the Dudayev side demanded that the Russian delegation be led by a representative of the Russian defense minister, not the command of the North Caucasian Military District.

The transfer of the Russian servicemen is to take place in Groznyy on December 8 in the presence of the parents and relatives, who will be taken to Groznyy by a special plane.

From Groznyy, a helicopter will move the Russian servicemen to Nazran, from where they will subsequently fly to Moscow.

The agreement on the release of the Russian servicemen was reached during the talks on December 6 between Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, in the Cossack village of Sleptsovskaya in Ingushetia's Sunzha Region.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, during the unsuccessful assault on Groznyy on November 26, 14 Russian servicemen were taken prisoner.

Groznyy Denies Hand Over of 7 Remaining POWs

LD0712191694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1840 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 7 Dec—Official Groznyy has denied the report by the Temporary Information Centers that the seven Russian officers remaining in Groznyy have already been handed over to the leadership of the North Caucasian military district and are allegedly in Rostov-on-Don.

A high-ranking staff member from the apparatus of the Chechen president has just told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that Groznyy, fulfilling yesterday's accord between Dzhokhar Dudayev and Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, was ready to hand over these people. He said however that A. Mityukhin, the commander of the troops of the North Caucasian military district, explaining that he had not been authorized by the Russian defense minister, refused to travel to Groznyy today and had put off the trip until tomorrow.

More Than 70 Russian Servicemen Taken Prisoner

LD0712185194 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Dec 94

[From the "Vesti" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the information of the Chechen government, more than 70 out of 150

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Russian servicemen who participated in the storming of Groznyy were taken prisoner. Journalists and deputies are regularly meeting only 15 of them guarded by the president's guard. The remaining prisoners were captured by soldiers of the Chechen interior troops and state security subunits and are being kept in the basements of these departments. Nobody has meetings with them. Some of the prisoners were wounded and are being treated in hospital. The number of those killed has not been established.

For the time being, Groznyy is not demanding the blood of the prisoners. However, Dudayev's supporters claim that no prisoners will be taken during the next storming of Groznyy.

Chechnya Forms Commission for Talks With Moscow

LD0712130494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chechnya has formed a government working commission for talks with Russia headed by the Economics and Finance Minister Taymaz Abubakarov.

An appropriate report was sent by the Chechen Justice Ministry to the Russian working commission for talks on a settlement in the North Caucasian republic led by the deputy Minister for Nationalities' Affairs and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhaylov.

According to the provisional information center set up in Moscow in view of the latest developments in Chechnya, the opposition Provisional Council sent its own list of delegation members.

Dudayev Views Possibility of War in Chechnya

LD0712130194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1121 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Neither Groznyy's authorities, nor Russia's Defense Ministry can guarantee that "there will be no war," declared Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev. During his meeting with journalists in the presidential palace in Groznyy on Tuesday evening. He, in particular, said: "The military mechanisms fulfill the will of political power and the political dispute between Russia and Chechnya has not been solved." "It would be rash to wait for any guarantees from Pavel Grachev in the present situation," Dudayev underlined.

It was announced after the meeting between Grachev and Dudayev in the village of Sleptsovskaya, Ingushetia's Sunzha Region, that the military aspect of the Chechen conflict has been resolved and that it is the political aspect which remains unsolved.

Dudayev reported to journalists that they reached an agreement with the Russian Defense Minister "to meet once more." "It is quite probable that we'll have to meet several times," he said.

Chechens Wait for Duma Debate Invitation

LD0712142794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1333 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 7 Dec—By 1600 Moscow time neither Dzhokhar Dudayev nor the Chechen parliament had received an official invitation to participate in the State Duma's session tomorrow at which the situation in Chechnya will be discussed. That is why officials refuse to say what Groznyy's reaction will be.

A high-ranking official in the Chechen president's apparatus confined himself to a statement that the leadership of the republic "is following with great attention the development of the situation in the top echelons of power in Moscow, expecting the Security Council, the Federation Council, and the State Duma to take balanced decisions on Chechnya."

Planes Overfly Groznyy; Dudayev Supporters Rally

LD0712160894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1439 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Another rally in support of Chechnya's independence was held on Groznyy's central square on Wednesday. Several thousand people take part, our Interfax correspondent reports.

Speakers announced that home guards from Chechnya's distant regions and from Russia had come to Groznyy.

On the whole the situation in Chechnya remains relatively normal, our Interfax correspondent reports. The main headquarters of Chechnya's armed forces reports that the night passed without incident.

Our Interfax correspondent, who has traveled along the route Groznyy-Nazran, reports that heavy trucks with concrete stand along the roads, to be used as roadblocks in the case that Russian military equipment is rolled in.

Home guards made up of village dwellers are on 24-hour duty in some populated centers situated near the road.

Meanwhile, Russian ground-attack aircraft continued flying over Groznyy on Wednesday.

'Official Groznyy' Reports Air Attack on TV Tower, Suburbs

LD0712185494 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1605 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The main headquarters of the Chechnya Armed Forces has just reported the new bombing of Groznyy suburbs by aircraft with Russian identification markings.

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Official Groznyy claims that a television tower located to the south of the Chechen capital was subjected to attack. There are no reports of casualties or damage.

Russian Planes Overfly Groznyy; No Bombing

LD0712180294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1713 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy December 7 TASS—Russian combat aircraft, presumably the SU-25, flew over the Chechen capital of Groznyy two times on Wednesday [7 December], but delivered no strikes on the city, TASS learned from the Central Command Post of the Chechen Armed Forces. An officer on duty said initially one plane circled over the capital and two others arrived later. "These were, evidently, reconnaissance flights", he said.

The officer added that fire was opened at the planes when they flew over Groznyy which could have been mistaken for bombing by the planes. He said there were reports that missile strikes were delivered at the television tower, but no traces of the alleged attack were found.

The officer stressed that such flights make local residents nervous and the official authorities qualify them as provocations.

Federation Council, Without Power Ministers, Views Chechnya

LD0712183494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1717 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation Council discussed the situation in Chechnya without the power ministers today.

An Interfax correspondent reports that deputies were not satisfied with the proposal to listen only to Federation Council Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko who would inform parliamentarians on the situation in Chechnya.

Deputy Viktor Kurochkin (elected from the Chita Region) accused government bodies of lying and proposed that "the power ministers who blessed the bombing of Groznyy be dismissed or arrested, if necessary."

Kurochkin said that if such actions were taken again he could "defend Groznyy, on the side of Groznyy."

Deputy Pyotr Romanov proposed that the budget be lowered for those ministries whose heads refused to come to the Federation Council.

Chairman of the Federation Council Budget Committee Nikolay Gonchar proposed that a draft resolution be adopted recommending that the State Duma "decide on possible dismissal of ministers refusing to come to the Federation Council." Gonchar said the ministers would appear in the Federation Council 20 minutes after they learned about the adoption of such a resolution .

The Federation Council decided that the defense minister, the interior minister and the director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service must participate in discussing the situation in Chechnya.

Moscow Accused of Imposing War on Chechnya

LD0712191394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1839 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy 7 Dec (TASS)—Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev denounced the Russian Security Council's statement on Chechnya, saying it is "imposing a war" on Chechen people and adding that Groznyy is prepared for any turn in the situation.

"The decision of the Russian Security Council did not come as a surprise to us. We want peace, but they are imposing a war upon us," Dudayev said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS on Wednesday [7 December].

"Whether there will be peace or war, it fully depends on Russia. We are prepared for any development of the situation," he said.

"We want to save dozens of thousands of lives of Russia and Chechen guys, but some forces in Russia are intent on starting a big fire, putting the military at risk," Dudayev said.

The Russian Security Council urged an immediate disarmament of both the government and opposition forces in the break-away republic of Chechnya, threatening to outlaw them.

"There is no conflict between Russia and Chechnya. There is only a fight for power waged by illegal armed groups in that part of the Russian Federation", the council said in a statement.

"Armed clashes with mass casualties should be immediately stopped and all warring armed groups outlawed. Simultaneously it is necessary to take all constitutional measures to disarm and disband the illegal armed groups", the council said.

President Boris Yeltsin had earlier decreed that the warring Chechen sides must surrender arms before December 15.

Nationalities minister and presidential envoy to Chechnya Nikolay Yegorov was appointed to coordinate government actions to restore constitutional order in the rebel republic.

Chechen Officials Claim 6 'Targets' Spotted

LD0712204094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1916 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Officials in the Chechen State Security Department told Interfax that six air targets had

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been spotted over Chechnya during Wednesday, three of them flying over the Gerzel area on the border with Dagestan and three over Groznyy suburbs and center.

One plane is believed to have fired a missile at the TV tower in a southern suburb of Groznyy. The tower was not hit, there were no casualties or damage.

Warning shots were fired at the targets from antiaircraft guns, the officials said.

Grachev Warns of 'Toughest' Option for Defiant Chechnya

MM0712125594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 94 First Edition p 1, 3

[Report by Vladimir Seledkin: "Guideline of Hope. Our Special Correspondent Reports from Mozdok"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pushing open the unusually light door of the inflatable module, we went into the operating theater. It was silent. Other parts of the field hospital on the outskirts of Mozdok were empty too. And, although outwardly its tarpaulins seem inferior to multistory modern clinic buildings, it is equipped with everything required to give immediate help to people should the flames of military action flare up in neighboring Chechnya.

But the doctors with whom I spoke nonetheless hope that they will not have to use their art. People are still hoping that there will be a peaceful outcome to this protracted drama.

The desire to resolve the fratricidal conflict in Chechnya by primarily peaceful means was also voiced by Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister, addressing journalists in Mozdok after a working conference with the leaders of power structures and other departments making up the group in charge of the operations to disarm and eliminate armed formations. [passage omitted]

Pavel Grachev said that 14 men are currently held by the Dudayev supporters. The defense minister warned the Chechen leadership that, if the hostages are killed, Dudayev and his associates will be held to account in the most serious fashion. A Security Council session to once again examine the question of the situation in Chechnya is to be held 8 December. If by then Groznyy has not changed its position on increasing military confrontation and rejecting peaceful ways to settle the conflict, then only the toughest of all the options will remain. The necessary forces—units and subunits of the Armed Forces, the Internal Troops, and special-purpose troops—have been concentrated in the North Caucasus in order to implement it. They are ready to carry out all the missions they have been assigned. But there is still a chance to avoid strong-arm methods. Only madmen have an interest in seeing blood shed.

North Caucasus Border Troops Reinforced by 50%

LD0812122094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1100 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The numerical strength of Russia's border troops in North Caucasus has been boosted by 50 percent. As Aleksandr Tymko, chief of Russian Border Troops Staff, declared in an interview with Interfax, that was done to prevent armed bandits from crossing the border. He reported that following the buildup of tension in Chechnya, reinforcements have been deployed all along the North Caucasian frontiers.

Tymko argues that "an agreement alone is not enough for the warring factions to resolve the issue on surrender of arms in Chechnya." "Without interference by force, there won't be a voluntary surrender of arms," he said.

Federation Council in 'Complicated' Debate on Chechnya

LD0812130994 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's sitting of both of the Federal Assembly's chambers is closed to the media. The situation in the Chechen republic is being discussed. Here is what our correspondent Vyacheslav Osipov learned at the Federation Council.

[Osipov] Each person coming out of the conference hall is mobbed by journalists. Of the entire volume of information, which is quite modest, the conclusion can be drawn that the debate on the Chechen crisis is developing along the two following lines: should the government be blamed for what has happened or should the problem brought about by General Dudayev's rule and the Russian leadership's silence be solved in a fundamental way? Sergey Shoygu, minister of Emergencies and Natural Disasters, said that the situation in the conference hall is very complicated. The upper chamber's corps of deputies is clearly divided into two camps. One camp is trying to gain political capital while the other is striving to honestly analyze the crisis situation, Shoygu said. He was negative about the deputies who turned the release of Russian captives into a show and complained about the fact that the same deputies do not care at all about the prisoners from the Afghan war.

It has become known that the Federation Council had a mixed response to Sergey Shakhray's speech: should it be treated like that by a member of the State Duma, leader of the PRES party or member of the government? During the interval Issa Kostoyev, chairman of Committee for legislation, told journalists that the sitting was discussing all the possible versions of the consequences of the Chechen crisis. Further, Deputy Kostoyev remarked:

[Begin Kostoyev recording] The issue of the situation and participants in the latest events has been raised in a very principled manner. No decision has been taken yet

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but a draft document will be discussed after the interval. The people who have come are, mainly, not those who we invited. We demanded that power ministers come here. Unfortunately, these people have not yet turned up, so the issue remains very tense. [Word indistinct] insisted that all power structures and their top ministers attend. [end recording]

[Osipov] A decision on the problem under discussion has been prepared by Ramazan Abdulatipov, deputy chairman of the Federation Council. The document is expected to be circulated later. Proceeding from constitutional norms, one could say that the document will include only recommendations.

Stepashin: Chechnya Must Comply With Russian Constitution

LD0812121794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1140 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia), 8 Dec—Russia is not at war with Chechnya. The problem that exists is one of disarming illegally armed groups in Chechnya and restoring constitutional order there. This is the ideological basis from which Russia's Security Council proceeds in its approach to a solution of the Chechnya problem, Sergey Stepashin, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK], told ITAR-TASS today after he arrived in Mozdok, accompanied by Nikolay Yegorov, the Russian president's representative to Chechnya.

Sergey Stepashin said that all members of the Security Council who spoke at Wednesday's [7 December] meeting of the council were in agreement on the approach to be taken toward a solution of the Chechen problem. The Security Council believes that compliance with the Russian Constitution is an indispensable condition in the process of achieving a settlement in Chechnya, the FSK director noted.

Dudayev Says Chechnya Ready To Rebuff Russian Aggression

LD0812122494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1159 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Chechnya is ready to rebuff the aggression by Russian troops, which will evidently have the form of a gradual seizure of territories," said the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev Wednesday [7 December] evening, addressing a conference attended by cabinet ministers in Groznyy.

"Despite Moscow's latest declarations that the Russian-Chechen conflict will be settled peacefully, Russia has not given up its plans for deploying troops," he said.

The Groznyy authorities, he told Interfax on Thursday, "are ready for any development, since, if Russia wants a war, we are not in a position to stop it." "We have taken our decision and informed Moscow of it; it's peace," Dudayev said. "Therefore the choice of war or peace depends entirely on Russia."

Conflicting Chechen Parties to Meet in Vladikavkaz

LD0812125294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1243 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow December 8 TASS—Talks on the settlement of the conflict in the Chechen Republic with the participation of the working commission of the Russian Government, representatives of the Groznyy authorities and the opposition will begin in Vladikavkaz at 15.00, Moscow time, on December 12, the provisional news centre reported today.

The federal authorities will be represented at the talks by a delegation of 12 people, led by head of the working commission and Deputy Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhaylov. The Groznyy delegation will be made up of nine people and will be led by Chechen Minister of Economy and Finance Taymaz Abubakirov. The opposition will be represented by three people, led by Public Prosecutor of Chechnya Bek Baskhanov, apppointed by the Provisional Council.

The talks with the Groznyy officials are expected to focus on the problems dealing with the termination of bloodshed, the handing in of weapons and the establishment of normal relations. So far as the talks with the opposition are concerned, the provisional news centre reported that the disarmament problems would be the only ones to be discussed there.

No Reason Found for Postponement of Grachev Visit

LD0812134694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1311 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia), 8 Dec—New Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Yegorov, charged with coordinating action to normalize the situation in Chechnya, and Federal Counterintelligence Service Director Sergey Stepashin, who arrived with him here, refused to tell journalists what decisions were made by the Russian Security Council on Wednesday [7 December].

Nor has it been possible to find out why Pavel Grachev's departure by air has been postponed. It was thought that he would today meet Dzhokhar Dudayev.

Dudayev Accepts Gorbachev Mediation in Chechnya Conflict

LD0812150994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1416 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mikhail Gorbachev has offered his mediation services in the conflict between Moscow

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and Groznyy to Dzhokhar Dudayev. An Interfax correspondent reports that this issue was discussed for 20 minutes in a telephone talk between the former USSR president and the Chechen leader.

Dudayev agreed to Gorbachev's mediation. Officials in Groznyy do not rule out the possibility of Gorbachev coming to Groznyy.

Lithuania's Landsbergis Agrees To Mediate Chechen Situation

LD0812151094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1445 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy denied reports that it had made new conditions for releasing the Russian POWs to Ivan Chizh, the Russian defense minister's envoy. Officials in the headquarters of the Chechen regime described these rumors as misinformation.

An Interfax correspondent reported earlier that due to problems in releasing the hostages faced by a team of Defense Ministry officials, Colonel General Aleksey Mityukhin, commander of the North Caucasian Military District, flew from Mozdok, Northern Ossetia, to Groznyy.

"Colonel General Ivan Chizh, Russian defense minister envoy, is currently staying in the prosecutor general's office and the POWs will be handed over to the Russian authorities once the legal formalities are settled," Chechen Prosecutor General Usman Imayev said.

An Interfax correspondent reports that the transfer of the Russian POWs will take place in the presence of Lithuanian representatives. At the request of the Chechen authorities Vytautas Landsbergis, the Lithuanian opposition leader, agreed to mediate between Moscow and Groznyy.

Rumors 'Persist' on Russian Assault of Groznyy

LD0812143994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1430 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy December 8 TASS—The last group of Russian servicemen taken prisoner during the recent opposition assault upon the Chechen capital is to be handed over to Russia at 18:00 Moscow time on Thursday [8 December], according to sources close to the Chechen president.

A Russian Defence Ministry senior official, Ivan Chizh, arrived in the Chechen capital today and was received by Aslan Maskhadov, chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces, and the Republic's Prosecutor General Ashman Imayev. The talks focused on the hand-over of seven Russian officers still kept in Groznyy.

In the afternoon, the Chechen government met under the chairmanship of President Dzhokhar Dudayev. After the sitting, the Chechen president is expected to meet the Russian Defence Ministry official, which is to be followed by the hand-over procedure.

Rumours persist in Groznyy that after the last prisoners leave the city, Russian troops will launch an assault.

Dudayev Spokesman Denies Report on Talks in Vladikavkaz

LD0812151694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1450 GMT 8 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 8 Dec—An official spokesman of the Chechen president's apparatus has denied a report by the Provisional Information Center under the Russian Committee for the Press, which claims that talks between official Groznyy and the opposition would start on 12 December in Vladikavkaz,

"The Chechen Republic's delegation agrees to meet only the Russian Federation's delegation," he stressed.

Dzhokhar Dudayev and other Chechen leaders have said more than once that "the so-called opposition represents traitors who should be tried by court."

Report on Officers Refusing To Fight in Chechnya Denied

LD0812171094 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1630 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Mayak has received the text of a statement by the Public Relations Center of the Russian Interior Ministry. Among other things, it says the following: The Vesti program on Russia's Television has broadcast its comments on the article: Officers in the Far East refuse to go to Chechnya, published in the newspaper SEGODNYA. The journalist refers to a statement by Major Viktor Zaytsev who refused to obey the order allegedly issued by the commander of the interior troops. It has been discovered in the course of an inquiry that there is no Major Viktor Zaytsev on the lists of interior troops officers serving in the Far East, said the Public Relations Center.

The Public Relations Center of the Interior Ministry also said that some media sources had lately been publishing unconfirmed and sometimes even slanderous reports about the interior troops.

Moscow Sees Use of Force in Chechnya as Inevitable

MK0812115094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 1

[Report by Georgiy Romashov under the "Security Council Meeting" rubric: "A War Is Undesirable, but Very Likely"]

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Yesterday the Security Council finally formulated the Russian authorities' view of the goings-on in Chechnya and around it. The statement, perhaps in clearer terms than ever before, says that Chechnya is part of Russia, and is a place where a mundane "struggle for power" between unlawful armed formations is under way on the Russian Federation's territory. Thus a line was drawn under the previous, clearly disastrous stage of crisis settlement that started with activating the Provisional Council.

That a new stage has begun was confirmed by the appointment of Nationalities Minister Nikolay Yegorov as deputy prime minister and coordinator of actions by all government agencies to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. Against this backdrop, the man who looks particularly hard hit is Sergey Shakhray. Meanwhile, by some accounts, both Sergey Filatov and Sergey Stepashin bet on the Provisional Council too. It is not clear, however, whether the Security Council passed an opinion on their activity. [passage omitted]

There is no evidence suggesting that Dudayev would go voluntarily or that Moscow would agree to talk with Groznyy on Dudayev's terms. If Moscow responds to Dudayev's snubbing of its requirements by imposing a blockade on the republic, this would hit the civilian population, which does not take part in the conflict in the first place. Dudayev's entourage will find a way to supply themselves with food and electric power. Meanwhile, food coming to Chechnya from other Russian regions will end up on the black market. The 200,000-strong Russian population will be in a particularly difficult situation (by some accounts about 70.000 Russians have already left Chechnya).

For this reason, according to reports from informed sources, the Kremlin now sees the force option as inevitable. If Chechnya fails to heed Moscow's message, measures will be taken to seize arms from the warring factions. Understandably, this is bound to trigger clashes with the Dudayev forces. It is possible that other field commanders (such as Ruslan Labazanov) will also refuse to be disarmed, in which case they will have to answer for their former sins.

If the operation is carried out within a short period of time and in a decisive fashion, a new Caucasian war will be unlikely, most analysts say. Unprofessional, indecisive, and uncoordinated actions by the power agencies, which are fairly likely, however, might cause a large number of casualties, which would negatively affect both the situation in the country in general and the position of the federal authorities.

Federation Leaders, Military Cited on Chechnya

MM0812112994 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Dec 94 p 2

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA-INFORM interviews with Ingush President Ruslan Aushev, Karelian Premier Viktor Stepanov, and Tatar President Mintimer Shaymiyev; followed by interviews with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov and Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, by Ravil Zaripov and commentary by Olga Gerasimenko; places and dates not given: "Will Russia Rise to Chechnya's Defense"—first paragraph is introduction; last seven paragraphs are Gerasimenko commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Federation Council discussed the situation in Chechnya. The day before the session of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament we managed to learn what well-known senators think about this problem.

Ingush President Ruslan Aushev:

"My attitude toward the introduction of Russian troops into Chechnya is sharply negative. Since we have missed our opportunity, the Chechen question cannot be resolved by strong-arm methods.

"The introduction of troops into the Chechen Republic is quite feasible. But, if that happens, there will be a very great deal of bloodshed. Russia will formally win a military victory, but a guerrilla war will then begin in Chechnya. No one there intends to surrender.

"The Republic of Ingushetia will impede the movement of Russian troops being sent to Chechnya. They are a fraternal people for us." [Aushev ends]

Viktor Stepanov, chairman of the Republic of Karelia Government:

[Stepanov] "I can see only two ways of solving the Chechen problem. The first being talks with Dudayev. The second—a referendum on the question of Chechen independence. Moscow will not bring itself to hold such a referendum owing to the risk of obtaining a result it finds unacceptable. However, I am convinced that the people will vote in favor of staying in Russia." [Stepanov ends]

Republic of Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev:

"Events in Chechnya have shown the state of society and authority in Russia. Society has advanced along the road of democracy, but the facts illustrate that there have been no changes in the authorities' actions. What we are seeing is deception of the people and the use of misinformation.

"This is a grim lesson for Federation components. If we want to embark on the legal path of building the state we must not allow these kinds of actions." [Shaymiyev ends]

Our correspondent met two generals in the Federation Council lobbies—Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov and Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff.

[Zaripov] Do you believe that the troops stationed around Chechnya will go into action?

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[Gromov] I hope that doesn't happen. If it does, the consequences will be catastrophic. Dudayev's supporters and opponents will come to their people's defense. The neighboring republics and representatives of other republics will back them. And people in Russia itself will also rise up. [Gromov ends]

[Kolesnikov] I also believe that a political solution is still possible. My confidence is based on the results of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's trip. He met not only with the Chechen president but also spoke to opposition leaders. [Kolesnikov ends]

Meanwhile

Yesterday a session of the Security Council, chaired by Boris Yeltsin, heard reports by ministers who had returned from the North Caucasus. The head of state's press service reports that Boris Yeltsin has "demanded unswerving observance of the Russian Federation's constitutional requirements and laws as regards the defense of citizens' rights and freedoms and public order, and suppression of the activity of illegal armed formation and of the incitement of ethnic and religious enmity."

[Gerasimenko commentary] Discussion of the Chechen question in the State Duma turned into a regular scandal.

Yesterday the following main items were put forward for discussion at the Duma: first—why Duma members are going to Chechnya; second—what is the nature of the "12 December Liberal-Democratic Union" deputies' group (led by Irina Khakamada and Boris Fedorov).

Members of the Duma argued until they were hoarse. The upshot being that at the prompting of the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] the question on Chechnya (it will be examined today at a closed Duma session) boiled down to which deputies were the first to go to Chechnya.

Here are just a few of the things that deputies said: LDPR leader V. Zhirinovskiy: "All factions have gone to acquire political capital by seeing who brings out more soldiers. That is the market." (Two hours later in the Duma Zhirinovskiy himself showed off two military prisoners whom his faction had brought out of Groznyy the day before). Deputy Lysenko: "Chechnya has been inundated with visitors; we must decide to ban unauthorized trips to the conflict zone."

At the same time Duma members submitted their proposals. Deputy Loginov suggested inviting Dzhokhar Dudayev and Chechen parliamentary deputies to a closed Duma session and also sending an official query to the Defense Ministry and the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] regarding the fate of 60 of our servicemen whose fate is still unknown.

Aleksandr Nevzorov also distinguished himself by suggesting that the extent of [Duma Defense Committee Chairman] Sergey Yushenkov's access to secret information be investigated. "There is every indication that Yushenkov is capable of producing his own political promotional show out of any state secret and matter of state importance."

Amid the general ballyhoo LDPR leader Zhirinovskiy took the rostrum with an unexpected proposal—that the registration of the "12 December Liberal-Democratic Union" deputies' group be revoked. And although the Democrat deputies tried to protect themselves by saying that "Zhirinovskiy himself is entirely based on lies," V.V.'s proposal did nonetheless get through.

Chechen Foreign Minister Describes Situation

JN0812095494 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8 Dec 94 pp 1, 23

[Report by Dr. Husam al-'Utum]

[FBIS Translated Text] Shams-al-Din Yusuf, foreign minister of the Republic of Chechnya, has said his country insists on independence from Russia and that he doubts a peaceful solution to the political and military crisis can be reached there.

In a telephone interview with AL-DUSTUR yesterday, he said the situation in the republic is cautiously calm and that the people are extremely worried.

Asked about the root causes of the crisis and its repercussions for the general situation in Russia, he said his country has been beleaguered by the Russians for three years and that independence has become a popular demand. He added that the current situation forebodes the downfall of the Russian empire and that current events in the republic have caused a real crisis for President Boris Yeltsin and his Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and that the crisis has spread to the Council of Ministers and Parliament.

He added that his country is in dire need of true Islamic media, in light of the campaign of rumors staged by the Russian media with the aim of destabilizing the Republic.

He noted that there is no real political opposition to his country's foreign or domestic policy and that the so-called opposition is merely a bunch of agents who have long been working for Russia; most of them are not of Chechen origin. He said these include people like 'Umar Utrakhov, Khasbulatov, Ruslan Khatamidu, and Mimdayn [all names as transliterated] and other faint-hearted people.

Concluding, he expressed his and his country's full respect and appreciation for His Majesty King Husayn.

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International Affairs

Ruthenian Foreign Minister Outlines Autonomy Aspirations

AU0812070794 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Dec 94 p 9

[Interview with Provisional Ruthenian Foreign Minister Tibor Ondik by Marian Dudinsky in Bratislava; date not given: "Slovakia's Siamese Twin"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Dudinsky] Our countries have a great deal in common from the past. However, what is the situation regarding the current lot of our peoples?

[Ondik] For the first time in 1,000 years, the lot of Slovakia and Ruthenia is different. Until now, we were like Siamese twins—we were both a Hungarian colony under Austria-Hungary and a Czech colony under Czechoslovakia. After the war, our President Voloshin was persecuted and executed, just like your President Tiso. Now, Slovakia has attained its complete international-legal sovereignty and independence, while the Ruthenians of Subcarpathian Ruthenia—where they live on their own territory as a state-forming nation—do not even have self-administration. Ruthenian has been replaced by Ukrainian in schools, in culture, and in social life. It is as if, in return for taxes from Slovaks, only the Czech language were to exist in your country, you were obliged to have Czech nationality written in your citizens' identification cards, you were working for Czech money, and your children were receiving an exclusively Czech education from the age of three.

[Dudinsky] Is this the main reason why you have now turned—in a letter—to Russian President Boris Yeltsin?

[Ondik] Two fundamental issues lie behind this step. First, a request for support from the Russian president in view of our basic demand, which is the annulment of the treaty—or, to be more precise, the treachery—of 29 June 1945 when the then Czechoslovak foreign minister, Zdenek Fierlinger, signed a treaty with his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov, on the secession of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. Our second aim is to publicize the issue, because—as with Slovakia—the world does not know very much about Ruthenians. At the moment, we are grateful to every reporter for objective information about our emancipatory efforts...

[Dudinsky] What is your view of the statements made by some Hungarian politicians who maintain that they are the representatives of all Hungarians—that is, including those beyond Hungary's borders—and of their attempts to gain crucial influence in the Carpathian basin?

[Ondik] Some 150,000 Hungarians also live on the territory of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. For quite some time, the Hungarians have regarded this territory as part of their mother country and the Carpathian Mountains as the natural border of Greater Hungary. But, I also know that, for example, Debrecen was a Ruthenian town at one time and that the Ruthenians there were assimilated. That is, the Ruthenians are the permanent inhabitants of this territory and they want to reestablish their statehood, while the Hungarians have their statehood—the Republic of Hungary. In Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the people are merely interested in their survival.

[Dudinsky] Let us accept that the present era [sucasnost] were sufficiently tolerant toward you that it would grant you the statute of an independent state. Have you any idea from what economic bearings you would proceed?

[Ondik] The economy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia contributes some $9.5 billion per annum to present-day Ukraine—in salt, forestry resources [lesne bohatstvo], and transit. After all, the largest railroad transfer point in Europe is in Batovo. We have 22 oil and gas pipelines, 360 mineral sources, kaolin, gold, oil, gas—this is another Kuwait in Europe. Some $7,000 per annum would fall to each inhabitant of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This money is currently being lost in the Ukrainian budget...

[Dudinsky] Do you think that Europe would be willing to accept such a Ruthenian state?

[Ondik] In my view, Western Europe is interested in detaching the whole of Ukraine from the former USSR and, if it does not succeed in this, it will have to accept the emancipatory process in this region. The contours for forming our future statehood could be that, by the end of 1995, autonomy would be established in Subcarpathian Ruthenia; but, sovereignty is a longer-term process and it will not come realistically into consideration perhaps until sometime after the year 2000—I will not say whether this will be after the year 2005, 2010, or earlier...

Kuchma Wants Equal Relations With Russia

LD0712182994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1706 GMT 7 Dec 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Russian-Ukrainian summit may be held next January, President Leonid Kuchma told journalists the leaders of the two countries had earlier said that Boris Yeltsin would not go to Kiev before a comprehensive Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between the two countries was completely agreed on by the state delegations.

IF Note: Yeltsin's visit to Kiev, originally planned for the beginning of last September has been repeatedly postponed because the treaty draft was not agreed. Experts began drafting the treaty back in February 1992 on the order of President's Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma.

Kuchma said that Ukraine did not hurry the signing of a comprehensive treaty with Russia. He explained that he

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was unwilling to leave any issues unresolved and that Ukraine needed a treaty which would lead to friendly and equal relations with Russia.

Kuchma said that the Black Sea Fleet remained the sole outstanding issue between the two countries.

The latest round of talks on this issue brought to the fore essential differences between Moscow and Kiev.

In particular, the two sides differ on the division of the fleet infrastructure and on its parts that will service the two new fleets.

Ukraine also objects to Russia having bases in Kerch and Feodosiya and to the idea of moving the Ukrainian naval headquarters from Sevastopol to Donuzlav.

Ukrainian chief negotiator First Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeniy Marchuk said that the two sides could not agree on the status of Sevastopol. In particular, he explained, Russia wants Ukraine to agree that "the Sevastopol naval base is the chief base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This includes the entire city of Sevastopol and the installations in it. Russia also wants to have a military commandant in the city."

Marchuk described these demands as inadmissible for Ukraine. Kiev wants a formulation under which the Russian naval base stays in Sevastopol and uses the infrastructure essential for its functioning.

Kuchma, Moroz See Positive NPT Guarantees

LD0712203394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1735 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev December 7 TASS—The memorandum on security guarantees for Ukraine signed during the CSCE summit meeting in Budapest this week is a historic document, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said.

Speaking at a news conference in Kiev on Wednesday, Kuchma said that the fact that the signing ceremony was attended by the leaders of 52 countries highlights the significance of the memorandum which has opened up a new stage of nuclear disarmament.

The president expressed the confidence that having joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Ukraine will receive the necessary assistance from the West in carrying out economic reform.

In Budapest, Kuchma held bilateral talks with the leaders of 21 countries, who assured him of their readiness to boost cooperation with Ukraine and pledged support.

"They set only one condition—that under no circumstances should Ukraine deviate from the path of radical reform," Kuchma said. "Ukraine has entered such a stage of reform from which there is no way back," he said.

Earlier today, Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz hailed the memorandum, saying that its signing became possible due to Ukraine's well-balanced foreign policy. He said the document provides sufficient security guarantees, but added that "they are sufficient only so long as they are observed."

Kuchma 'Eyes' Iran as Oil Source

LD0712204694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1807 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev December 7 TASS—Ukraine wants to lose its dependence on Russian oil and eyes Iran as an alternative source. Tehran agreed and wants to get Ukrainian aircraft and equipment in exchange.

"We are interested in supplies of Iranian fuel to Ukraine," President Leonid Kuchma said at today's meeting with Iranian Parliament Speaker 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri.

"But we still have certain problems in this field. However, they are to be solved shortly as now we are setting up a representative commission to oversee joint oil projects," Kuchma noted. Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr Plitin will be Ukrainian co-chairman of the commission.

At the same time, Ukrainian Speaker Aleksandr Moroz told a joint news conference later in the day that the current visit by the Iranian delegation helped "get many things moving, including the construction of an oil pipeline from Iran to Ukraine."

"Certainly, it would be cheaper for us to buy oil in Russia, but we should not confine ourselves to one source only," the speaker pointed out.

At the same news conference, the Iranian Parliament chief confirmed that his country is ready not only to supply Ukraine with oil, but also to finance the construction of the pipeline. He told reporters that the talks with Ukraine "open up new vistas for bilateral relations." In particular, "Iran is interested in Ukrainian aircraft, equipment for heavy industry, metals, agricultural products, which meets Ukraine's interests as well," he noted.

During Nateq-Nuri's meeting with the Ukrainian president, the latter said Ukraine is interested in developing all-round relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, both in the political and in the economic sphere.

It was noted at the meeting that the two countries do not have any disagreements in the political field. As for the economic sphere, the accords signed recently are not

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being implemented in full so far. They should become more effective and specific, the negotiating parties pointed out.

The visit by the Iranian delegation also resulted in signing a number of bilateral documents on trade, economic, cultural and scientific relations.

Discusses Gas Pipeline

LD0712183794 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Nateq-Nuri, the speaker of the Islamic Consultative Majles, continuing his visit to Ukraine, met the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, this afternoon.

At the meeting, the Ukrainian president, referring to the CSCE conference in Budapest, explained about Ukrainian developments after its independence and expressed his country's willingness to make use of its resources for the extension of Iran's gas pipeline to Europe.

Nateq-Nuri, expressing hope for the further expansion of relations between the two countries, introduced our country's Minister of Industries Ne'matzadeh as the official on the Iranian side responsible for the economic committee during the visit.

According to a report by the correspondent dispatched to Ukraine by the central news unit's correspondent, the Ukrainian foreign minister visited the Majles speaker at Nateq-Nuri's residence this afternoon. During the meeting the Ukrainian foreign minister briefed the Majles speaker on Ukraine's relations with the Central Asian states and said: Just as Ukraine carries out its obligations at international level, it believes itself duty-bound to carry out its obligations toward Iran as well.

The Majles speaker expressed the hope that the results of his visit are followed up continually by his [the foreign minister's] Iranian counterpart.

Referring to the Serbs' crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said: The Bosnian issue does not merely concern the Muslims. There are humanitarian issues, and the issue of the trampling of human rights in that country. Those who do not confront that crime and remain indifferent to it will be condemned in history.

Nateq-Nuri also visited the Ukrainian Antonov aircraft manufacturing complex this morning.

Kuchma Asserts Chechnya Nonintervention

LD0712202794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1715 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev December 7 TASS—"Ukraine has no intention to intervene in the Chechen conflict. This issue lies within the jurisdiction of the Russian state," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said.

Speaking at a news conference in Kiev on Wednesday, Kuchma said that Russia "shows respect for us by not interfering in the Crimean issue."

At the same time, Kuchma stressed that Ukraine should take care of its citizens living in Chechnya. But this should be done through talks, he said.

UNA-UNSO on Plane, Fighters in Chechnya

LD0712180694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1614 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Nekrasova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lvov, 7 Dec—The transport plane shot down in Chechnya on 5 December was sent there by the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO) and the number of fighters sent to Chechnya by the organization of Ukrainian nationalists is approaching 200. Andriy Shkil, the chairman of the local committee of the UNA-UNSO, revealed this information at a news conference today. He also said that UNA-UNSO fighters are there at the invitation of Dudayev and are ready to defend "Chechen independence."

The temporary information center reported that day [5 December] in Moscow that a plane carrying mercenaries had been downed over Chechnya by helicopters. The center's report was at that time denied by the staff of the Chechen Armed Forces.

Shkil refused to say who had financed the flight and claimed that there had been no fighters aboard—it was, he stressed, carrying a humanitarian cargo: Medicines, bandages, clothing, and food. As for the UNA-UNSO fighters already there, he said that they represented a quarter of the number of Georgians there and a tenth of the number of fighters from Kabardino-Balkaria.

The news conference was called in connection with arrests made in Ukraine by the law enforcement agencies. Thus, four UNA-UNSO leaders in the town of Torez, Donetsk Oblast, and two in Lvov were arrested and charged with possessing arms. Shkil linked these arrests with events in Chechnya and threatened to mount pickets outside militia and counterintelligence service offices if the detainees were not freed by midnight, 9 December.

Crimeans Sign Electricity Protocol in Moscow

LD0712193894 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol [no dateline as received]—Currently on a visit to Moscow, a Crimean Government delegation, led by Prime Minister Anatoliy

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Franchuk, has held a number of meetings and negotiations with responsible officials of the Russian Federation's Government. During the negotiations, there were discussions on cooperation between the Republic of Crimea, the Russian Federation, and the Moscow government in the sphere of trade and economic relations, power engineering, the chemical and electronic industries, agriculture, the development of health resorts, and tourism.

A meeting between Anatoliy Franchuk and Yuriy Shafranik, Russia's fuel and power engineering minister, resulted in a document on cooperation between the Crimean Republic's Government and a number of enterprises, and that ministry. A protocol on the supply of electricity to Crimea was signed, Crimean Parliament Speaker Serhiy Tsekov told journalists.

An agreement on cooperation between the Crimean Government and the joint-stock bank "Orbita" was signed.

Crimea's prime minister and members of the delegation held talks with the Russian Federation Communications Minister, V. Khokhlov [name and title as received], and S. Ilyushyn, the president of the "Elektronika" concern, on cooperation in the electronic and communications industries.

Sevastopol Makes Financial Claims on Black Sea Fleet

MK0712104094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 4

[Report from Simferopol by Viktor Yadukha in the "Problem" column: "Confrontation Between the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol Civilian Authorities Continues. The City Could Lose Its Relative Independence from Kiev and Get Nothing in Exchange"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After relative calm, related to the change of leadership in Ukraine, another grand intrigue is brewing around the Black Sea Fleet. Speaking 15 November in the Russian State Duma hearings on Crimea, Fleet Commander Admiral Baltin had every reason to believe that his report would not go down well in Ukraine. The reason is not only the serious geopolitical disagreements between the Russian admiral and Ukraine politicians, but also his criticism of the three-year-old, multi-stage financial game allowing Ukraine to manipulate whole items of the Russian budget. Even so, the admiral hardly expected confrontation with the civilian authorities of Sevastopol linked with the fleet by one historical and economic fate.

Ten days after the Duma hearings and the publication of the commander's report in Crimea newspapers, the Sevastopol City Council press service described Baltin's thesis that "the city is virtually living off the fleet" as an exaggeration. This was backed up by the fact that "the city budget is based on, among other things, a subvention from the Ukraine state budget in the amount of 337 billion karbovanets which by now the city has drawn in full. Russia has not remitted anything for the upkeep of our city to date." The commander was reminded that the families of military seamen, along with civilian families, use city public utilities and benefits while retirees enjoy free rides in streetcars on a par with other pensioners.

Therefore the first attempt at official polemics between the fleet and the civilian authorities of Sevastopol has been made. Informally the fleet has always been reproached for departmental egoism. In 1991, however, after Kiev's direct jurisdiction was extended to Sevastopol, the relations aggravated. The executive branch and the related private firms are beginning to allege that the fleet is hampering the plan to turn the city into a "flourishing orchard, and a center of world business." Today this idea has been transformed into demands that lands occupied by fleet installations be handed over to the city. For its part, the command says that prior to top-level negotiations about a full division of the Black Sea Fleet there can be no question about transferring fleet lands to the city, especially considering that the city authorities are not even a subject of these negotiations. The seamen cite a telegram by Ukraine Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov: "Esteemed Eduard Dmitriyevich [Baltin], I ask you not to transfer fleet lands to anybody before a division of the Black Sea Fleet."

And of course it would be silly on the part of Russia to take on de jure maintenance of a Ukraine city with a bloated administrative apparatus, with a Ukraine internal affairs directorate, communications and parasitic-minded private structures pending a government decision about leasing the bases or their use on other grounds. The fleet, half of whose conscripts are Ukraine citizens, is even now fully supported by the Russian budget, including inadequate customs duties on fuel and food supplies. According to the Black Sea Fleet financial services, the fleet pays 42 different taxes to the Ukraine budget whose aggregate sum exceeds 50 percent of the Crimea budget. In the first six months of 1994 alone the fleet has paid 243 billion karbovanets in various taxes, not counting the losses sustained in the process of remitting salaries from Russia at a fixed exchange rate. Against this backdrop the "easy credits" and "subventions" from Kiev, in which the Sevastopol authorities take such pride, appear to be only a partial return of what has been taken illegally.

The emerging confrontation is also complicated by strained personal relations between the leading officials. Malicious tongues say that this was due to Sevastopol Mayor Viktor Semenov's resentment of Adm. Baltin, who allegedly gave him a bad image. Observers believe that this is quite plausible: Both chiefs are known for their ambitions, but at this point a "third force" comes into play. Citing a conversation, secretly recorded, between Semenov and Yevgeniy Podanev, leader of Crimea's largest [criminal] grouping and who was killed in June at his dacha, the press has put out a version that Semenov has been undermining Baltin's positions,

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trying, through Pavel Grachev himself, to have him replaced with Adm. Ustimenko, Northern Fleet first deputy commander, in order to implement some grand project. The Sevastopol mayor has not tried publicly to rebut this version. Experts believe that if such a recording actually exists, it was, in all likelihood, made by special services because unauthorized access to the assassinated authority's dacha was virtually impossible. It is also noteworthy that the transcript of this conversation was first published in Kiev 17 November, i.e., sent to press almost simultaneously with Baltin's statement in the Russian Duma.

This version not only clearly devalues Russian policy in the Black Sea region but also calls into question the promising idea of creating a single fleet combining the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukraine Navy. Analysis of financial claims on the fleet on the part of the Sevastopol authorities, the inadequate ambitions of people involved, and the openly instigative position by Kiev points to a similarity between this situation and the recent crisis in Crimea. Observers suppose that the confrontation between the fleet command and the city along the lines of a Crimea scenario is being provoked by Kiev in the run-up to negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet in order to assume, at the right moment, the role of an arbiter and finally take the situation in hand. For its part the Black Sea Fleet command believes that the emerging confrontation can only end up in the city authorities' losing their present relative independence from Kiev, getting nothing in exchange.

National Affairs

Factions Challenge Moroz, Left Leadership

WS0812100694 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0319 GMT 8 Dec 94

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Oksana Hasiuk]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Dec. 7.—Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz is likely to return back from the upcoming Christmas recess and face a major challenge to his leadership, according to sources in national-democratic and centrist factions.

Six factions—Rukh, Reforms, Interregional Deputy Group, Unity, Statehood and Center—are reportedly fed up with the leadership of Moroz—who heads the Socialist party—and his leftist-dominated presidium.

The leading candidate to replace the speaker is Oleksandr Karpov, who heads the Interregional faction favored by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Although national democrats would prefer to see one of their own number in the speaker's post, many of them are saying that they will nonetheless push his candidacy because of the blocs strong position in the Rada [parliament] and its influence in the Executive Branch.

Other names being floated include Valeriy Cherep of the Center faction, who reportedly enjoys support from the right.

In addition, nationalists are reportedly insistent that a member of Rukh be named deputy speaker.

Soviet Sets Election Date for 'Invalid' Regions

LD0712232794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1851 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decided Wednesday to put off for one year the re-elections in those constituencies where the elections have been recognized as invalid three times and in those where deputies have never been elected.

According to the Ukrainian Central Election Commission, there are a total of 43 such constituencies, including 16 in Kiev.

Central Election Commission Chairman Ivan Yemets told the session that a trend for lower electors' activity was taking shape in the republic. As many as 75.6 percent of electors took part in the March 27 elections, while a total of 51.1 percent went to the ballot box on July 24 and only 41.5 percent on November 20.

At present, the Ukrainian parliament consists of 404 deputies. The powers of another three deputies have not yet been confirmed. A total of 43 seats remain vacant.

Mercenary Recruiters Receive Criminal Sentences

AU0712142594 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 6 Dec 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "For the First Time, Recruiters of Mercenaries Have Been Sentenced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time in Ukraine's judicial practice, the Kiev Oblast Court has passed a sentence in a criminal case involving mercenary activities. Three of our compatriots—Oleksandr Rudenko, Andriy Petryk, and Pavlo Stutskyy—and also Azerbaijani citizen Fizuli Verdiyev were found guilty of recruiting, financing, and delivering militants to areas of the armed conflict on the territory of Azerbaijan.

Verdiyev, who also committed other crimes (contraband and illegal operations with currency), has been sentenced to seven years imprisonment with confiscation of currency and personal property. Rudenko and Petryk were given, respectively, three and a half and three years in a corrective-labor colony with strict regime, and Stutskyy was given a one-year suspended sentence.

As is known, Ukraine has joined the international convention on combating mercenaries. Thus, the first organizers of the "wild geese" pack are already heading for places of confinement.

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Kuchma Prioritizes Defense Factory Privatization

LD0712211994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1916 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The defense factories must be privatized as a first priority in Ukraine, President Leonid Kuchma said. He said at a news conference in Kiev on December 7 that the defense factories accounted for one third of the country's industry but they were used only to 10 percent of their capacity.

He sharply criticized the Ukrainian parliament for including bakeries together with defense industries into a list of factories not to be privatized.

Kuchma argued that nuclear power stations, weaponry production and railroads could not be privatized. He said, however, that those who stayed on the list of factories not to be privatized would not be allowed to parasite on the state.

Kuchma did not think that the government pursued his policies. He complained that he had found gas supplies cut when he had returned from the U.S. and when he had returned from Budapest and asked if the government was unable to tackle such minor issues.

Kuchma emphasized that he was prepared to shoulder the responsibility for appointing the government and for the government's activities and so he wanted this provision to be included in the power legislation.

Deputy Suggests Economic, Political Program

WS0612143094 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 23 Nov 94 pp 4, 5

[Article by Professor Volodymyr Pylypchuk, academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Economic Sciences, member of the "Statehood" legislative faction: "What Does the Future Have in Store for Us?"

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] **Calling the situation in Ukraine "simple" would be a great exaggeration. However, that situation did not develop independently—it is a derivative of the situation in the legislature, and the latter's relations with the president, the government, and the National Bank. I intend to devote this article to politics rather than economy, given that the faithful followers of the cause of Stalin and Lenin at the Ukrainian Supreme Council have implemented Stalin's well-known postulate that politics inevitably takes precedence over economy. That is to say that Ukraine's economy, and thus, the living standards of our people have become victims of politics, particularly the political games of the pro-communist majority of both the former and the current parliaments.**

Instead of a Foreword

I was inspired to "take the stylus" when the Supreme Council's 4 November plenary session, following a two-week recess, announced a draft package of legislative acts on social issues—wages, prices, and social protection. It then turned out that there was nothing to discuss—the documents were not ready. Communist deputies, along with socialists, started to put the blame on national-democratic deputies and their program of market reform, and to criticize the president's program.

This is very strange. Communists and socialists are trying again to blame someone else for the state of things in the country and for the imperfection of the legal acts, and to evade responsibility instead of suggesting a resolution to the current problems. That is why I will try to briefly assess from an economic perspective the issues that were to have been discussed; however, I am going to concentrate on the political aspect of the matter.

First, I would like to definitely point out that efficient social protection of the people is impossible in light of the current situation, due to a dramatic reduction of production volumes in Ukraine.

If we ignored prices and wages, and distributed all the manufactured consumer goods for free among the Ukrainian people, the volume of the former would be insufficient to form a minimum consumer basket. For instance, less than one keg of meat per capita is produced monthly, while the medically substantiated norm is six keg. Thus, regardless of the level of wages and prices, only those things can be consumed which have been produced. There are not enough products to fill the consumer basket. Where is the solution? It lies in reform, which would make it possible to constantly increase the GNP and the national income. Without increasing the gross national income there will be nothing to distribute, redistribute, buy, or consume. However, worthless discussions on social protection can continue forever.

Second, I am convinced that an increase in labor productivity is the sole basis for raising people's living standards.

Third, it has been proven that any increase in wages not accompanied by an adequate growth in production causes prices to go up, but has no effect on living standards.

Fourth, it is technically impossible to introduce a planned socialist-type economy in Ukraine, which would include a planned, scientifically justified regulation of prices and planned distribution of all kinds of resources, given that:

—The methodology and programs for introducing a planned economy have been retained by Moscow. It would take decades to create them in Ukraine;

—Even if those documents were to be obtained through the "fraternal" Communist Party of Russia, it would be impossible to apply them in Ukraine, because the USSR had an absolutely different production structure, and interbranch and interproduct [mizhproduktovi] balances were calculated with an eye to this

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structure in natural and price indicators. Those balances were based on domestic cooperation, cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON], and the international division of labor. Ukraine has a different structure of production and import-export operations. Thus, it would take some 10 years to "work to perfection" the methodology and programs for Ukraine, provided we find specialists and funds. Even if the methodology and programs were to be received from Moscow and were to be "worked to perfection" by the Ukrainian Communist Party, the states of the former USSR, COMECON, and the socialist camp would not provide former ties, because they are undergoing market transformations.

Thus, the market and businessmen, and not the state would determine which products to manufacture, with whom and when to trade, what prices to fix, and what currency to choose.

Even if positive answers existed to all the aforementioned "if's," to draft plans in their old form, Ukraine would have to multiply the number of computer centers that once belonged to the State Committee for Planning, and train specialists. For this, we would need two or three years and almost $1.5 billion. I do not think that we have enough time and that the IMF would finance this.

Thus, we can state that in Ukraine, a planned socialist economy built on contribution and distribution is dead and buried. Thus, let us not waste time. We should accelerate market-type transformations, which would produce the following effects:

—Owners would not steal their own property;

—Owners would not work unproductively and inefficiently;

—Competition among owners to acquire consumers would cause the quality of production to increase and prices to go down;

—Society would be freed of inefficient administrators and owners, whose companies would become bankrupt;

—Freedom of entrepreneurship would help fill the market with products and services, and raise people's living standards.

Can Reform Be Expedited? Under What Conditions?

Before answering this question let us go back again to the 4 November plenary session. The communists and socialists blamed democrats, market programs, and the president for the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine, and for failure to resolve the problem of social protection.

As we know, a certain stabilization of inflationary processes was achieved at the beginning of 1994, which would be worth solidifying to carry out reform, step up production, and increase people's living standards. However in May (when the new legislature started functioning), a political fuss started, accompanied by incompetent intervention in the economy on the part of the pro-communist bloc of deputies. Thus, the current aggravation of the situation as compared to January-May 1994, is an "accomplishment" of the new legislature and government. The pro-communist majority has been implementing its own economic program. Thus, democrats should not be made scapegoats again. The implementation of President Kuchma's program has not even started. Now, let us see whether democrats are guilty of hampering discussions on the social package.

First, pro-communist forces have the majority of seats in the legislature (this has been demonstrated by the results of voting on lifting the ban on the activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and thus, can discuss any issue and pass any resolution they want.

Second, the Ukrainian Supreme Council leadership is totally "red."

Third, the "reds" constitute 75 percent of the Supreme Council Presidium.

Fourth, the chairman of the Commission for the Issues of Social Protection is a social democrat and his deputy—a socialist. The Commission for the Issues of Economic Policy is mostly pro-communist. The banking commission chairman voted for lifting the ban on the activities of the Communist Party.

Fifth, the Ukrainian prime minister has stated that he has not abandoned the ranks of the Communist Party. After presenting his program, he swore allegiance to the leftist cause.

Six, those people and structures were supposed to draft a package of legislative acts on social protection during the two-week recess, and submit it for the Supreme Council's consideration. This has not been done. Who is to blame, the democrats? Did the legislative speaker learn about price increases from the mass media? If an issue is not ready for discussion, a plenary session can be postponed. Who convened it, the democrats?

The pro-communist forces presented the working people with a "gift" to commemorate the anniversary of the October mutiny and coup—another price hike and a lack of social guarantees.

The democrats have suggested: Let us not call a recess; let us work on 7 and 8 November [anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution], make it a "holiday of communist labor," and discuss the issue of social protection, instead of marching with Lenin's and Stalin's portraits and slogans calling for the restoration of the USSR. The communists did not support that suggestion. Do they really care about the people or are they resolving their

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own political problems? Do the political interests of communists match the interests of the people of Ukraine? They do not.

How Can One Define the Strategy of the Pro-Communist Forces in the Ukrainian Legislature

1. Populist actions:

—Long discussions about stopping inflation always end up in new spins, due to the continuous emission of unbacked money and subsidies for inefficient enterprises;

—Fiery appeals for curbing the growth of prices for the basic products are accompanied by demands to increase prices for agricultural products;

—While demanding that producers be protected, the pro-communist forces produce more red tape to hamper the activities of the former, and continue to support inefficient enterprises;

—They appeal to reduce taxes, however take absolutely no measures. Meanwhile, this issue can be resolved in a couple of hours;

—Instead of assisting war veterans, huge sums of money are wasted on all kinds of celebrations, while pensions are curbed despite assurances by the law;

—The protection of people's living standards for years on end is reduced to discussions, while prices have been "regulated" eight times now;

—The only electoral promise kept by the communists is their pledge to return baloney at 2.2 karbovantsi per keg to food stores (the current price, however, is 2.2 million karbovantsi per keg).

2. Primitive actions:

—The pro-communist forces demanded that the planned economy be restored, although they had no idea of the scope of work, expenditures, and time necessary for the implementation of that task. They refuse to admit that one-third of the nations which advocated the communist way of development have abandoned it as erroneous, utopian, and nonpragmatic, and returned to a normal economy;

—They have turned the parliament into a communist rally where they talk about everything they know; where they discuss their parochial interests (the Communist Party, the USSR, socialism), instead of passing laws necessary for market-type reform. They have not passed a single fundamental law that would help change the state of things;

—Parliamentary sessions devoted to the economy resemble a session at the Ministry of Agriculture Board or a briefing at that ministry.

Thus, the functions of the executive authority, particularly the government, particularly one of its departments are being duplicated. The legislature has been playing the role (very ineffectively) of a plant production controller, perhaps led by Lenin's well-known idea that a country can be ruled as one huge factory;

—Objective economic laws of monetary circulation, value, and so on are being ignored;

—The pro-communist majority feels an aggressive nostalgia for the principle "expropriate and distribute." They would like to nationalize banks and property, to "divide and rule."

3. Destructive and confrontational actions:

—They are blocking presidential initiatives;

—They are unwilling to cooperate with the national-democratic forces to carry out the program for overcoming the crisis and to reform the economy;

—They are waging a war against the developing middle class of owners;

—While demanding a just privatization, the pro-communist forces have not drafted their own privatization bill, which would correspond to that demand;

—While demanding social protection of the people, they did not submit an appropriate bill for discussion. Neither have they drafted bills improving the policy of interest rates, credits, deposits, and currency exchange rates;

—All suggestions expressed by the noncommunist bloc are rejected and no optional solutions proposed. One does not have to be a deputy to voice his demands—this can be done by any average citizen. Meanwhile at the Supreme Council, one has to transform their knowledge into legislative documents, given that claims, complaints, laments, execration, and accusations are not parliamentary products. Instead, the legislature should produce concrete laws, resolutions, and programs.

4. False and perfidious actions:

—Speaking at the parliament, the pro-communist forces call for peace and accord, but at their party congresses they call for violence: "Arise the damned of the earth..., we will destroy the world to its base..., this is our ultimate and decisive fight";

—While advocating Ukraine's territorial integrity at the Supreme Council, the same deputies urge the "restoration of a single USSR," and demand "a single Soviet motherland" and the denunciation of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements;

—In parliament, they advocate civic accord, but at their congresses and meetings they refuse to cooperate with democrats, they pit eastern Ukraine against the nationalist western oblasts; they pit Ukrainians against Russians, and different religions against one another;

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—In parliament, they demand that Ukraine be treated with respect by the world community, but at their rallies and congresses they attack developed nations, calling them "capitalist sharks"; they reject assistance from international economic institutions;

—In parliament and in their declarations they claim that they do not want Ukraine to become an appendix of some other state. Meanwhile in reality, including at Supreme Council sessions, they are hampering the construction of the Odessa oil terminal;

—They champion honesty and decency, but in parliament, they fake the results of voting (for instance, on lifting the ban on the Communist Party);

—They never wear deputies' badges at the Supreme Council, but they always wear them at official meetings with foreigners;

—They uphold the law, yet disregard the Law on Languages, they are terrified by the legalized symbols of the Ukrainian state, and do not want to apply the provisions of the law to the Crimean authorities, which violate the Constitution of Ukraine.

5. Antipopular actions:

—They support the USSR, although at the referendum held on 1 December 1991 the people voted for the Independence Act;

—The people supported the president's economic program by giving him their votes, but the pro-communist forces reject the principal provisions of that program.

6. Antihuman actions:

—Intolerance of opposition and opponents;

—Intolerance of human rights and freedoms, including the rights to property and land. Opposition against free entrepreneurship (the pro-communist forces advocate regulation and control);

—Constant political terror (in the press and in declarations) against reformers, who are blamed for nonexistent sins and crimes;

—Demands to be given power for three months to shoot a part of the people (the communist-fascist version of restoring order);

—Physiological hatred of intelligent people and intellectuals, attempts to depict them as enemies, discredit, insult, and, if possible, annihilate them.

7. Anti-Ukrainian actions:

Ukraine cannot exist as an independent state, because it depends on Russia's power sources. The pro-communist forces, as I have already mentioned, are blocking the construction of the oil terminal (one can compare the lists of those who voted against alternative energy sources, and those who voted for the annulment of the ban on the Communist Party);

—They consider the Soviet Union, not Ukraine, to be their motherland, claiming that the motherland has been dismembered and destroyed;

—They sling mud at those who have proven with their lives their loyalty to Ukraine, at those who, in fact have won statehood;

—There is no country in the world in which lawmakers are trying to liquidate statehood.

I hope that after this analysis of the actions of the pro-communist forces at the Ukrainian legislature, most people have no more illusions regarding those forces. They cannot lead Ukraine out of the crisis; they cannot improve people's lives, because they have no patriotic feelings, no constructive thinking, and no professionalism. Patriotism is not only love for a state's name or territory. Primarily, it is love for the people, their culture and history. [passage omitted]

How Things Will Develop

Theoretically, the following scenarios are possible:

1. The pro-communist forces may give up their strategy and tactics of resistance, and concentrate on accelerating market-type reform in accordance with the Ukrainian president's program. In this case, in terms of living standards Ukraine will be able to approach the most developed nations of the world by the end of this century.

2. The pro-communist bloc may continue its policy of exacerbating the situation and confrontation with the president and the opposition. In this case, a civil war is possible, given that the people can no longer stand the lowering of their living standards. Reforms are causing a shock. After the war, transition to a market economy could be made. To prevent a civil war, the president might use Yeltsin's variant of resolving problems with the legislature. Market reform may then be implemented.

3. If the pro-communist bloc continues to resist reform and becomes more "rigid" the president may resort to a referendum. Whom would the people support—the president or the Supreme Council? Early elections may be called then, and after that, market reform may be carried out.

4. If the pro-communist bloc continues to resist reform, but becomes more "flexible," the implementation of reform may be regulated by presidential edicts. The lawmakers may be sent on vacation for a year or so, or else they may concentrate on other areas of legislative activities.

5. If the first, the third, and the fourth variants do not take place, the coming catastrophe can only be averted by proclaiming dictatorship. Who will become the dictator?

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If the leftist forces do, the extermination of the right will come first, but finally, the left will become history. After that, reform may be implemented.

If the rightist politicians come to power, we will avoid a "bloodbath," and leftist parties will be banned for good as profascist. Incidentally, leftist parties in the West have an ideology which is different from the ideology of their allies in the former USSR.

If the president holds power, reform will take place, but it is not clear whether Ukraine will exist as an [independent] state.

6. The legislature could call early elections. Procommunist forces in the new parliament would be much weaker. Market reform could be implemented after the elections.

We will live and see. However, it is evident that the current composition of the parliament does not suit Ukraine's social needs. At the same time, market reform will be carried out regardless of the scenario, but its price would be much higher because of the destructive stance of the leftist forces in the legislature. Thus, we should waste no time and try to use the first, or at least the fourth scenario.

Kuchma Adviser on NPT, Weapons, Politics

WS0812115894 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 2 Dec 94 p 4

[Interview with General Major Vadym Hrechaninov, presidential military adviser, by Anatoliy Smetanin; place and date not given: "My Post Is Both Military and Political"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **General Major Vadym Oleksandrovych Hrechaninov is a graduate of the Kharkov Aviation School of Navigators, the Antiaircraft Defense Academy, and the Staff Academy. He has been serving in the Ukrainian Army since the first days of its existence—as chief of the Defense Ministry Center for Operational-Strategic Research and as deputy chief of the National Committee for Disarmament. Since July 1993, he has been deputy defense minister for military policy issues. He has a doctorate and is a member of the Academy of Engineering and the Aerospace Academy of Ukraine. He is also Ukrainian president's military adviser.**

[Smetanin] Is your post military or political?

[Hrechaninov] First of all, it is political. Particularly now, when our Army is living through a transitional period and facing social problems. My primary duty is to resolve military- political problems and to prepare recommendations for the president.

[Smetanin] The ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a major political accomplishment of Leonid Kuchma and his team. The overall significance of the NPT is immense. What concrete message does it have for the military?

[Hrechaninov] One thing is clear: We must think how to prepare our Armed Forces for fighting a war using solely conventional arms. I believe that our military officials should accept the approach of the United States where they count every soldier killed in action. The Persian Gulf operation is a good example. The Americans suffered insignificant personnel losses there, most of them at the preparatory stage. Has anybody counted how many Arabs [Iraquis] died there? Let me cite a couple more examples: Only 28 U.S. paratroopers were killed in Panama; meanwhile 530 British soldiers died during the Falkland operation, thousands of miles from their homeland.

[Smetanin] During a televised interview, Volodymyr Mukhin, chairman of the Supreme Council Committee for Defense and National Security, pointed out that the elimination of nuclear arms should result in the development of new types of weapons, including high- precision weapons. Will Ukraine produce them?

[Hrechaninov] Indeed, we should admit that if a state (such as Ukraine) eliminates one type of arms—nuclear, which served as a deterrent—it should develop an alternative of some sort. Those should be weapons which would serve to deter an aggressor under the new circumstances. High-precision weapons, too, can perform that function. At present, all developed states are working to create such weapons. I think that Ukraine is not an exception, particularly since we do not have to start from scratch. The new models, once used in combat, should be directed mainly against command posts and other important facilities, the loss of which can cause disruption of control over armed forces and defense systems in general. Meanwhile, those weapons do not lead to casualties among civilians. Take, for instance the attack of F-111 aircraft on Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's palace in Libya. However, I am sure that the use of deterrent and response-attack weapons should be regulated at the international level.

[Smetanin] Do you not think that if someone combines the posts of defense minister and minister for the military-industrial complex this may produce negative consequences? Trading in arms and hardware is an easy road to bribes and corruption....

[Hrechaninov] I support the appointment of Valeriy Shmarov. On the other hand, all instances of concentration of power in one pair of hands may have negative effects. Arms trade is commonplace worldwide, and this business should not be regarded solely from the perspective of personal profits of those involved in it. Unfortunately in Ukraine, too, there have been negative examples of that kind. However, I hope that those specialists who have recently achieved positions of leadership—most of them analysts—will be able to put things in order. I would like to point out that the times of enthusiasts and altruists are over. Nowadays, people demand good salaries for any sort of jobs.

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[Smetanin] What is your viewpoint regarding Ukraine's participation in resolving the Georgian-Abkhasian and the Karabakh conflicts?

[Hrechaninov] I think that in the Black Sea area, not far from our borders, we should be able to exert some kind of influence on the situation. I believe that the issue of Ukrainian observers' presence in those zones is urgent. However, the military contingents represented there should be formed on a multinational basis, and operate in line with the UN and CSCE principles. In light of the situation, preference should not be given to any individual state, because the elimination of such conflicts is a task for the entire international community.

It is hard to discuss that matter at this point. Everything is still in the initial phase. Yet we must remember that people are dying in the Caucasian conflicts, and nobody seems to be counting casualties.

[Smetanin] Have you already suggested anything to the president?

[Hrechaninov] During our first meeting, I told him that we should expedite the restructuring of the Defense Ministry central administration.

[Smetanin] Do you believe that the Defense Ministry will welcome the idea?

[Hrechaninov] I am sure they will not, but the point is that the defense minister should accelerate the forming of his semicivilian team, on which he will be able to rely. There are many appropriate candidates.

Kiev Favors Nonpolitical Crimean Agreement

LD0712153094 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The president and the Government of Ukraine are prepared to sign any agreement with Crimea other than a political one, deputy Petro Stepanyuk, a member of the Supreme Council interim commission for issues of studying the situation in Crimea, said at a news conference in Simferopol on 6 December. According to him, there are forces in the Crimean parliament that are involved in intrigues with Kiev, Moscow, and their own population.

Despite this, Mr. Stepanyuk stressed, Ukraine has rendered and will render assistance to Crimea as a constituent part of Ukraine.

Navy Looks To Promising Prospects

MM0712152994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Pasyakin under the "Postscriptum. Events and Commentaries" rubric: "Ukrainian Navy Is Expanding and...Falling Apart. Will There Be a Joint Fleet on Black Sea?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today there are five ships in the Ukrainian Navy. That's not many. True, unlike the relatively large but constantly shrinking Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian Navy is being replenished with new ships. As yet with those which were laid down in the shipyards back when the USSR existed. But, despite Ukraine's extremely serious economic situation, it looks like a prospect of replenishing the national navy specifically with Ukrainian ships has emerged. It has become known that the ceremonial laying down of a new small ASW ship Zaporizhska Sich has been planned at Kiev's "Leninska Kuznya" shipyard. According to Rear Admiral Mikola Kostriv, deputy commander of the Ukrainian Navy, the laying down of the new ship has been timed to coincide with the third anniversary of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The Zaporizhska Sich will become the third ASW ship of its class after the Lutsk, which is already in service, and the Ternopil, which is under construction in Kiev. In the opinion of Mikola Kostriv, the Ukrainian Navy, which, it can be said, has been created through the military department's enthusiasm, is in a state of normal combat readiness and is carrying out a number of state tasks. Evidence of this is fighting ships' participation in voyages, international exercises, and official visits.

At the same time, the Ukrainian Navy is in a lamentable state with regard to its "physical, moral, and material situation." This is not just due to a shortage of petroleum oils and lubricants and technical equipment. Rear Admiral Kostriv admits that during this year alone about 300 officers quit the Ukrainian Navy. The reasons were their impoverished position, the lack of career prospects, a sense of the uselessness of their work, and the top naval brass' inability to resolve social problems.

True, there is now light at the end of the tunnel. In the shape of the Black Sea Fleet possibly uniting with the Ukrainian Navy. Officers of the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy have signed a joint letter on this subject to the Russian and Ukrainian leaderships, and have declared themselves in support of the swiftest possible resolution of the question of unification within the framework of he Russian-Ukrainian treaty which is in preparation. However, this immediately caused dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian Navy's command as unification threatens the top level in the military with the loss of their senior posts.

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Belarus

Chyhir, Chernomyrdin Work Out Economic Accords

LD0712181894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belarus Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir on Thursday leaves for a visit to Moscow.

On Friday he is due to sign about 20 accords with his Russian counterpart, Viktor Chernomyrdin, to form a basis for future economic union between the two post-Soviet states, Chyhir's spokesman Sergey Dubovik told Interfax. The documents include a customs union treaty and an agreement to set up Russo-Belarussian industrial and financial groups.

A key political treaty between the two countries will be signed by their presidents during a visit to Minsk by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Dubovik said. "The exact date for the trip has not yet been set, but it's clear that it won't happen before the Russian president is back from Ukraine," the spokesman said.

Yeltsin's visit to Ukraine has tentatively been scheduled for the beginning of next year.

Lukashenka Enforces Ethics Edict, Fires Minister

MM0712135394 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by Valeriy Kholod: "'Retired Generals' Plot'. How People in Uniform Understand Ethics in Belorussia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk—The wedding of the daughter of former Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy and the son of parliamentary Speaker Mechyslaw Hryb, which took place on the territory of a military unit with Army service personnel, gave President Alyaksandr Lukashenka grounds not just for removing the minister from office but also for dismissing him from the Army entirely. But it is interesting to compare two formulations.

Here is an extract from the edict of the President of the Republic of Belorussia [Belarus]: "For using his official position for personal ends and causing the state great harm, Pavel Pavlovich Kozlovskiy is to be demoted to the rank of lieutenant general. A.I. Kostenko, defense minister of the Republic of Belorussia, is instructed to resolve the question of the advisability of P.P. Kozlovskiy's continued presence in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belorussia...."

But here is what the ministerial document says: "In accordance with the statute on the performance of military service by officers of the Republic of Belorussia Armed Forces, Pavel Pavlovich Kozlovskiy is to be discharged into the reserve with the right to wear the uniform of lieutenant general. I express gratitude for his impeccable service in the Armed Forces."

Incidentally, the boss was followed into civilian life by a group of close associates. All these people are still fairly active and the role of pensioner is demeaning for them, to say the least. They have abandoned their military uniforms but have no intention of quitting big-time politics.

Meanwhile, the president has received a statement signed by six generals. The statement is emotional in character and contains no specific evidence of the complete collapse of the Army as described by its authors.

In the best traditions of the dissident movement in this country, a press conference has been held at the former defense minister's apartment where Pavel Pavlovich once more rejected all the accusations made against him and told journalists that he had no intention of giving up.

Unions Protest 'Misery,' Call For Tax Changes

LD0712211494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1916 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Association of Independent Industrial Trade Unions of Belarus sent a statement to the president and government Wednesday saying that the association was prepared to share in mass protest early in 1995 against the falling standards and misery of the working people.

The trade unions want the authorities to pass an order that the wages be paid before factories pay taxes to the budget. The authors of the document call for reducing the taxes levied on the industries and removal of restrictions imposed on the wage payment and consumption funds of factories.

Alyaksandr Bukhvostov, a cochairman of the association, told Interfax that the protest had been triggered by the inability of the authorities to deliver on their promises such as having all idling factories work before the new year and creating an economic climate favoring sales of their products by the factories.

Bukhvostov said that 10 factories whose workers are members of the association had either completely stopped work or frozen certain shops. Every other factory in the country does not operate a full working day or a full working week. The economic reform does not lead to regular work, Bukhvostov believes.

Moldova

Government Restricts Food Exports

AU0712173494 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2254 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, INFOTAG, 6/12/1994—As from December 1, the Moldovan Government imposed restrictions for exports of some food

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products and raw materials. All contracts for exports of particularly important products have to be registered in the Foreign Economic Relations Department of the Economy Ministry.

The list of the "strategic" products includes sugar-beet, sunflower seeds, non-fermented tobaccos, industrial waste fit for producing combined animal food, cattle, sugar, vegetable oils, milk powder, concentrated apple juice, butter, alcohol, eggs and egg products, processed and unprocessed skins.

Agriculture Industry 'Needs' Private Investment

AU0612145894 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1940 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 5/12/1994—The notions of some people that the Moldovan agro-industrial complex is well-developed are nothing but an illusion, believes Ivan Sturza, president of Incon joint-stock society that unites seven largest canned-food factories of Moldova.

"The complex urgently needs new investment by 100 percent. Absolutely everything needs to be modernized in it. This sector of economy is totally incomparable with the really advanced 'world level.' We have not only stopped in our development, but are falling down to the most primitive, lowest level of agriculture. Most of those who are ardently wishing 'to do something' have no even a faintest idea about what things are like in reality," Sturza said.

In his firm opinion, practically nobody of private foreign partners show serious interest to work in Moldova. Financial assistance and investment come mainly from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Bank, USAID, and all the three agencies have chosen Incon for a partner in Moldova.

"We have long tried to attract prominent packed-food producers to work in Moldova, but our efforts came to be fruitless. We cooperate excellently as long as we work at the level of semi-finished products. But the moment we enter the next and final level—production of ready food—we immediately become rivals to them, at Eastern markets first and foremost. They fully understand that if we begin producing, say, tetrapacked juice and send several million packages to Russia, they will lose competition to us, at least in terms of our lower prices," Sturza said.

At present, Incon is very active at Western and CIS markets. The company is one of the biggest suppliers of concentrated apple juice to Europe, and exports also frozen and dried fruit.

In Sturza's opinion, the canned food industry is one of the most promising in the Moldovan agro-industrial complex, and it has achieved a much greater progress than in any other sectors, having received some $100 million worth of commercial investment during the past five-six years.

Other fairly promising sectors in need of investment are sugar and essential-oil industries, wine-making, tobacco-growing, and animal breeding.

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Kazakhstan

Almaty To Be Stricter on Loan Guarantees

LD0712193494 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 3 Dec 94 p 5

[FBIS Translated Text] On 16 November the Cabinet of Ministers adopted another resolution to regulate the way government guarantees for attracting foreign credits are calculated. Because of a deterioration in the situation due to the large disbursements made from the budget to pay off the principal debt and concomitant expenditures, and because of the need to find foreign currency funds to repay insolvent enterprises' debts to foreign creditors, the Cabinet of Ministers canceled 18 governmental guarantees issued between February 1993 and April 1994 and worth a total of 359.5 million dollars, as well as an agreement under which India was to supply credit of 10 million dollars, which was not backed by the relevant agreements.

In addition, the document establishes a compulsory one-time payment for the issue and registration of government guarantees, equivalent to two percent of the sum of the credit for which the guarantee is granted, on prepayment terms. Starting from 1 December this year, a risk payment is to be introduced for registered government guarantees, to be calculated at one percent per annum of the unrepaid portion of the credit, payable in the currency in which the guarantee was granted. The Ministry of Finance is to open a special account at the National Bank for this revenue.

Another innovation introduced by the document is that when lenders obtain a government guarantee, they will be obliged to provide pledges (or counterguarantees) for a sum not less than the amount of credit granted. The Ministry of Finance has been instructed to reregister government guarantees issued previously to come into line with these conditions within one month, using the actual debt on unrepaid credits for its calculations and issuing a new registration number. If the guarantee that has been granted has not been used within a six-month period it is automatically canceled.

The government's position on enterprises that are not funded out of the state budget is somewhat tougher. Guarantees for them will be registered on condition that they seek their own sources of funding for clearing their foreign loans, and proof that these sources really exist must be furnished. All government guarantees which have not gone through the reregistration process by 1 January will be considered null and void. Credits received under these guarantees will not be repayable out of state budget funds.

The main tax inspectorate at the Ministry of Finance and the State Committee on Financial Supervision have been given strict instructions to monitor lenders who are using guarantees, up to and including freezing their bank accounts.

CSCE Security Guarantees Welcomed for Kazakhstan

LD0712204794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1937 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Zhirnikhin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest December 7 TASS—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev praised a memorandum on security guarantees for Kazakhstan signed by the major nuclear powers during the CSCE summit meeting in Budapest as a historic event.

In an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS on Wednesday [7 December], Nazarbayev, who is in Hungary on an official visit, said that the memorandum guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan, and non-aggression, both conventional and nuclear, against it.

Under the memorandum, if an aggression is committed against Kazakhstan, the U.N. Security Council must respond immediately. This is vital for Kazakhstan's security and for its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free country, he said.

Speaking about the results of the European security meeting, Nazarbayev said that the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that existed during the cold war era has receded into the past along with the East-West confrontation. The CSCE should become an instrument for resolving the existing conflicts, using preventing diplomacy and preventing new conflicts.

The new international situations requires a stronger CSCE. The United Nations is now involved in peacekeeping operations in 17 trouble spots across the globe and so far, unfortunately, with "little effect," the president said.

The decision to transform the CSCE into an effective organisation to safeguard peace and security on the European continent was supported by all CSCE summit participants, he added.

The fact that the summit meeting failed to adopt a decision on Bosnia-Herzegovina only highlights the complexity of the situation there, he continued. "some consider one side to be the aggressor, others see the other side as such. However, the very fact that there are so many armed people in Bosnia shows that this is an extremely difficult problem to solve. We know this from our own experience in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan."

"It is very hard to resolve such problems quickly. It is a very sad fact that such a bloodshed is taking place in the very centre of Europe, where 200,000 people have already died, and there is no end in sight. It is also sad that the European Community and the U.N. cannot resolve this problem and out an end to the conflict," Nazarbayev said.

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Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Addresses Constitutional Assembly

LD0712201894 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1055 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by President Askar Akayev to the Constitutional Assembly in Bishkek; date not given; monitored in progress—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] The economic situation in Kyrgyzstan is difficult. People's social position, the low standard of political and legal culture, and the still unconsolidated structures of popular power, which we are only now forming—all this forms the material for the problem of democracy in the transition period. This is why it is apparent that it is not democracy that is characteristic of this period, (?oddly enough), but rather pre-democracy, if one can put it that way—a gradual democratization of all aspects of public life.

A prolonged period of creating the prerequisites for democracy is particularly necessary in view of the fact that the communist regime, which quite a lot people still miss, proved to be totally incapable of productive reform and gradual change.

Now the former party nomenklatura, which finds itself out of power, is criticizing us with the categorical judgements typical of communists, to the effect that the reform is not being carried out the way it should at the moment. But who held them back from reforming in the way that was needed when they were in power? Maybe they did not realize that reforms were inevitable and urgently needed at the time. A party nomenklatura that has outlived its era but still hangs on is working in close alliance with out-and-out nationalists, and sometimes with fascists, too, as in Russia, and seeking to gain political capital out of the difficulties of life in many CIS countries, essentially by shifting all the hardships of the transition period onto the shoulders of the new authorities, We must speak clearly and frankly about this today.

They are actually no less responsible for these difficulties—to say the least—than the current authorities are. [passage omitted]

We must say with a sense of full responsibility that we made a grave mistake in our forecasts of the dynamics of crime. We showed unforgivable equanimity in estimating its destructive force.

Today it has become clear that the war on crime has become a main, paramount task of the state, and that there is a real question as to which side will come out on top. Not only can people simply not do their work; they cannot live their lives in a turgid atmosphere of fear for their property, for themselves, and for their children and relatives.

Corruption is assuming monstrous proportions as it penetrates into every branch of power—executive, legislative, judicial—and at all layers of it. Because of this the faith placed in the honesty and selflessness of quite a few democrats who were the first post-Soviet recruits, so to speak, has been undermined. Righteousness is not to be found among our opposition, either. There are quite a few cases of this, too.

It is natural, however, that it is much harder for those who are in power to stay clean in this regard. People who are hold an official post have more temptation and more opportunities to be drawn into corruption, particularly when the state is weak. Moral purity and a readiness to refuse privileges, to renounce money-grubbers and careerists, to keep those who infringe the moral standards away from one's own milieu, and to make lawbreakers accountable—that is the most valuable asset of a genuinely democratic state, which, unfortunately, we still do not have.

If virtuous acts are supplanted by robbery, democracy degenerates and dies, as the ancients said. [passage omitted]

The ideas I have just set out about the state of affairs in the republic's political life and on the prospects for the future, in particular the transition period through which Kyrgyzstan must pass, represent a context outside which it is hard to comprehend our proposals for amendments and additions to the Kyrgyz Constitution. These same ideas make it possible not only to solve problems relating to the shape of the constitutional amendments, but also to give a positive response on the expediency of such amendments—and this only a year and a half after the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan was adopted.

I stress this in view of the sharp and categorical accusations which certain opposition organizations have made against me, and in connection with the initiatives which are being pursued within the framework of the constitutional process, the constitutional reform. This criticism quintessentially consists of accusations about a certain constitutional, anti-democratic coup and a usurpation of power by the president.

With all due respect, any constitution is a document that is essentially secondary to real life. That is something we should not forget. It is natural, then, that serious changes in public life, changes which affect the major aspects of life, simply must be reflected in the constitution. The amount of time in which these changes have taken place—one and a half years after the constitution was adopted, one and a half decades, one and a half centuries—must not alter the heart of the matter. In the last 170 years France has adopted 15 new constitutions. Fifteen of them. [passage omitted]

As far as the usurpation of power by the president is concerned, I must declare at once to the Constitutional Assembly: Esteemed members of the Constitutional Assembly, in the proposed constitutional amendments the president's powers, in terms of his individual powers and in terms of his ability to fulfill some special interests of his own, are not only not strengthened but are even

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greatly weakened. We want to set things up in such a way that no one can come and take advantage of this post to establish an authoritarian rule over our people and our state, either now or in the future.

For this reason we have deliberately stipulated a reduction in the president's powers, just as we have with the Supreme Council .

For instance, under Article 72, Paragraph 1 in the Constitution the president is invested with the right of virtually all-embracing control over the government's work. It is proposed to drop this paragraph from the constitution, and in its place to stipulate the right of interpellation of the Assembly of People's Representatives; in other words its right to demand that the government provide an explanation of its domestic or foreign policy, or some specific issue.

Here is another example. Under Article 46, Paragraph 105, Point 1, the president can dissolve the Supreme Council ahead of term in line with the results of a nationwide referendum. And his hands are not tied by any specific need to provide justification here. He needs to provide no justifications. What we are proposing is to define these justifications in very restrictive terms. It thus follows that these are very important presidential powers as they affect the state.

We could cite a number of other examples, but essentially I think that we will start closely restricting the powers of the president in order to also restrict the powers of the Supreme Council, so that we can strengthen our executive authority, the government, and the judicial authorities. [passage omitted]

I have also said that it is my conviction that the people cannot be deprived of their natural right to be the only source of state power and the bearer of sovereignty, regardless of whether this is written into the constitution or not. This cannot be taken from the people any more than their name, the land they live on, and the language they think and speak in.

It is odd and surprising that this axiom of public life has not been grasped by some esteemed representatives of respected foreign states. I believe that a lack of proper information, and perhaps also deliberate misinformation, played a part here.

As far as the current phase of the constitution reform is concerned, we are pursuing it in strict accordance with Articles 96 and 97 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic. [passage omitted]

We may cite as an example the extremely unsuccessful way in which the constitution sets out the issue of confidence in the republic's government. Article 58, Paragraph 25. If my memory does not fail me, last December, the Supreme Council unsuccessfully tried to reach a common opinion on this count for two days. In consequence, the technical and legal negligence resulted in an unconstitutional decision on the resignation of the prime minister. A parliamentary scandal took place, with all its features, including the resignation of some respected peoples's deputies.

I would not like to seek scapegoats for a all these constitutional errors. The responsibility ultimately rests with me and with the Supreme Council. [passage omitted]

The proposed right of partial veto is a legal innovation. The current constitutional norm, laid down in Paragraphs 400 and 46, stipulates that the president has the right to approve or appeal against a draft law in toto, rather than individual articles of it.

This creates a number of serious problems, because sometimes a bill containing articles that run counter to the constitution has either to be approved or else appealed against in toto, because of one or two unconstitutional articles. Remember the nonsense that surrounded the veto on the agrarian code in July 1991. There was only one infringement in all the several hundred articles of that code. Just one. Yet the whole code was effectively torpedoed.

For this reason, giving the president the right to appeal against individual articles while approving a bill as a whole, in other words the right of partial, selective veto, would undoubtedly make this instrument more effective. Time can always be found to work with the Supreme Council one or two articles, to reach a consensus and arrive at a common denominator. But the law has to work, doesn't it?

The political responsibility of each independent chamber of the Supreme Council is a matter deserving of very serious attention. This should also be precisely defined in the constitution, as should the responsibilities of the government, courts and the president. At the moment, however, a clear imbalance between the responsibilities of the branches of power is apparent. Legislative authority, in the shape of the Supreme Council, is effectively beyond any kind of control, out of reach of the system of mutual obligations with other branches of power.

Bearing in mind the experience of the rest of the world, it is therefore proposed to establish specific grounds and procedures for dissolving the Legislative Assembly and the Assembly of People's Representatives.

If the Legislative Assembly repeatedly passes laws which violate the constitution of the Kyrgyz republic and human and civil rights and freedoms it can be dissolved by the president of the Kyrgyz Republic following a demand issued by the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic and confirmed by the conclusions of the supreme judicial office.

The Assembly of People's Representatives can be dissolved in two cases:

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First, if it thrice rejects the candidature for the post of prime minister which has been submitted to it;

Secondly, if within three months it repeatedly expresses no confidence in the government, provided that the first such no confidence decision by the chamber has been rejected by the president.

There is another point regarding the work of parliament which we cannot avoid mentioning. It answers questions which are currently on many people's minds: how will disagreements between the chambers be resolved? It is proposed that these disagreements should be resolved by the president with the help of all kinds of conciliation procedures. If an agreed solution is not reached the president may pass the resolution of the dispute for consideration by the Supreme Court, the decision of which will be final and not subject to appeal. It is the supreme judicial office.

Strengthening statehood and reinforcing state power in the conditions of the transition period presuppose improving the status of the government. Here I would like to speak in some more detail.

What we are talking about is expanding the government's powers, and more effective guarantees for its operations as an initiating force. Executive authority is inherently vertical, a hierarchical system in which the top is personified by the prime minister, the head of government. Without a strong prime minister invested with power and the freedom to exercise this power, including the freedom to form his government team; without a prime minister who assumes personal responsibility for the successes and failures of the whole system of executive power, we are unlikely to be successful in strengthening statehood, establishing order in the country and getting the country out of the economic crisis in the near future.

What happens at the moment? I think it would be no exaggeration to say that the prime minister has practically no rights in the face of parliament. He has no defense mechanisms against parliament. He is deprived of the opportunity to choose the members of the government in line with his principles. This is because a principle of triple control is at work here. In short, there are quite a few legal and political disparities with the principle of separation of power. In view of these circumstances the following proposals are being put forward:

The prime minister and the government headed by him are released from constant control exercised by the president.

The prime minister is appointed by the president with the consent of the Assembly of People's Representatives. As I have told you, if this chamber rejects the candidate who is nominated three times it will be dissolved by the president, and the president will appoint the prime minister without its consent. The executive authority has to work.

All the members of the government are appointed by the president on proposals of the prime minister and without coordination with the parliament. The premier must choose the team himself and should bear the responsibility, so that ministers will not say that they were chosen by parliament, and should be responsible primarily to the head of the government, the prime minister, and work as members of his team rather than pursue their own policy.

This does not at all mean that the government is entirely taken out of the control of parliament, in the shape of the Assembly of People's Representatives. I have already spoken about the powers of this chamber as a whole, and specifically as regards the government. I have no doubts that they are quite adequate and effective. The question is simply one of how to implement them sensibly and purposefully. [passage omitted]

Dzhumagulov-Led Delegation Departs for Paris

LD0712150394 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 0000 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On 6 December, a Kyrgyz Government delegation led by Prime Minister Abbas Dzhumagulov left for Paris. An international conference on private investment will take place tomorrow. The Kyrgyz Republic delegation will discuss a number of projects related to the agro-industrial complex, to restructuring plants, and to developing the textile industry. The conference was organized jointly by the IMF and banking organizations.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Addresses CSCE Summit in Budapest

LD0712132494 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1100 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Emomali Rakhmanov, president of Tajikistan, delivered a speech at the CSCE summit in Budapest.

In his speech he pointed out that during its three years of membership of the CSCE Tajikistan has faced tragic events. Thousands of people have been killed, tens of thousands have fled the country, and the national economy and government have been destroyed as a result of the disturbances. At the expense of many victims and as a result of the world community efforts and assistance, we have succeeded in putting an end to the civil war and stabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the country, he said.

Emomali Rakhmanov also spoke about very important events which have taken place in the Republic. The Tajik people have approved the Constitution and elected their president through a nationwide referendum and free elections. We are pursuing the path of constructing a democratic society and will not change our minds, he asserted.

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Recalling the present difficulties of the Republic, President Rakhmanov pointed out that the CSCE has to render more assistance and cooperate with the republics of the former Soviet Union. It is very important to make the role of the economic forum of the CSCE more efficient, to develop cooperation between the CSCE and the European Union, the UN economic commission in Europe, and other regional economic organizations, with the aim of attracting foreign investment and rendering assistance in resolving the issues of employment, privatization of property, and entrepreneurship.

Concluding his speech, President Rakhmanov thanked Hungarian President Arpad Goncz for providing the optimum conditions for the efficient and successful work of the summit.

Returns From CSCE Summit

LD0712151394 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A Tajikistani Government delegation led by President Emomali Rakhmanov returned to Dushanbe from Budapest today.

The president of our republic attended the summit of CSCE member states. We hope the head of state will hold a news conference and will speak in detail about the issues which were discussed at the summit.

Russian Servicemen Facing Islamic Movement

LD0712164594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1439 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tajikistan's Islamic Revival Movement is currently moving its units located in Afghanistan towards the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in the south of Tajikistan, Commander of Tajikistan Russian Border Guard Regiment Anatoliy Chechulin, announced in Dushanbe on Wednesday [7 December].

He said that "Tajik opposition militants, led by Chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement Sa'id Abdullo Nuri and commander-in-chief of the opposition forces Rizvon Sadirov, are planning a series of actions against Russian border guards and servicemen of Russia's 201st Motorized-Infantry Division on the eve of the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks to be held in Moscow in December."

Chechulin believes that the opposition intends "to provoke Russian servicemen into taking counter measures" and then to use the media and international organizations to blame the Russian contingent in Tajikistan and the republic's power ministries for foiling the fourth round of talks and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, signed in Tehran on September 17.

He announced that groups of militants were being concentrated in the Shurabad and Kalikhumb directions, particularly in the villages of Yalur, Shalshond and Tabagaybashan, located opposite the 12th Post of the Moskovskiy Border Guard Regiment, and the 1st and 4th posts of the Kalaykhumb Border Guard Regiment.

Chechulin warned that all attempts "to settle accounts with the Russian border guards are doomed." He also urged the leaders of the Islamic Revival Movement to observe the cease-fire agreement, noting that he has "reserved the right to resolutely suppress all armed provocations against Russian border guards in Tajikistan."

Decree Abolishes Ministries, Departments

LD0812121194 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1100 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan has issued a resolution on the implementation of a decree of the president of Tajikistan, which says:

With the aim of implementing the decree of the president of Tajikistan on 3 December 1994, no. 8 on approving the structure of the government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Council of Ministers decrees that the following ministries and departments are to be abolished as from 3 December 1994:

1. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Tajikistan.

2. The Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Tajikistan.

3. The Ministry of Press and Information of the Republic of Tajikistan.

4. The Ministry of Construction of the Republic of Tajikistan.

5. The Ministry of Trade and Material Resources of the Republic of Tajikistan.

6. The Ministry of Economy and Forecasting of the Republic of Tajikistan.

7. The State Committee of Radio and Television of the Republic of Tajikistan.

According to this resolution a number of committees and departments have been abolished.

The full text of this resolution will be published in the press.

Uzbekistan

India To Lend $10 Million for Joint Ventures

LD0712144094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1208 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Indian Government will lend Uzbekistan $10 million to form joint ventures, the

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Indian Embassy in Tashkent informed the Financial Information Agency Wednesday [7 December].

An embassy spokesman said that in keeping with the November 22 bilateral agreement signed in Delhi, the loan will be given for nine years at 7 percent annual interest. The formation of joint ventures will be promoted primarily in the production of medicines and small cement plants as well as in cotton processing.

According to the economic section of the embassy, Uzbekistan has registered 14 joint ventures with India, mostly in the production of consumer goods and medicines, hotels and other services.

In 1992 India also opened a credit line of $10 million to Uzbekistan for the formation of joint ventures. This money has already been used.

Karimov Previews Proposals for CSCE Summit

LD0512174694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1721 GMT 5 Dec 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovsky; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Uzbekistan, at the Budapest summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is going to suggest measures to stabilize the situation on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and ways to solve Central Asia's environmental problems.

"The essence and purpose of the CSCE is to defend the rights and freedoms of the individual, build a democratic society, help developing states build market economies, cooperate with international organizations and refrain from the arbitrary revision of borders," [President Islam] Karimov told reporters.

In a speech at the summit, the president is also going to propose reorganizing the CSCE, his office said.

The Uzbek leadership believes that the organization's efforts must be made more effective and that its decisions must be as mandatory as those of the United Nations, a source in the president's office told INTERFAX.

The CSCE "can and must be an organization consolidating regional stability" and resolving regional conflicts," but it "must also take into account local conditions and the national character of a state in which it operates," the source said.

Today the CSCE "uses the age-old democratic traditions of Europe as principles for dealing with all its members," he said.

Karimov Addresses CSCE Meeting

LD0712212694

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Russian at 1640 GMT on 7 December 94 carries an 11-minute recording of an address by President Islam Karimov's to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the forum's opening session in Budapest on 5 December. Karimov speaks in Russian.

He stresses the importance of the role which the CSCE could play in Central Asia, an area threatened by drugs, fundamentalism, and conflict. He chides CSCE members for attending only to European problems when Europe's security also depends on its fringes. The CSCE has non-European members, too, he says.

Karimov calls for outside help for Tajikistan and for the Aral Sea ecological problems.

On Uzbekistan, he says the country was going its own way and has its own specific mentality, but he says the CSCE could play a key part in fostering democracy in Central Asia.

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Armenia

Karabakh Intelligence on Azerbaijani Role in Chechnya

NC0812112794 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 0918 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to the Karabakh Intelligence Service, on December 6 a special battalion of the Azeri Army was dispatched from Agdam front-line to Baku, from where the battalion was sent to Chechnya to help Djohar Dudayev's Government. The Karabakh Press and Information Department, referring to well-informed sources in Stepanakert reports that the decision to dispatch the Azeri forces to Grozny was taken after the request by Azeri Clergy, which supported Dudayev's call for jihad (holy war) against Russians. According to the same source, it is not excluded that in case of further aggravating of the situation in Grozny, two more detachments of the Azeri Army will be dispatched from Aghdam and Fizuli front-lines to the Northern Caucasus.

ARF-Dashnaktsutiun: President Misrepresents Party

NC0712124394 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 0832 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On December 6 the member of the Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-[ARF]-Dashnaktsutiun Vahan Ohanesian and the member of Party's Central Committee Hrair Karapetian held a news conference in Yerevan.

ARF-Dashnaktsutiun's leaders presume that President Levon Ter-Petrosian and his team misrepresent party's stand on the issues, concerning economic reforms. In particular, certain persons are trying to convince Western and other diplomats that like Russia, in Armenia there is also strong opposition to economic reforms, but since there is no strong communist opposition the Armenian leadership thought it would be right that Dashnakstutiun played the role of political foe. Meanwhile, Dashnakstutiun is not against economic reforms and IMF's credits, but against the methods, according to which these credits are received, moreover, Dashnaktsutiun does not confide in the current leadership. It is natural that under created situation the activity of opposition, including Dashnaktsutiun has stepped up. President's denouncements of Dashnaktsutiun have become regular especially after his speech on June 29, 1992 (during this speech President announced about the expulsion of one of Dashnakstutiun's leaders, citizen of Greece Hrair Marukhian) and are repeated every time as the situation on front-line becomes stable. The fact is mentioned in the latest publications of the "HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTIUN" (the Armenian Supreme Council's daily), the "BANBER: (newspaper of Christian-Democratic Union), the "HNCHAK HAYASTANI" ("Hnchak" Social-Democratic Party's paper), etc.

Among those, who have been recently detained by the Armenian and Russian special agencies, there is the member of Dashnaktsutiun Hrant Markarian. All the efforts by Party's leadership to obtain any information from officials of the Armenian Prosecutor's Office, Head of the Armenian National Security Department Vazgen Sarkisian have failed. The Acting Head of the Armenian State National Security Department Davit Shahnazarian openly refused to meet with the Chairman of Parliamentary Commission on Juridical Issues, member of Dashnaktsutiun Kim Balayan. According to Vahan Ohanesian, the Armenian authorities are always ready to frame criminal case against their political foes, and Vahan Avakian's case is the best example of it. Party's leadership is concerned that current leadership will start persecution of the leaders of ARF-Dashnakstutiun. To firm up this statement Hrant Karapetian mentioned "a striking", as he characterized it, intention by the Armenian Prosecutor's Office, which is trying to gain an arrest warrant for the parliament member Pavel Giurdjian from the Armenian Supreme Council. It is worth mentioning that Pavel Giurdjian has been fighting in Mountainous Karabakh for 4 years.

Speaking on Ashot Abrahamian's case (Ashot Abrahamian is the former Chairman of the Union of Armenian Cooperators, and also a former member of Dashnakstutiun) and accusations, brought against him in an article published in the "BANBER", the leaders of ARF-Dashnaktsutiun stressed that the facts described in an article did not correspond to the reality and Ashot Abrahamian during the confrontation denied that he testified against the Party.

As to the adoption of a new Constitution and the work carried out in this regard, Ohanesian said: "According to our President's New Year resolutions in 25 days we will have a new Constitution, the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant will resume operating, and peace will come to Mountainous Karabakh." He also added that Dashnaktsutiun was ready to compromise with the authorities on the issue of adoption of a new Constitution.

Karapetian and Ohanesian stated that their Party will push for resignation of the current leadership and its expulsion from political scene. Therefore, the Party attaches great importance to the rally of the opposition bloc "Alliance of National Accord" scheduled on December 9. In case of leadership's mass pressure on opposition, the party will appeal to the people with the call to protect democracy.

Azerbaijan

President Aliyev's Return to Baku Reported

NC0712183894 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President Geydar Aliyev returned from Budapest to Baku today. Chairman of the

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National Assembly Rasul Guliyev, Acting Prime Minister Fuat Guliyev, and other officials welcomed him at the airport.

Law on Ratification of Oil Contract Published

NC0712211594 Baku TURAN in English 1335 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, December 7 (TURAN)—The text of law on adoption, approval and permission for realization of the contract between SOCAR and the consortium about joint development of oil-fields "Azeri", "Chirag" and "Guneshli" and distribution of shares in the contract, has been published in press.

The law reads:

1. The Milli Mejlis adopts and approves the contract and permits to carry it out;

2. The document of the Cabinet from 15.11.94 on governmental guarantees and commitments is adopted, approved and permitted for realization;

3. The contract and document on governmental guarantees and commitments acquire the status of the law and for the duration of the contract they will have priority over the standings of the law, which will be adopted in the future and contradicting the terms of the contract.

4. All earlier adopted agreements, contracts on any part of the contracted square, are to be considered invalid while foreign members of the contract are given an exclusive right to conduct oil-gas operation in the contracted square;

5. The Cabinet, Ministries, state committees, Senior Managements and other state bodies provide participants of the contract with licenses, customs permissions, visas and other sanctions and powers;

6. Any amendments and addenda or abrogation of the present contract are valid only on condition of being made in written form and signed by all parties;

7. The law enters into force on the date of it signing.

The Law is signed by President Aliyev on December 2, 1994.

Georgia

Report To Parliament on CSCE Summit

LD0712180894 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1351 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no dateline as received]—At a session of the Georgian Supreme Council today, Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze presented deputies with a short report on the results of the Budapest meeting of CSCE heads of state. He said that participants in the forum had adopted a political declaration outlining prospects for further sociopolitical and socioeconomic development across the Eurasian expanse, and the role and importance of the CSCE in developing integrational processes and protecting the security of its member states. He said that a new model for such protection would be worked out and presented to the CSCE for examination.

Mr. Shevardnadze stressed that the main document adopted at the meeting takes special note of the Georgian issue. The document recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia, expresses concern about the unlawful steps taken recently by the Abkhaz separatists, and strongly condemns the policy of ethnic cleansing pursued by the Gudauta clique against the Georgian population.

The Georgian leader also noted a favorable reaction from participants in the meeting to the positive developments in the settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, who had reaffirmed their support for the sides' efforts to solve this problem by peaceful means.

Eduard Shevardnadze also reported that it had emerged in the course of the Budapest summit that several members of the CIS were planning to issue statements containing the appropriate assessment of the unlawful actions by the Abkhaz separatists and expressing support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and the inviolability of its borders.

The Georgian leader went on to express deep sorrow in connection with the tragic death of Giorgi Chanturia. He said that all relevant structures in the Republic were involved in investigating the crime, and those who were guilty of it would be named. Eduard Shevardnadze called on the deputies not to allow further confrontation and to refrain from making hasty accusations and demands for the resignation of any official.

After delivering his report, Eduard Shevardnadze answered deputies' questions.

Parliament Calls For Government Resignation

LD0712150894 Tbilisi SAKINFORM in Russian 0930 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Georgian Parliament session on 7 December continued to debate the Georgian Government's resignation due to its inability to run the country and because its staying in power may cause chaos in the state. Especially strong demands for the government's resignation came from representatives of the parliamentary opposition.

Yesterday, such demands were made by representatives of the National Democratic Party, whose leader, Giorgi Chanturia, was brutally killed on Saturday [3 December].

Parliament also demanded that the chairman of the Control Chamber deliver a report on the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers. The session began to hear reports from members of the Cabinet of Ministers. The first report was delivered by Economics Minister Vladimer Papava.

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Estonia

Meri Surprised by Yeltsin's Criticisms at CSCE

LD0612125294 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0700 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Estonian President Lennart Meri made a speech at the CSCE summit in Budapest yesterday. Marianne Mikko reports:

[Mikko] Estonian President Lennart Meri made a speech at the CSCE summit yesterday. The participants eagerly waited to hear how the Estonian president would reply to Boris Yeltsin's accusations—whether he would avoid the issue of persecution of Orthodox Christians or would vigorously defend Estonia's policy. Although Lennart Meri's speech did contain a response to the Russian president's accusations, the Estonian president spoke mainly about the positive influence of the CSCE on the security of both Europe and Estonia. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the security of Europe, Lennart Meri also praised cooperation with the Council of Europe and the United Nations. He also spoke about the pact on stability in Europe and NATO. I quote: The expansion of NATO should be accepted like the CSCE's role in preventive diplomacy. Therefore we warmly welcome the decision made by the North Atlantic Council of Ministers last week to begin working out membership requirements for states which wish to join NATO, unquote.

Finally, President Meri spoke about peacekeeping, where Estonia shares the view that international peacekeeping forces should be sent to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Listeners are, of course, keen to know how the Estonian president replied to the Russian president. Lennart Meri expressed deep surprise about Boris Yeltsin's critical view. Touching on the fact that the Estonian Orthodox Church was subordinated to Moscow at the beginning of the Soviet era, Meri emphasized that the issues of subordination of congregations must be decided by the members of the congregations and not by the politicians; this delicate issue should not be used in a propagandist way.

President: Estonia Has No Territorial Claims

LD0612132194 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0800 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President Lennart Meri met with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson in Budapest yesterday. The presidential press service reports that they discussed border issues, and Lennart Meri emphasized the need for Russia's recognition of the [1920] Tartu peace treaty. President Meri said Estonia wants to prove that it has no territorial claims against any neighbor state. Meri stated that the stability of areas close to Estonia is being promoted by a good-neighborly cooperation policy with St. Petersburg. The meeting between Lennart Meri and Ingvar Carlsson also discussed issues relating to the Estonia ferry catastrophe and preserving the memory of the victims.

President Lennart Meri also met with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari last night. Their discussion focused on setting up a visa-free regime between Estonia and Finland.

President Satisfied With CSCE Final Document

WS0712101794 Tallinn ETA in English 0758 GMT 7 Dec 94

[From 7 Dec HOMMIKULEHT, POSTIMEES, p. 1; "News Bulletin" No. 239/94]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The CSCE meeting was successful for Estonia, President Lennart Meri commented to the POSTIMEES on Tuesday [6 December]. Estonia achieved its aims at the conference, he said. The president added that the conference also revealed the abilities and limitations of the institution. "It is reality that real blood is shed a couple of hundred kilometres from Budapest," the president stressed. Foreign Minister Juri Luik also expressed his satisfaction with the final document section on the Baltic region. The CSCE conference welcomed the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic states. Delegation member Vaino Reinart admitted that compromise had to be made in the wording of the declaration (the Russian delegation initially objected to the "welcoming" part). Luik was also satisfied with the statement on the success of the CSCE mission to Estonia and the recommendation that its activities should be extended to other countries of the region. "This is a direct reference to Russia," Luik said. The summit demonstrated that the CSCE is efficient as a tool for avoiding conflicts, but inefficient in the handling of already existing ones, he stressed.

Latvia

Gailis on Baltic Context of Russian Withdrawal

LD0712202394 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis said today the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia has great significance for maintaining peace and security in the Baltic region, Europe, and the world. Gailis was speaking on behalf of all the three Baltic participants at the 49th session of the UN General Assembly. The prime minister thanked the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and individual countries for their support in reaching this aim.

However, it is necessary to continue to monitor the implementation of the agreements on army withdrawal which also involve, in this work, international organizations. It particularly applies to the agreement between

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Latvia and Russia on the legal status of the Skrunde radar station during the time of its temporary functioning and dismantling.

Gailis also reported that Russian military personnel discharged in Latvia and Estonia are still there in breach of agreements. Commenting on Russian military transit through Lithuania, Gailis expressed the view that it should take place taking account of the norms of the national legislation and international law. It is also necessary to tackle in the future the (?issue of) compensation for the environmental damage done by the Russian army.

Ulmanis Admits to National Minority Problem

LD0712200394 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis and Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas met Czech President Vaclav Havel in Prague today and discussed problems of security. A decision on a meeting between the heads of the Visegrad states and the Baltic states to consider the possibility of cooperation aimed at tackling problems of security has not been taken nonetheless. Havel does not support this Brazauskas's initiative for the time being because he believes that it is currently more important to tackle issues of economic cooperation.

Latvian President Ulmanis after the meeting stated that Latvia considers joining NATO the main guarantee of its security, but at the same time he added that NATO expansion to the Russian borders was a very delicate question. Latvia wants good neighborly relations with both the Czech Republic and Russia. But Ulmanis also admitted that a problem of national minorities existed in Latvia. Latvian residents of Russian nationality has the choice—for those who wish, to help return to homeland [as received], but the rest—Latvian society will try to assimilate them.

Brazauskas for his part stated that the main problem in relations between Lithuania and Russia was demilitarization of Kaliningrad region and Russian military transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad.

President Address CSCE, Calls Bosnia a 'Failure'

WS0712100594 Tallinn BNS in English 1805 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Hungary, Dec 06, BNS—Latvia supports the expansion on regional cooperation in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Baltic nation's President Guntis Ulmanis told the CSCE summit in Budapest Tuesday [6 December].

The cooperation should focus on promoting mutual confidence and observing armament control regimes as there are "broad chances to apply the comprehensive potential of the CSCE," he said.

Speaking on Latvian-Russian relations, Ulmanis said that the security organization played a role in monitoring the Russian-operated radar station at Skrunda in Latvia and tackling humanitarian and social problems of the Russian troop withdrawal.

The Latvian foreign policies are based on "Europe as a community of democracy, freedom and market economy without any new political boundaries," Ulmanis said.

"Each nation of Europe is entitled to a free choice of its cooperation partners and security guarantees," he said.

"That's why Latvia joins the countries that categorically reject any attempts to block the implementation of policies that correspond to national interests of states," Ulmanis noted.

Latvia praises the decision to create an international peacekeeping force to ease tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh as a new important step in the CSCE activities. Peacekeepers in third countries should staunchly abide by the CSCE norms and principles, and stick to the safety and security interests of Europe, the president added. The CSCE member countries should follow up their commitments in all spheres of CSCE activities.

The body's decisions are not legally binding to its members and that's why part of its attempts to prevent crises and regulate conflicts fail, Ulmanis said.

Ulmanis described the Bosnian crisis as the greatest failure of the CSCE and urged its member countries to "mobilize their political and military resources to restrain the aggressor and check the suffering of the Bosnian people."

Lithuania

President on NATO Expansion, Russian Relations

AU0712192694 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Dec 94 p 4

[Interview with President Algirdas Brazauskas by Miklos Ritecz; place and date not given: "NATO's Expansion Is a Long Process"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Partly due to his country's geopolitical situation, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas paid special attention to the Russian delegation's statements at the CSCE summit in Budapest. He gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG on this issue.

[Ritecz] What are your views on Boris Yeltsin's speech in which he voiced his reservations in connection with NATO's extension?

[Brazauskas] This is not the first time I have heard this view from Moscow. Naturally, Russian diplomacy also

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has a right to have its own views. However, I cannot agree with Yeltsin in that the eastern extension would lead to Russia's isolation and Moscow would in this case be left out of the world processes. The Russians have also signed the Partnership for Peace—what is the problem then? The extension will be a result of a long process, anyway, while NATO itself will also undergo changes. I do not believe that it will continue to fulfill a military and defense role as it did during the Cold War. NATO's conflict-prevention and conciliatory role will obviously come to the forefront. Nowadays, no one is considering the possibility of a third world war. The problems created by nationalism, and religious and historic antagonism have to be solved at the moment.

[Ritecz] Tensions can be seen in the relations of the Baltic countries—including Lithuania—and Moscow even today. How do you handle these?

[Brazauskas] We tried to resolve the fundamental issues in agreements. However, we still have not reached an agreement on the issue of the Russian military deliveries transported from Kaliningrad via Lithuania to Russia. Russia has not yet accepted our conditions, and negotiations are under way.

[Ritecz] To what extent can Russia exert economic pressure on you? The Lithuanian economy was based on the Soviet Union's economy for years.

[Brazauskas] I feel that we are economically independent. We can pay for practically all the goods that we purchase from the states of the former Soviet Union.

[Ritecz] The problems of national minorities is a source of tension for the whole Eastern European region. Many people of Russian and Polish origin live in Lithuania. They are dissatisfied in many respects....

[Brazauskas] I cannot see any reason for dissatisfaction. We pay attention to the problems of the Poles and Russians in Lithuania: A special state office deals with them, laws regulate their rights, and they have educational establishments and their own school books. Those people who had requested citizenship were awarded it. We did not set impossible conditions.

Brazauskas on NATO, EU, Russia, Other Issues

BR0512143294 Rome L'INFORMAZIONE in Italian 3 Dec 94 p 15

[Interview with President Algirdas Brazauskas by Gian Franco Svidercoschi in Rome; date not given: "Vilnius Hopes in the West"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Svidercoschi] Is Lithuania's national sovereignty in danger at the moment? There is talk of recurrent leanings in Russian circles, particularly military circles, in the direction of a new pan-Slavic expansionism...

[Brazauskas] Pan-Slavism has been, and still is, a temptation. As we are neighbors of Russia, we are fully familiar with both the country's stronger points and its weaker ones. But at the present moment—while the reforms are being implemented in Russia and profound changes are occurring in Europe and the world—I do not think that Pan-Slavism is a real danger. However, the West's ability to involve Russia in cooperation at the international level represents one of the conditions for stifling expansionist temptations.

[Svidercoschi] And what about relations with the West?

[Brazauskas] We are receiving continuous aid from the northern European countries under the PHARE [Poland-Hungary Aid for Economic Restructuring] program. If there is no hope of a "Marshall Plan" such as I mentioned at the United Nations, investment and loans are what we really need now.

[Svidercoschi] Are there prospects of your becoming a member of the European Union? And what about NATO?

[Brazauskas] Yes, I have more than mere hopes. We have signed a free trade agreement with the EU this year. We hope to become associate members of the EU next year and, around the year 2000, full members. Moreover, the Partnership for Peace program and the creation of a peace force are bringing us closer to NATO.

[Svidercoschi] They say that the old nomenklatura is in command in Lithuania...

[Brazauskas] Power is in the hands of the democratically elected parliament and the president elected, for the first time in Lithuanian history, by universal suffrage. Of course, conditions typical of a transitional period still prevail, but the government's strategy is to strengthen the free market and to foster the growth of an intermediate class, regardless of its curriculum vitae.

[Svidercoschi] The fact remains, however, that, despite political change, Lithuania continues to suffer from an extremely grave social and economic crisis.

[Brazauskas] The situation is not an easy one, although we have managed to avoid falling into an abyss. Past governments have made mistakes, and the present government is not infallible either. Nevertheless, we have succeeded in stabilizing the currency, and we have achieved one of the highest levels of privatization in central and eastern Europe.

[Svidercoschi] Archbishop Backis recently wrote: "Lithuania is no longer a Catholic country. Communism has overwhelmed it."

[Brazauskas] Compared with many other countries, Lithuania is a deeply Catholic country, with 95 percent of Lithuanians baptized and a very large number of practising Catholics. I hope that the church, which fought for independence before, will now become a pacifying force. I believe that the church's condemnation of social discrimination, unbridled market materialism,

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and the mass culture will help us to cast off the yoke imposed by a system of lies.

[Svidercoschi] In which direction will the future of Lithuania be played out: toward the East or toward the West?

[Brazauskas] We see our future inside the European Community, as part of a united Europe. Our integration into the European structures will be easier if it is not accompanied by East-West antagonism.

[Svidercoschi] And will Lithania succeed in performing the role that geography has assigned it, that of a European "bridge" between east and west?

[Brazauskas] Yes, we want to be a country of transit, all the more so because the geopolitical situation is in our favor in this respect. In a Europe made up of nations that cooperate with one another, and not divided by a Cold War mentality, we take crossroads countries such as Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, and Belgium as our role models.

Brazauskas Advocates Closer Ties Between CSCE, UN

LD0512223394 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2000 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In his speech delivered at the Budapest summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas (?stressed) that Europe can and must become a continent of stable security.

Lithuania's foreign policy is based on the principle of expanding good-neighborly relations, Mr. Brazauskas said, adding that Lithuania and Poland have already concluded a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. A similar agreement is expected to be signed with Belarus in the near future.

According to Mr. Brazauskas, there do not exist ethnic minority or border problems between Lithuania and Russia. Lithuania was oriented (?toward a vigilant) stand of (?a) democratic state and supported the democratic processes in Russia, Mr. Brazauskas said.

He expressed regret that for the past 12 months Russia had been trading with Lithuania on the basis of the least favorable (?regime), thus violating the GATT principles, although both countries wish to join the World Trade Organization.

Mr. Brazauskas also emphasized that after Lithuania signs an associate agreement with the European Union, it will be able to develop internal [as heard] cooperation with Central European countries.

According to the Lithuanian president, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would increase its efficiency, especially in the field of peacekeeping, if it established closer contacts with the United Nations. The CSCE could become a special regional structure to discuss and resolve problems of European security and stability with an active participation by the United States and Canada.

Prime Minister on Foreign Policy Objectives

LD0712190194 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius viewed Lithuanian foreign policy in his regular radio broadcast today. Questions by the listeners were also answered by Albinas Januska, secretary of the Foreign Ministry, .

Speaking of the strategy of Lithuanian foreign policy, the prime minister stressed that it must be universal. It is impossible to categorically claim that an orientation to the East or to the West is taking place. The whole foreign policy is equally important, Slezevicius said.

According to the prime minister, Lithuania has been striving in an active manner to join European economic and defense structures. An important step in this direction will be taken in the first half of next year. It is expected that Lithuania's agreement with the European Union on associated membership will be signed then.

The prime minister also stressed that it was important to maintain good relations with Russia and other eastern neighbors. Speaking of military transit to the Kaliningrad region, the prime minister reminded that an agreement on military transit with Russia has not been signed. The Lithuanian government has endorsed rules of the transit of hazardous and military cargoes through the territory of Lithuania by foreign states. They will come into force on 1 January next year and will be binding for all states.

Meanwhile, Slezevicius said the issue of compensation for an alleged damage during the transportation of such cargoes is not within the competence of a single state. It is impossible with our legal act to oblige the institutions of another state to compensate for damage inflicted by them. Therefore this issue would be best dealt with by a bilateral agreement, claimed the prime minister.

Commenting on Lithuania's relations with NATO, Januska said that the individual program of Partnership for Peace, signed recently, was an essential but insufficient step toward full NATO membership. He reminded that from 23 states which joined the Partnership for Peace program only nine have signed the so called individual membership program. Lithuania is so far the only Baltic state to do this.

Slezevicius expressed satisfaction that the NATO countries, in spite of Russian objections, confirmed that the NATO expansion program would be continued.

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Ignalina Security Increased After Chechen Threat

LD0812115894 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Additional security measures have been in effect since yesterday evening [7 December] at the Ignalina nuclear power station against a possible Chechnyan sabotage.

Gennadiy Negrivoda, chief engineer at the station, said in an interview with BNS yesterday that he had received a warning from the Ministry of Power Engineering about possible attacks by the Chechnyans. The station's personnel have been advised to be more vigilant and pay attention to strangers in the area of the station. The battalion protecting the plant has received similar instructions from its leadership and introduced stricter control over permits.

Negrivoda, who is temporarily replacing Viktor Shevaldin, the director of the Ignalina nuclear power station, who is on a duty visit to Sweden, told a BNS correspondent that he had observed stricter security measures going to work this morning.

LIETUVOS RYTAS has reported that the U.S. State Department advised the Lithuanian Government to increase protection at the plant. According to the U.S. special services, Chechen President Dudayev had given instructions to attack Russian nuclear power stations. National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius confirmed to the newspaper that such a warning had been received.

The station's chief engineer told a BNS correspondent that maybe the Chechnyans are not familiar with geography, but it is essential to take heed of such warnings. [passage omitted]

Two Deputies Try to Mediate in Chechen Conflict

LD0612194394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1849 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Two members of the Lithuanian Seimas (parliament), leader of the Center Union Romualdas Ozolas and member of the opposition Christian Democratic Party Algirdas Patackas, have arrived in Moscow to try to mediate in the Chechen conflict, Algirdas Endriukaitis, member of the Lithuanian parliament's group on links with Chechnya, told Interfax in Vilnius Tuesday [6 December].

Endriukaitis said that the two MPs will were met with their Russian counterparts and negotiated with Ingush President Ruslan Aushev on the Chechen issue.

Endriukaitis added that Lithuania was prepared to send its representatives to Groznyy but the Russian Foreign Ministry banned this.

The Seimas adopted a statement on December 1 calling for an immediate end to the bloodshed and resolution of issues through peaceful means in Chechnya.

The Seimas asked the Russian parliament to take steps to put an end to the armed conflict in Chechnya through negotiations and to have international observers sent to Chechnya.

Seimas Members Meet Ingush Republic President

LD0612192694 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Seimas members Algirdas Patackas and Romualdas Ozolas met with Ruslan Aushev, president of the Republic of Ingushetia, in Moscow today, ELTA was informed by Algirdas Endriukaitis, chairman of the Lithuanian-Chechnya group of interparliamentary relations.

Their trip has been organized on the initiative of the above mentioned group with the approval of the Seimas Board. The parliamentarians are responding with this visit to the request by Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev, and Parliament Chairman Akhyad Idigov, to the decision by the Seimas foreign affairs committee to send two, third observers of human rights to Chechnya. In addition, they respond to the statements by this committee and the Seimas [as heard].

Seimas member Patackas informed the leader of the Seimas right-wing opposition, Vytautas Landsbergis, on the telephone today that the delegates should, at the invitation of the Chechnya president, and with assistance of Yevgeniy Yavlinskiy, deputy of the Russian State Duma, who is Chechnya, leave Moscow by air at 2000 hours today for Chechnya to mediate in negotiations on the return of Russian prisoners of war in that country and the establishment of conditions for a dialogue between Russia and Chechnya.

Seimas member Endriukaitis says in his statement that the Russian Foreign Ministry has issued instructions not to grant permits to go to Chechnya. He also says that Russian parliamentarians, who arrived in Ingushetia by air, were taken by bus to Groznyy today, and other passengers were sent back to Moscow.

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